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ABSTRACT
Does Foundational ism Work?
(September, 1982)
Timm Triplett, B.A.
,
Antioch College
M.A., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Gareth Matthews
Chapter I: The tenets essential to any foundationalist theory
are stated. These tenets make reference to the concept of a basic
proposition. Literature discussing and attempting to define this con-
cept is surveyed and assessed.
Chapter II: The definitions surveyed are seen to make use of
the concept of epistemic justification. Two senses of justification-
external and internal are distinguished and discussed. A definition
of basic propositions is offered using the external sense of
justification.
Chapter III: A variety of theories, all satisfying the essen-
tial tenets of foundationalism, are distinguished. Special attention
is given to Cartesian foundationalism and its relation to the other
theories distinguished. Something is said about the motivation for
accepting Cartesian foundationalism.
Chapter IV: A variety of criticisms of foundationalism are
assessed from the point of view of determining whether they are suc-
cessful against Cartesian foundationalism. It is shown that many cri-
ticisms are directed against tenets associated with but not essential
X
to Cartesian foundationalism. Other criticisms attack Cartesian foun-
dationalism more directly, but are shown to be unsuccessful.
Chapter V: Critics allege that Cartesian foundationalism
requires the existence of "the given" and that either the given does
not exist or it cannot provide the foundation for knowledge that the
Cartesian foundationalist requires of it. The arguments of these cri-
tics are assessed. It is concluded that they too are unsuccessful.
Chapter VI: Chisholm's version of Cartesian foundationalism
is assessed. It is found to be unsatisfactory in its attempt to
establish a bridging principle that would state the conditions under
which a basic proposition justifies a nonbasic proposition.
Chapter VII: After considering some criticisms by Pollack
pertinent to establishing foundationalist principles, a revision of
one of Chisholm's bridging principles is formulated and discussed. It
is concluded that the revised principle can serve as a plausible com-
ponent of a Cartesian foundationalist theory. No complete theory is
developed, but directions are suggested for future work.
XI
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CHAPTER I
WHAT IS FOUNDATIONALISM? I: BASIC PROPOSITIONS
I shall begin with a general characterization of
f oundationalism. A more precise characterization requires a defini-
tion of "basic proposition," and this leads, in the present chapter,
to a survey of the literature attempting such a definition.
The Essence of Foundationalism
Two tenets are common to all forms of foundationalism:
^
EFl: There are basic propositions.
EF2: Any justified empirical proposition is either basic or
derives its justification, at least in part, from the
fact that it stands in an appropriate relation to
propositions which are basic.
On the foundationalist account, justified propositions are hlerarchi
cally structured. Lower level or basic propositions are self-
justified; they do not require Independent justification. And every
other justified proposition is tied in to the structure supported by
these foundational propositions in that at least part of its justifi
cation derives from one or more basic propositions. It thus forms
part of the higher level of this epistemic structure, and requires
support from the propositions at the foundations.
Contrast with Coherentism
Coherentism opposes both these central tenets of
foundationalism. Negatively, it denies the existence of basic
1
2propositions, and it denies the hierarchical structure of knowledge
posited by foundationalisra. Positively, it holds, first, that every
empirical proposition is in principle liable to the requirement that
it be given independent justification, even if in some contexts justi-
fication of that proposition is not needed or called for. (As we
shall see, some moderate foundationalists accept this tenet as well,
although it has traditionally been associated with coherentism
.
)
Second, and more distinctively, coherentism maintains that what justi-
fies a proposition for an individual is its coherence with the set of
propositions believed by that individual.
2
Aim of this Work
The above descriptions of foundationallsm and coherentism— the
two major competing theories about the structure of episteraic
justification are serviceable as first approximations. They are
obviously not precise or self-sufficient. Many questions remain for
further clarification: What are basic propositions? Just what rela-
tion do they bear to nonbasic ones? What is meant by the coherence
of a set of propositions, and how and to what extent does coherence
work to confer justification? Are there degrees of coherence?
My purpose in this work is to introduce more clarity into the
notion of a foundationalist theory of knowledge, to defend a version
of this theory which I shall call Cartesian foundationalisra against
both traditional and more recent criticisms that have been levelled
against it, and to present at least the fundamentals of a plausible
3version of Cartesian foundationalisra. This latter task will be based
closely on the work of Roderick Chisholm. A precise description and
evaluation of coherentism is left to another and more sympathetic
philosopher. My purpose is not to compare and evaluate foundational-
ism versus coherentism, but rather to get clearer about what sort of
theory the former is and to carry on Chisholm's work of attempting to
formulate a workable I'd better not say "coherent"—version of it.
The characterization of foundationalism above leaves us with
two obvious questions: \^at are basic propositions, and just what is
the epistemic relation they bear to nonbasic ones? The first question
will be answered in the following chapter, where I offer a definition
of the concept of a basic proposition. A partial answer to the second
question is reserved for the last chapter.
Basic Propositions in the Literature
I shall first present some of the definitions of basic propo-
sitions that can be found in the literature.^ For the moment I shall
exclude Roderick Chisholm’s definition, which is the starting point
for the definition to be developed in Chapter II.
The first definitions I shall consider are useful in providing
an Intuitive notion of the concept of a basic proposition. But they
mention Important epistemic relations which themselves need to be
clarified, and when attempts are made to do so (by Cornman and Pastin)
difficulties emerge, as I shall show. Other definitions to be con-
sidered are often unclear or include specific conditions that many
4foundationalists would not accept as necessary or even appropriate
conditions for a basic proposition. An adequate definition should be
one which (i) provides a clear sense of how to distinguish a basic
from a nonbasic proposition, (ii) provides an understanding or explan-
ation of the concept of a basic proposition, and (iii) does not in-
clude conditions in the definition which are extraneous, inessential,
or applicable only to certain forms of foundational ism.
There is a certain tension between the first and third of
these criteria, for different foundationalists hold different views
about which propositions are to count as basic. For example,
Cartesian foundationalists wish to restrict basic propositions to
those about a subject's mental states—his sensations, beliefs,
memories, etc. Other foundationalists would include among basic pro-
positions ordinary propositions about the external world. Still
others would insist that the fundamental propositions of scientific
theory are basic, or at least have the possibility of becoming basic.
Given such differences, then, a definition which clearly and precisely
categorizes a certain type of proposition as basic will tend to run
afoul of the third criterion. Certain foundationalists will object to
that type of proposition as basic and will regard the defining con-
ditions which determine this classification as inappropriate or
incorrect. It would thus be very difficult, if not impossible, to
provide a definition which fully satisfies all three criteria. The
one I shall propose fulfills (i) more fully than (iii). However, it
does not, I believe, violate (iii) as seriously as the other defini-
5tions considered here which are vulnerable to this problem.
Basic propositions are not always so called. Among the works
to be cited we will also find them designated "self-presenting states
of affairs, first cognitions," "self-evident beliefs," and "self-
warranted beliefs. Unless there is specific evidence to the con-
trary, I shall assume that the different terms are being used to
elucidate the same fundamental concept.
General Characterizations
These accounts are all right as far as they go—they give us
an initial intuitive idea of the concept in question. But they suf-
fice only as general characterizations. They contain crucial epis—
temic terms which are themselves undiscussed and undefined, and thus
they have only limited use in helping us understand and distinguish
basic propositions. The accounts of this type noted here are all
similar in emphasizing the self- justifying nature attributed to basic
propositions and the claim that such propositions do not need indepen-
dent justification or reasons in order to be justified. Thus Michael
Williams
:
Let us, provisionally, define epistemically basic beliefs to
be beliefs on the basis of which other beliefs are justified
but which do not themselves require justification. We can say
that such beliefs are intrinsically credible.
(Williams, 1977, p. 61)
David Annis:
Basic statements have at least some degree of justification
independent of the support such statements may derive from
6other statements.
(Annis, 1978, p. 213, cf . also Annis, 1977, p. 349)
and John Pollack:
(EB) P is an epistemologically basic proposition relative to aperson S iff it is logically possible for S to justifiably
believe P without having any reason for believing P.
(Pollock, 1979, pp. 93-94)
As Pollock himself notes (p. 94), "this is a bit vague without an
account of what it is to have a reason for believing a proposition."
For Williams' part, he would need to specify what it is for a belief
to be justified without requiring justification. As for Annis, he
would need to tell us what it is for a statement to have justification
independent of the support of other statements.
Note that Williams' definition seems to imply that it is
beliefs which are basic. This is a matter of contention. Several
foundationalist theories maintain, for example, that it is not only a
subject's beliefs, but also his experiences, which are basic for him.
Hence it would be better to give a definition that does not commit us
to the view that whatever is basic is a subject's beliefs. A defini-
tion in terms of basic propositions
,
rather than beliefs, would always
allow us to add a clause to the effect that the proposition must be
believed by someone in order to be basic for that person, if further
consideration would reveal this to be the case.
7Incomplete Definitions
Before we discuss definitions which apparently attempt to pro-
vide relatively complete and adequate characterizations of basic
propositions, it is well to say something about the discussions of
basic propositions by William Alston and Brian Skyrms, for these
discussions are quite extensive and detailed. However, neither of
their definitions can be considered complete and satisfactory from the
point of view of explicating foundationalism. It does not appear to
have been the Intent of either philosopher to provide such explica-
tion, these definitions were given merely as necessary steps to other
goals
.
In "Self-Warrant: A Neglected Form of Privileged Access,"
Alston offers the following remarks and definitions in a discussion of
"self-warranted" beliefs:
(2) Belief b is self-warranted =df b is warranted just by
virtue of being b (being b is sufficient for b’s being
warranted )
.
(Alston, 1976b, p. 257)
Alston fills this out with a "more illuminating" remark:
... a belief will be self-warranted ... by virtue of some
of its features rather than others. If my belief that I am
now feeling tired is self-warranted, it is not by virtue of
its being a belief about a psychological state or even about a
[conscious state] (not all such beliefs are self-warranted),
but by virtue of its being a belief of a certain person that
he is currently in a^ certain [conscious state]
.
(Ibid., pp. 257-258)
Alston then develops his definition as follows:
8O) Belief b is self-warranted =df b belongs to a type ofbeliefs, K, such that any K is warranted just by virtue ofbeing a K.
(Ibid., p. 258)
and
:
(4) Beliefs of type K are self-warranted =df Any belief of
type K is warranted just by virtue of being a belief of type
K •
(Ibid.)
Alston notes that to avoid triviality we must observe certain
restrictions in our choice of types." But he does not go on to state
what these restrictions might be. Hence, his definition is, from the
viewpoint of an explication of the concept of self-warranted beliefs,
incomplete as formulated. However, his aim here is not to give an
adequate definition of self-warranted beliefs; it is rather to show in
what sense the specific types of beliefs he classes as self—warranted
are privileged-access beliefs.
Skyrms’ "The Explication of 'X Knows that P’" includes the
following definition and explicating comment:
(A) Conditions for Basic Knowledge
(1) 'p’ R X
(2) X believes that p, and his belief is not
based on evidence.
(3) ’p' is true.
However, it is by no means clear that there is an appropriate
relation R that defines a class of basic statements for each
person such that the conditions of (A) formulate a sufficient
condition for knowledge and the entire definition formulates a
necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge . . . And
among philosophers who hold that there is such a relation and
only one, there is no general agreement as to what it is.
The issue of basic knowledge is the Pandora's box of
epistemology. It shall remain closed during this discussion.
9for significant questions about the adequacy of [a previousdefinition] can be asked without becoming enmeshed in
questions about the existence or nature of basic knowledge.
(Skyrms, 1967, pp. 374-375)
It is the relation R that would define basic statements.
Skyrms does not attempt to explicate it. Condition (2) of (A) could
not, of course, serve as the sole account of basic statements, nor
could It be conjoined with (3) only, for true belief that is not based
on evidence may simply be a lucky guess. This would hardly constitute
basic knowledge or even basic justification.
Skyrms' aim here is to characterize basic knowledge, which
introduces issues and complexities not always relevant to the charac-
terization of basic propositions themselves. The concept of basic
knowledge is broader than that of basic proposition, and Skyrms does
not wish to generate the additional complexity that an explication of
the latter would entail.
Definitions of Aune, Lehrer, Will
There is a class of definitions of basic propositions that
requires of them "indubitability , " "irrefutability," or
"incorrigibility." Thus Bruce Aune:
... to attain knowledge of the actual world [on the foun-
dationalist account], you must ultimately have premises whose
truth is acceptable independently of any inference and whose
status is accordingly Indubitable. Only by having such premi-
ses can you gain a starting point that would make inference
worthwhile
.
(Aune, 1967, p. 41)
10
Keith Lehrer (1974, p. 76) includes in his specification of
the foundationalist’s required tenets the views that "a basic state-
ment must be self-justified and must not be justified by any non-basic
belief and that "a basic belief must either be irrefutable, or, if
refutable at all, it must only be refutable by other basic beliefs."
And from Frederick Will, we have:
There is a class of claims, cognitions, that are known in a
special direct, certain, incorrigible way; and all epistemic
authority resides in these.
(Will, 1974, p. 142)
[These] first cognitions [are] sure items of original
knowledge that could serve as the origins for other items
because they themselves had no origins, and hence none that
could possibly be mistaken.
(Ibid., p. 144)
Essential to this [ foundatlonallst] view of the justification
or validation procedure is a certain asymmetry in the relation
between justifying grounds and justified conclusions which
renders the grounds both incapable of being validated by the
conclusions and immune to revision by them. However difficult
it is to maintain this incorrigibility in some phases of
knowledge, it is necessary to the hierarchical conception of
the sources and transmission of validity that is represented
in this view.
(Ibid., p. 158)
These anti-foundationalists may be excused from holding
foundationalists to the view that basic propositions must have such a
high epistemic status as appears to be intended by words like
"incorrigible." For the two most Influential foundationalists of this
century appear to have held that basic propositions have the property
of being certain, a concept often related to that of incorrigibility.
11
We have from C.I. Lewis his well-known claim "if anything is to be
probable, then something must be certain" (C.I. Lewis, 1946, p. 186;
cf. also ibid., p. 182 and C.I. Lewis, 1956, pp. 310-312). And
Roderick Chisholm attributes certainty to the propositions he later
identifies as "self-presenting" (cf. Chisholm, 1977, p. 11).
Indeed, it may well be that basic propositions turn out to
have the property of certainty or of incorrigibility. But it seems
inappropriate to work such concepts into the definition of basic pro-
positions (neither Chisholm nor Lewis does). This should be something
that should be discovered to be the case, if true, rather than made
true by definition. For it may well be that a consistent and workable
foundationalist theory can exist which assigns no higher epistemic
status to basic propositions than that of being justified. We should
not at any rate set conditions that will exclude such theories a
priori . It is true that Lewis has an argument in support of his claim
that if anything is probable, something must be certain (cf. Lewis*
passages cited in the preceding paragraph). But with respect to his
and other such arguments, the most appropriate course in defining
basic propositions would seem to be to exclude incorrigibility-type
requirements from the definition. Then if any of these Lewis-type
arguments should prove to be sound, we can always add that basic pro-
positions have this additional property not contained in the original
definition. Also, the view of basic propositions as certain or
incorrigible derives from the Cartesian forms of foundational ism. But
as already noted, there are other forms of foundationalism which take.
12
for example, some ordinary propositions about the external world to be
basic. Such propositions might be less plausibly claimed to be cer-
tain or incorrigible than Cartesian propositions about a subject's
mental states. It would be unfortunate if certain forms of founda-
tionalism were ruled out because of an idiosyncratic definition of
basic propositions.
There is an additional difficulty with Lehrer's definition.
It seems too strong to require without further explication that a
basic statement "must not" be justified by any nonbasic statement.
Even if Cartesian propositions such as that expressed by "S is in
pain turn out to be basic for S, such propositions may be justified
by other propositions, for example, those about how S appears and
behaves. And if basics are about the external world, these can obvi-
ously be justified for S not only by direct means, but also indirect-
ly, as when, for example, S comes to believe that he is standing
before an object that is red not because he directly sees a red apple
but because another person tells him that a red apple is on the table
behind the opaque object that obstructs S's view of the apple. For
these reasons a definition such as Williams', which makes the weaker
claim that basics do not require independent justification, seems to
be more acceptable than Lehrer's definition.
Definitions of Butchvarov, Quinton, Kekes
I shall now consider a more miscellaneous set of accounts.
Panayot Butchvarov 's is interesting in that it denies the possibility
13
of a full characterization of basic propositions: to fully charac-
terize them would be to impugn their basicness. In discussing
self-evident beliefs," Butchvarov acknowledges that:
It is a fact that sometimes we know certain truths without
appealing, or even being able to appeal, to any other truths,
and that we regard a claim to such knowledge as justified as
supported, as having a basis, and not at all as an expression
of a mere true belief.
(Butchvarov, 1970, p. 62)
But Butchvarov denies that there could be a method for determining
which beliefs are self-evidently true. Such a method would challenge
the allegedly self-evidential character of the beliefs in question,
according to Butchvarov. For this method would amount to a proof of
these self-evident propositions when their character is that they can
be known without proof (cf. ibid., p. 62).
Butchvarov seems to mean by a method for determining which
beliefs are self-evident not only a subjective rule which the indivi-
dual can apply to his specific beliefs but also any objective charac—
ts^^ization or definition of self-evident beliefs. In either case, his
skepticism is based on a misunderstanding. Any proof that a specific
proposition p is self-evident is not incompatible with the self-
evidence of p. For such a proof would be an epistemic argument
directed at justifying, not p itself, but the proposition that p is
self-evident. Suppose, for example, that the proposition that S in in
pain is self-evident to S. We can of course ask why this proposition
is self-evident to S, and we may develop a theory of epistemic justi-
fication to explain this. Now on Butchvarov 's account, it would seem
Ill
Just as mistakes and errors are more conspicuous ways In whichthe possibility of malfunction exhibits Itself, so the possl-bility of malfunction Is Itself but one aspect of the generalpossibility that is represented in incorrigibility
. . . Like
of sensory discrimination
exhibit their liability to change, improvement, deterioration,
and obsolescence in the dependence they exhibit at all points
upon individual and social needs and the conditions under
which these needs are filled.
(Will, 1974, p. 207)
Although Will distinguishes incorrigibility from certainty (cf. Will,
1974, pp. 206-208) he lists both these epistemic properties as among
those required by the foundatlonalists' basic propositions:
There is [according to the foundationalist] a class of claims,
cognitions, that are known in a special direct, certain,
incorrigible way; and all epistemic authority resides in
these. The philosophical question of the epistemic status of
any claim is always a question of the relation of that claim
to this class of first cognitions. A claim can be established
to be a genuine example of knowledge, or at least a claim
worthy of some kind of reasonable adherence, only if it can be
disclosed to be, if not a first cognition itself, in some
degree authenticated by one or more of such cognitions.
(Will, 1974, p. 142)
Will then attacks foundatlonalism on the grounds that these epistemic
properties do not in fact belong to "first cognitions" or basic propo-
sitions (Will, 1974, Ch. /, cf. especially pp. 196-211).
In a similar vein, Lehrer sets up stringent epistemic stan-
dards which, at least in an early chapter, he asserts that any basic
propositions must meet:
. .
. a basic belief must either be irrefutable, or, if refu-
table at all, it must only be refutable by other basic
beliefs.
(Lehrer, 1974, p. 76)
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that admitting the need for such a theory would establish that the
proposition expressed by "S is in pain" is not self-evident for S
after all. For if a theory is necessary to justify the proposition
that S is in pain, then presumably that proposition is not self-
evident to anyone. It does not epistemically support itself. It
requires the epistemic theory to buoy it up, as it were.
The mistake in this example is, I believe, the assertion that
the epistemic theory is necessary to justify the proposition expressed
by S is in pain. It is not this proposition that requires the sup-
port of an epistemic theory. This proposition may well be as directly
and immediately evident to S as it ever could be. Rather, what an
epistemic theory might be called in to support would be the proposi-
tion expressed by ”'S is in pain' is self-evident to S." Thus,
contrary to what Butchvarov seems to assume, to call for a philosophi-
cal explication of the concept of self-evidence or basicness is not to
inpugn the alleged self-evidence or basicness or any specific
proposition. (For a more detailed look at the sort of assumption
Butchvarov may be making here, see the discussion of Peirce and Aune
in the section on "Iterative Foundationalism" in Chapter IV.)
Anthony Quinton refers to basic beliefs as those that are both
ostensive and intuitive (1966, p. 62). Quinton defines these terms as
follows
:
By an intuitive belief is meant one which does not owe its
truth or credibility to some other belief or beliefs from
which it can be inferred.
(Quinton, 1966, p. 58)
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Ostensive statements are
. .
. statements whose meaning is not explained in terms of
other statements already understood.
(Ibid., p. 60)
The characterization of basics as intuitive seems itself to
involve some difficulties. Is p basic simply because it "owes its
truth" to the entailing proposition p & q? Then every proposition is
basic. Also, I am not sure it is wise to lump together so readily the
concepts of truth and credibility. A proposition may "owe its truth"
to various causal factors combined, perhaps, with general scientific
laws. These factors may well be entirely unknown, and what the pro-
position owes its credibility" to may be another matter entirely.
Another difficulty with Quinton's account is the additional
requirement that basics be ostensive. This seems as otiose as the
additional requirement that they be incorrigible. Quinton's account
leaves the existence of basic propositions open to attack on grounds
that might be irrelevant to the notion of basic propositions that many
foundationalists have in mind. The question should not be, I believe,
whether basic propositions have some primitive meaning . The essential
character of basic proposition has to do not with any linguistic pro-
perties they may or may not possess, but with epistemic properties
—
with how they function as justifiers. Now it may turn out that they
are also linguistically primitive.^ But that is something to
discover, not to impose by definition. It would seem rather rash to
assume without argument that a proposition such as that expressed by
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S IS in pain" or by "S is looking at a red object" could not be a
basic justifier unless it were also a proposition "whose meaning is
not explained in terms of other statements already understood." The
fact that a given proposition is basic for a certain person at a cer-
tain time does not seem to entail in any obvious way that that person
must lack other background knowledge, such as explanations of the
meanings of the concepts contained in the basic proposition (cf.
Chisholm, 1977, p. 33).
John Kekes' "A New Defence of Common Sense," contains two
accounts of basic propositions:
Other beliefs rest upon basic beliefs in the sense that the
truth-value of basic beliefs is independent of the truth-value
of other beliefs, while the truth-value of other beliefs
depends on the truth-value of basic beliefs.
(Kekes, 1979, p. 115)
A belief is basic if and only if it has four characteristics:
it is universally held, unavoidable, a necessary condition of
action, and the likelihood of its truth cannot and need not be
Increased by additional evidence.
(Ibid., p. 116)
The first characterization seems mistaken in its reliance solely on
the metaphysical notion of truth-value and not additionally on some
epistemic notion. In any case, Kekes would have to clarify what it is
for the truth-value of one proposition to depend upon that of another.
There seems to be the same sort of difficulty here as was already
noted concerning Quinton's definition: does p "depend for its
truth-value" on p & q, which entails it? If it does, p would not be
basic on Kekes' account, nor would any proposition be basic, since
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each has an entailing conjunction. If p does not so depend on p 5 q,
then Kekes needs to Include appropriate exclusionary clauses In his
def inition.
It would not seem enough to simply exclude entailment and
other deductive relations, for the concept of truth-value-dependence
remains problematic. On what does a general, derivative proposition
such as that expressed by "All stars are hot" depend for its
truth-value?^ Perhaps it depends ultimately on fundamental yet
highly complex laws of particle physics, laws which may yet be
undiscovered. Few if any foundationalists would wish to regard such
undiscovered laws as the epistemlcally basic justifiers for our
knowledge that all stars are hot. Or perhaps the truth of this propo-
sition depends on the Individual causal histories of each star. This
account too would seem to disqualify the common varieties of
f oundationalism, which take propositions about the individual's mental
states or ordlnar7 singular propositions about the external world to
be basic. Accounts of truth-value-dependence developed along either
of these lines would seem to be unwarrantedly restrictive. But the
9
main point to be made here is again that Kekes has not proposed any
account of this concept, and thus his first definition remains
unclear
.
Kekes' second definition states four conditions which a basic
proposition must satisfy. Some of these conditions ("unavoidable," "a
necessary condition of action") seem unclear and are not elaborated
upon. Also, the conditions seem to be geared toward Kekes' own sped-
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fic account of basic propositions. Essentially he has in mind to
defend as basic those propositions which G.E. Moore described in his
"A Defence of Common Sense" as "truisms, every one of which (in my own
opinion) I know, with certainty, to be true" (Moore, 1966, p. 100).
The list Moore gives includes such propositions as the proposition
that the Earth has existed for many years before Moore was born, that
for many years large numbers of human bodies have been alive on the
Earth, and so on. It is of course entirely appropriate for Kekes to
provide a definition that singles out those propositions he regards as
basic. But to the extent that other foundationalists do not agree
with Kekes' list of basic propositions, his definition will not be
adequate to those other theories. For example, it will not be ade-
quate to a version of foundationalism which restricts basic proposi-
tions to those about a subject’s mental states. Hence it cannot serve
as the broader and more inclusive type of definition we are looking
for
.
It is not even clear that Kekes’ second definition does the
job for his own categorization of basic propositions. One might
argue, for example, that whether a proposition is universally held has
little to do with whether one knows it to be true with certainty.
Suppose just one person sincerely believes that he is the only human
among millions of clever machines. Also, one might argue that addi-
tional scientific evidence could increase the likelihood of a proposi-
tion such as that expressed by "The Earth has existed for many years."
In any case, this again seems to be a definition which is
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unclear In many specifics and inapplicable to many Important varieties
of foundationalism.
Dofinltions of Cornnian and Pas tin
It may be helpful at this point to take stock before pro-
ceeding with the next set of definitions. An interesting intuitive
account of basic propositions has been offered by Williams, Annis, and
Pollock, to the effect, in Williams' formulation, that a basic propo-
sition is one that is justified without itself requiring
justification. But it is not clear from this rather general account
what it means to say that a proposition is so justified. Just what
are the conditions under which a proposition has such epistemic
independence? The other definitions we have thus far considered have
not given a clear answer to this question, and have frequently imposed
additional conditions that seem inappropriate or incorrect.
I shall next consider two definitions that are directly con-
CGtned with the intuitive idea of Williams, et al
. ,
that portrays
basic propositions as independently justified. These definitions—by
James Cornman and Mark Pastin—attempt to bring more clarity and
precision into this intuitive notion. If these important analyses
fail, they fall in more subtle ways than do the previous attempts.
Indeed, I do not believe it is possible to state categorically that
these analyses fall (or that they succeed). Rather, I think we must
say that whether they succeed depends on what concept of justification
one has in mind. This will lead us to Chapter II, where I shall argue
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that there are (at least) two distinct concepts of epistemic
justification. In order to evaluate fully these definitions of basic
propositions, we must go some way toward elucidating these different
concepts of justification. For the present, I shall only consider one
intuitive but quite plausible notion of justification and show that
given this sense of justification, the definitions of Cornman and
Pastin do not succeed. I shall then go some small way toward a clari-
fication of this notion of justification and of the related but
contrasting notion of justification. However, a full explication of
this distinction is beyond the scope of the present work.
James Cornman's definition is as follows:^
p is self-justifying (justifies itself) for S at t =df p isjustified for S at t, and it is false that it would be
justified for S at t, only if it were to be justified by some
relationship it has to some other statement or group of
statements.
(Cornman, 1978, p. 230)
It seems to me that there is an intuitive and plausible sense
of p justifies q under which the following can serve as a counter-
example to Cornman's definition. Suppose that p is the proposition
expressed by 'S is in pain," the sort of proposition that many foun-
dationallsts would want to count as basic. Suppose that q is the pro-
position expressed by "S is in pain and all stars are hot," presumably
a nonbasic proposition for S since one conjunct is a general, nonbasic
proposition. In order for p to be basic on Cornman's definition, the
following subjunctive conditional must be false:^
SC: If p were justified then there would be some q which
justifies p.
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According to the current accounts of the semantics of subjunctive
conditionals (cf. Stalnaker, 1968, D. Lewis, 1973), SC is true if, in
the nearest possible world(s) in which p is justified, it is true that
there is some q which justifies p. Now it seems plausible to maintain
that in e^^ possible world in which p ("S is in pain") is justified.
It IS true that q ("S is in pain and all stars are hot") justifies p.
For q entails p, and if we take "q justifies p" to mean something like
if It is reasonable to accept q then it is reasonable to accept p,"
or "if q is true then p is likely to be true," then it seems we would
have to take entailment relations as justificatory relations. Indeed,
entailment relations would seem to be particularly strong—perhaps the
strongest possible— justificatory relations. Again, I do not mean to
suggest that this is the only way to understand the concept of
justification. Indeed, it is not, as I shall show. Here I wish to
suggest only that on one fairly plausible and intuitive reading of the
concept of justification, q justifies p in every possible world
because q entails p, and hence in any world in which p is justified, q
justifies p. But if this is so, then the subjunctive conditional
noted above is true, and thus p is not basic for S.
A natural response to this counterexample would be to exclude
entailment relations from justificatory ones. The justification rela-
tion would still be used in roughly the same intuitive sense of one
proposition making another more likely or reasonable, but here
entailment relations would be specifically excluded. Instead one
would look for, for example, inductive confirmation of p.
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Unfortunately, there are also counterexamples to this
emendation. If we go to the nearest possible world(s) in which the
proposition expressed by "S is in pain" is true, we are likely to find
a good deal of inductive evidence for that proposition. S may be
writhing in agony, for example. (In the actual world his appendix was
very close to bursting.) Or we will have considerable evidence from
S’s verbal behavior or the statements and tests of the doctor. Note
that this evidence is, so we are presuming, available to S as well as
to the rest of us. (That S does not need this inductive evidence to
establish that he is in pain is not to be taken into account under the
definition and the concept of justification we are presently
considering see the discussion of Pastin below and the dialogue that
begins Chapter II for further consideration of the view that indepen-
dent justificaiton is not necessary in order for a basic proposition
to be justified.) And we would probably be Inclined to say, in many
cases at least, that this evidence in itself is enough to justify for
S the proposition that S is in pain. Of course, it is possible that
when we go to the nearest possible world in which S is in pain, we
find no Inductive evidence at all: S exhibits no behavioral mani-
festations of a mild headache, or S stoically bears a migraine. So
indeed some propositions might count as basic on this interpretation
of Cornman's definition. But the foundationalist is unlikely to let
behavioral manifestation of pain be a determinant of basicness. If
the proposition expressed by "S is in pain" is basic for S, it should
be so whether the pain in question is a mild headache which engenders
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no behavioral manifestation or a ruptnred appendix which generates all
sorts of readily available evidence.
Note that although I have constructed these counterexamples
with the Cartesian foundatlonalist view of basic propositions as inner
mental states in mind, counterexamples could be easily constructed
using any foundatlonalist view of what ought to count as a basic
proposition. The procedure is simply to pick an example of a proposi-
tion that is basic according to that version of foundationalism, go to
the nearest possible world in which it is true, and point out the
inductive evidence that is almost always likely to exist in that world
that epistemically supports the purported basic proposition.
These counterexamples suggest, as an emendation, a move from a
subjunctive to a necessary conditions analysis. The idea is that none
of this troublesome inductive evidence is necessary to justify the
proposition that S is in pain. This proposition is, or should be if
it is truly a basic proposition, justified independently of that
evidence. The inductive support is not necessary in order that the
proposition be justified.
This is just the sort of definition Mark Pastin first con-
siders in his "Modest Foundationalism and Self-Warrant:"®
Proposition p is self-warranted for person S at time t: (i) p
is warranted for S at t, and (il) not necessarily if p is
warranted for S at t, then S has inductive evidential support
for p at t.
(Pastin, 1978, p. 283)
This definition too is defective, as Pastin himself notes.
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Cons ider
:
P» S is in pain or the moon is round.
For the Cartesian foundationalist who wants to restrict basic proposi-
tions to subjective statements directly verified by the subject’s
immediate experience, p should not be considered a basic proposition.
Suppose that S is not in pain, but that the proposition expressed by
"The moon is round" is justified for S ("warranted" in Pastin’s
terminology). Suppose that S reasons from "The moon is round" to pro-
position p above. For the Cartesian foundationalist, p should not be
basic for S, for S derives all his evidence for it from a nonbasic
proposition plus logical reasoning. But p basic according to the
above definition, for it is not necessary that whenever p is justified
there is some q which does not entail p and which justifies p (or
which provides "inductive evidential support for p"). For p may be
justified by r: S is in pain. It is not necessary that there be any
logically independent q which justifies p, so p is basic by the above
definition (cf. ibid.).
This is not, of course, a problem only for the Cartesian
foundationalist. Consider a foundationalist who holds as basic,
the external—world proposition that S is seeing an object that
is red. The same problem will arise here when we form a disjunction
of this proposition and some clearly nonbasic proposition, e.g., the
disjunction expressed by "S is seeing an object that is red or the
theory of evolution is more reasonable than creationism."
Pastin proposes a revision of the above definition that he
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believes will avoid these difficulties,
definition of an "epistemic system:"
He begins with a preliminary
. .
-let us consider the notion of a set of propositions
constituting an epistemic sysj^. The elements of an episte-
P’^opositions of the forms "p is warranted for S(abbreviated W(p,S,t) ), "p provides inductive eviden-tial support for q for S at t" (abbreviated "I ( p,q , S , t ) " ) and
p provides deductive evidential support for q for S at t"(abbreviated "D(p,q,S,t)")
,
where S and t are held constant.
set of propositions R of the appropriate forms constitutes
an epistemic system if, and only if, it is logically (or
metaphysically) possible that there be a person S and a time tsuch that for all propositions p and q: (i) W(p,S,t) e R iffW P,S,t); (li) I(p,q,S,t) £ R iff I(p,q,S,t); and (iii)
D(P>q,S,t) e R Iff D(p,q,S,t) ... An epistemic system
R is the epistemic system of a person S’ at a time t' if and
on y if, letting S = S', and t = t', all the elements of R are
t rue .
(Ibid., pp. 283-284)
Next Pastin defines the notion of an epistemic subsystem:
Next let us consider the notion of one epistemic system R’
^ subsystem of another epistemic system R with resect
^
a specified element or set of elements' E of~R (abbreviated
R' Subst R on E"). R' Subst R on E if, and onTy if, R' can
be obtained from R by first eliminating E or the members of E
from R and then eliminating n
>_ 0 other elements of R.
(Ibid., p. 284)
Pastin next considers minimal subsystems:
. . . we should focus on those subsystems of a person S's
epistemic system R at time t with respect to an element (or
set of elements) E such that these systems would be attribu-
table to S at t on the assumption that his condition at t be
changed only as required on epistemic grounds by the fact that
E (or the members of E) is eliminated from his epistemic
system. I shall call such subsystems minimal subsystems for S
at _t R with respect to E.
(Ibid., p. 286)
This allows Pastin to formulate a new definition of self-warrant:
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Proposition p is self-warranted for person S at time f S'sepistemxc system at t, R is such that: (i) w(p,S.t) c'r and
at t of subsystem R' fot S
(Ibid
.)
The crucial second clause of this definition might be restated as
follows: Consider all those subsystems which eliminate only proposi-
tions about the inductive evidence for p (and those propositions also
required epistemical ly to be eliminated). Does every such subsystem
lack W(p,S,t)? If so, p is not self-warranted. If not, p is
self-warranted
.
Unfortunately, these emendations do not seem to be immune from
the sort of counterexample the original definition was subject to.
Consider again the earlier counterexample:
p: S is in pain or the moon is round.
Consider then, relative to S's present epistemic system, all those
subsystems which eliminate propositions providing inductive support
for p. Such subsystems would presumably eliminate propositions about
astronomy relating to the nature of the moon, and propositions about
S's behavior, facial expressions, and avowals. (Pastin's definitions
would also require the elimination of those propositions which must be
removed "on epistemic grounds [due to] the fact that E (or the members
of E) is eliminated from his epistemic system.") Let us label this
set of subsystems F.
Note that all the inductive support for the simpler proposi-
tion r: S is in pain, will have been removed in all the subsystems of
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r. How „U1 r than fare? It It functions as the basic proposition
It is supposed to be (on Cartesian grounds—for nonCartesian
foundationalists, analogous examples could be used to make the same
point), then it should be that even though all the inductive support
for it has been removed, it is still warranted for S at t. If this
were not the case, then r would itself be a counterexample to
Pastin’s latest definition. For it could easily be shown that this
presumably basic proposition is not basic according to the definition.
So we must assume that W(r,S,t) remains in at least one of the
subsystems in T. But if so, then surely W(p,S,t) also remains in such
a subsystem. Recall that only inductive supports for p have been
removed. r supports p not inductively, but deductively. So p will be
warranted if r is.^*^ But if W(p,S,t) remains in some epistemic sub-
system that has been shorn of its inductive support for p, then p is a
basic proposition according to Pastin's latest definition. But p is
not basic. This was just the problem with the earlier definition
Pastin rejected.
When the proposition expressed by "S is in pain" is true, the
proposition expressed by S is in pain or the moon is round" may not
be a serious counterexample to Pastin’s definition. This depends,
on the sense of justification being employed. For in one sense
of justification, one might well acknowledge that a proposition
entailed by a basic proposition would also be basic. According to the
definition of basic propositions I shall propose, the proposition
expressed by "S is in pain or the moon is round" will be basic when
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the .proposition expressed by ”S Is in pain" Is true. This will be a
natural result of the concept of Justification employed In that
definition.
Whether the proposition expressed by "S is in pain or the moon
is round" constitutes a counterexample to Pastin’s definition is
unclear, since he does not specify in enough detail what he means by
"inductive evidential support," and thus it is unclear which concept
of justification he is working with.
There is, however, another difficulty with Pastin's
definition. This concerns the method for determining which proposi-
tions are basic, given Pastin’s definition. In spite of his precise
and detailed work, it is still an open question just how this method
is to be carried out. And the possible methods that suggest them-
selves do not appear, upon examination, to do the job required.
For example, when testing the basicness of p: S is in pain or
the moon is round, Pastin says we should consider those subsystems
which eliminate inductive evidential support for p, and everything
else that must be eliminated on epistemic grounds by the removal of
this support. What subsystems precisely does this lead us to
consider? One suggestion is that we consider the subjunctive state of
affairs of what S's epistemic system would be if his actual epistemic
system did not include any inductive evidential support for p. That
would presumably require going to the nearest possible world(s) in
which there is no inductive evidential support for either the
proposition that S is in pain or the proposition that the moon is
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round. But such worlds might be so different from the actual world
that S’s epistemic system would change so significantly from his
actual world epistemic system that the former could not be used to
make the appropriate epistemic evaluations of the latter. To
illustrate, suppose the proposition that S is in pain is true in the
actual world. Pastin’s method is supposed to show that it is also
basic for S. But the possible worlds approach will send us to worlds
in which there is no inductive evidential support for the proposition
that S is in pain. Now if in the actual world S is in the hospital
with a ruptured appendix, generating all sorts of inductive evidential
support for the proposition that S is in pain, it may well be that in
the nearest world(s) in which there is no inductive evidential support
for the proposition that S is in pain, S's appendix never ruptured at
all, and W ( S is in pain," S,t) does not occur in S’s minimal
subsystem, contrary to what Pastin's definition would require if the
proposition that S is in pain were to be basic. (This is, of course,
essentially the same objection we had to Cornman’s definition.)
So the possible worlds approach will not work for Pastin here.
There is perhaps another methodology that could be employed to deter~
mine whether a proposition is basic according to Pastin's definition:
instead of comparing possible versus actual epistemic systems, one
might compare and examine two epistemic systems without regard to
whether they are possible or actual, but simply with regard to the
epistemic considerations which determine which propositions are
warranted in the respective systems. But a similar problem would seem
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to arise here. We would be comparing one epistemic system where, say,
the proposition that S is in pain is warranted for S, with another
which lacks all inductive evidential support for the proposition that
S IS in pain and also lacks whatever must be rejected on epistemic
grounds because of this change. We would be asked to determine
whether W ( S is in pain, S,t) in this second system (the subsystem).
Having just the two sets of propositions by which to make this
determination, it seems we would be inclined to deny W("S is in pain,"
S,t) in the subsystem, having seen all the inductive support for it
eliminated. It seems then that we need the experiencing subject to
ground the beliefs, but when we think again of what the actual subject
would be warranted in believing if there were no inductive support for
his belief, we are likely to judge that the proposition that S is in
pain would not be warranted for S because he would not in that case be
in pain.
One could avoid this dilemma by insisting that W("S is in
pain," S,t) be held constant in both subsystems. This would assure
that the proposition that S is in pain comes out as a basic
proposition. But it would do so by fiat. Any proposition could be so
treated
.
It seems then that Pastin's definition has both formal and
methodological problems. Let us note, however, that the type of coun-
terexample which gave rise to Pastin’s attempt to improve on the defi-
nition he first considered only works as a counterexample if we assume
a concept of justification where "p justifies q" means roughly "p
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makes q more likely or probable."
terexamples to Cornman's definition
will not necessarily work if other
employed
.
As we shall see, the coun—
and to Pastin’s first definition
concepts of justification are
Concluding Reflections on this Approach
to Defining Basic Propositions
Most of the definitions we have thus far considered—including
those of Cornman and Pastin-have included statements or attempts to
explicate the intuitive notion that a basic proposition is one which
is justified, capable of justifying other propositions, but not itself
in need of independent justification. Given the concern and interest
that has been shown this Intuitive notion, it is natural to ask why
this notion is so popular. I believe that there is a natural line of
reasoning—the same line of reasoning that leads foundationalists to
posit basic propositions in the first place—that gives us this
intuitive notion of basic propositions. The following considerations
may help to bring this line of reasoning out.
We recognize that some propositions derive their justification
from other propositions. For example, the proposition that families
in Love Canal have unusually high rates of chromosome damage is
justified for me by the proposition that I have read reports to this
effect in two or three newspapers. Hence the justification for the
foraer proposition is derived from other propositions. It is
indirect, nonbasic.
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But what of the proposition that I am in pain (when this pro-
position is true)? What proposition independently justifies it for
me? For the foundationalist. or at least the Cartesian sort of
foundationalist, there is no independent justification for it. There
is only the fact, or proposition, that I am in pain. That proposition
justifies itself—or, on some accounts, needs no justification.
Again, what independent evidence would I have to marshal 1—indeed
,
what evidence co^ I marshall-in order to justify (for myself) the
proposition that 1 believe Socrates is mortal? It’s not clear in this
case that independent justification by me is even possible, yet surely
the proposition is justified for me. (Cf. Chisholm’s discussion,
1977, pp. 16-22.)
On grounds such as these, the case for basic propositions is
built. Propositions such as those expressed by "I am in pain" and "I
believe Socrates is mortal are said to be justified for the person
expressing them even though they do not themselves require independent
justification. Such propositions are said to be basic.
I believe that this is the sort of reasoning that led Cornman
and Pastin to their definitions of basic propositions, and one can see
the naturalness of adopting this approach. Now as I have already
noted, the definitions of Cornman and Pastin have not been decisively
refuted. The counterexamples work only on the prior assumption of a
specific concept of justification. It is controversial whether this
is the appropriate concept of justification to use in this context.
There is an alternative concept of justification which does not entail
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the falsity of Cornn.an-Pastln type definitions. In the next chapter.
I shall discuss ho» these two concepts of Justification differ.
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Notes to Chapter I
For similar or equivalent
tenets of foundationalism see for
Annis (1977, p. 345), Lehrer (1977
Sosa (1980, p. 5).
characterizations of the essential
example, Chisholm (1964, p. 263),
pp. 17-18), Pollock (1979, p. 93 )^
p. 170), Lehrer (1974, p. 100), Will (1974 nn 197-iqft>
^
hold this view that all empirical propositions * require independLt
°
justification may or may not be coherentists
. Of those notL aboveLehrer goes on to develop a coherence theory of justification* Will’does not Quine-s and Sellar’s influentia/remarL (1^ t^^a^ovecitations) about the revisability in principle of any proposition—emarks which seemed to deny that any propositions were bLic—led to
Senarrthemse^r' coherentism, and Quine andll s them lves have been regarded as coherentists. But this
(197r''pr'249-25^’'^''r'^^
challenged, for example by CornmanUy/8, p. 249 252), who regards them as moderate foundationalists.
moderate varieties of foundationalism that share some viewswith coherentism will be discussed in Chapter III.
Oninfnn
^econd positive tenet see, tor example,Qu to (1966, pp 56-57), Rescher (1974, p. 201) (here also calledthe network model ), Lehrer (1974, p. 154; 1977, p. 18), Bonjour(1976, p. 283), Sosa (1980, p. 18). (Only the middle three amongthese authors advocate some form of coherentism.)
Lehrer argues that "weak" foundationalist theories which
assert no more than the essential tenets of foundationalism (Lehrer's
are roughly equivalent to my EFl and EF2) "fail to distinguish them-
selves from coherentism in a fruitful manner" (Lehrer, 1977, p. 17).But the distinction only collapses, Lehrer notes further on (cf.ibid., p. 18), if basic beliefs are explicated in a way that essen-
tially involves reference to their relation to nonbasic beliefs. If,
on the other hand, basic beliefs are basic because of some intrinsic
feature of the belief, the distinction can stand (cf. ibid.). The
definition of basic propositions which I offer in Chapter II does not
refer to a basic proposition’s relation to a nonbasic belief.
Lehrer seems already to be considering nonessential tenets of
foundationalism when he restricts his discussion to basic beliefs, as
though whatever is basic for a subject must be a belief of that
subject. On some foundationalist accounts a basic proposition need
true of a subject, not believed by him. Lehrer also assumes
that a basic belief is self- justified
,
as opposed to being an
unjustified justlfier. By a self— justified belief Lehrer appears to
mean a belief which stands in the same relation to itself that two
nonbasic beliefs, one of which justifies the other, stand to each
other. Again, there are foundationalist accounts which do not require
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propositions be self- justified in this sense CCf
datlcLllst The f^un-
euher of thet ^L^U
this theory they are not sell^ns^lfled" rL
and coher:: -^: fou^Ltlonalls.
credible (ri htj \ f°™datlonallsm' s acceptance of Intrinsically
^
Ptopoaition. on this account. Is justified by Its relation
The specUlc reLuor justified for the Individual,
with ?h^!! ^ V , the proposition's coherenceCoherence Is a necesLry and sufflclenrcondition for a proposition's being Justified (Lehrer: "a belief Isjustified if and only if it coheres with other beliefs in a specified
leLITo Y P- the foundatlonllst, coheren e
slalM^ ooIli; I II'"*
“ """ "" J-tlfioatlon. As T
mii ?»rlf justification, a basic proposition Is not justifiedy Its relation to other propositions, a fortiori It Is not iusMfieHby coherence relations.
These general remarks will become clearer when the distinctivefeatures of specific foundatlonalist theories are discussed (cf. espe-cially the definition of basic propositions in Chapter II and thetaxonomy of foundatlonalist theories as outlined in Chapter III).
In Sellars (1973), a distinction is made between interpreta-
tions of basic propositions as nonconceptual sensory experiences on
the one hand and as conceptual renderings (or "takings") of that
experience on the other. But Sellars does not give a general defini-
tion of basic propositions in either of these senses (cf. especially
p. 616). Armstrong (1973) considers the possibility of
non-inferentlal beliefs" that would be "initially credible" or
®^lf~®vident
,
but he does not give a definition of these latter
terms, on the grounds that non— inf e rent! al beliefs are unlikely to
have such properties (p. 157). He goes on to develop an account of
when non-inferential belief constitutes non-inferential knowledge (pp.162-183). This account, although cast as a definition, is irrelevant
hsre, since Armstrong does not define the concept of non-inferentlal
belief itself and he does not develop, or apparently accept, the idea
that such beliefs are initially credible or self-evident.
C.I. Lewis (1946, p. 182) anticipates Chisholm's definition
with the remark that, for what is directly given "there is no distinc-
tion of what determines truth from any justifying ground of the
affirmation." Sellars (1979, pp. 171, 172) offers two accounts of
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"self-presenting states of affairs
Chisholm's definition.
which appear to be based on
^
Some critics of foundationalism argue that sinrp anv Kqo-;proposition must be linguistically primitive (in Quinton's sense tLt
und^r^ understanding on other propositions alrLdv
posit?onf ; r
candidates typically offered as basic pro-tions (e.g., the proposition expressed by "S is in pain") are notp imitive in this sense, they are not in fact basic. This argumentwill be discussed in the last section of Chapter IV.
.
assuming here that the proposition that all stars arehot is nonbasic, which would seem to follow from all foundationalisttheories that have thus far been proposed. If perchance a foun-
ationalist theory took this proposition to be basic, one could makethe same point against Kekes using an example of a proposition thatwas nonbasic according to that theory.
^For consistency with my notation, I
X and S" for "s" in Cornman's definition,
typographical changes.
have substituted "p" for
I have also made minor
^In this statement and the discussion that follows, I
reference to persons and times when no unclarity results from
so
.
suppress
doing
®The phrase inductive evidential support" in this definitionis obviously meant to exclude what Pastin calls (p. 284) "deductive
evidential support and hence excludes the entailment relations that
troubled Cornman's definition.
Pastin s discussion would profit from an explication of what
he means by "Inductive evidential support." It is clear that he
intends a proposition such as that expressed by "S is in pain" not to
require inductive evidential support, even when this empirical pFopo-
sition is warranted or justified.
In this and the subsequent definition I have substituted "n"
for "P". ^
9The text has "in" following "that" at this point. I take
this to be a typographical error.
^®One might hold that this will not be so if S fails to notice
the entailment relation between r and p. In one sense of warrant or
justification—so-called internal justification—this is so, and it
does provide a way around the difficulty. But Pastin clearly does not
have this notion of justification in mind. If he did, he would have
found no difficulty with the first definition he considered. This
definition too is acceptable if one has in mind the internal sense of
justification or warrant. Pastln's usage suggests that by "p warrants
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q" he »ould mean roughly that the truth of p makes mote llkelvinoreases the probability of q, whether S notices ^1^0' not!ow or details on these two senses of justification.
or
See
CHAPTER II
WHAT IS FOUNDATIONAL ISM? II: JUSTIFICATION AND
THE DEFINITION OF BASIC PROPOSITIONS
Two concepts of justification-internal and extetnal-are
distinguished and discussed. The latter concept Is then used to
define basic propositions.
A Dialogue on Justification
The difference between the two concepts noted can be brought
out by imagining a disagreement over a Cornman-Pastin type definition
—a disagreement based on these two different understandings of the
nature of justification. In the following dialogue, A defends the
Cornman-Pastin type definitions as the proper approach for charac-
terizing basic propositions. B disagrees.
A: To say a proposition p is basic is simply to say, first,
that it is justified and second, that there is no other
proposition q which justifies it.
B: That's no good. Suppose p is the proposition that I am in
pain. May this not be justified for me not only, so to
speak, directly, but also indirectly? That is, suppose I
am quite aware, through consciousness of my own internal
mental states and sensations, that I am in pain. But sup-
pose I am also justified in believing that proposition on
the basis of what we may call external evidence—the evi-
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dence objectively available to any ordinary observer in
the situation. I notice myself in a mirror, for example,
and note the swollen lump on the side of my head. A
friend describes the bicycle accident I was in that led to
the bump. I observe my own behavior—the facts that I
report a headache, frequently call for aspirin, etc.
Surely this external evidence alone is enough to justify
the proposition that I am in pain. My friend, for
example, having access only to this external evidence, is
surely quite justified in believing that I am in pain. To
deny this would amount to embracing skepticism about other
minds. This external evidence, then, can be conjoined to
form a proposition q which apparently does justify p for
me, for I do take note of this evidence as well as the
internal or direct evidence. But if q does so justify p,
then p is not basic according to your definition.
OK, I grant that you could use all that external evidence
q to justify p for you. But the point is you don't need
to use it. p would be justified even if you didn't use
any of that external evidence, whether that external evi-
dence is there or not. That's not what justifies p. p
justifies itself.
B; Wait a minute. Are you suggesting that if I have all that
external evidence for p, but I don't happen to use it to
arrive at ray conclusion that p, then that external evi-
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dence doesn't justify p?
A: If you don't use that evidence, then p justifies p. The
evidence doesn't. It's potential evidence. It doesn't
justify p. There's no need for it in this case.
B: But that external evidence d^ justify p. Granted, you
don't have to use it. All the same, it constitutes
overwhelming evidence for p. iJhat more do you want?
A: But just constituting evidence in some potential way isn't
enough, no matter how "overwhelming." q doesn't justify p
for you in that case. You have to actively make the con-
nection between q and p—you have to s^ that q constitu-
tes evidence for p, in order for q to justify p for you.
B: You're just mistaken about justification. Even if I do
not myself make the connections between the external evi-
dence available to me and the proposition that I am in
pain, still, that external evidence justifies the proposi-
tion for me, for I do have access to this evidence and it
does make the proposition reasonable to believe. It
doesn't matter whether I actually use the evidence to
arrive at the conclusion that I'm in pain. The evidence
justifies the conclusion in any case.
A: No, that's not what justification is like. It's not a
passive relation like that. One proposition justifies
another for someone only if that person puts the two
together and is aware of the connection between them. If
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you do not ^ any external evidence to arrive at your
conclusion, the evidence does not In tact justify the
conclusion. And if, m addition, you do not ne^ any such
evidence In order for a proposition to be justified for
you, that proposition has no distinct justlflers and so Is
basic
.
Neither A nor B wins this argument. \^at it reveals is rather
an ambiguity in the concept of justification. Two distinct senses of
justification seem to be emerging, intuitive and rather vaguely
expressed, in this dialogue. Clearly, if the idea of basic proposi-
tions is to be more fully explicated, we must look into the concept of
justification.
Justification
I believe that the concept of justification is one of the
central concepts of epistemology. (Of course I am distinguishing
epistemic or cognitive justification here from moral justification.)
It is the one purely epistemic concept in the traditional definition
of knowledge (the concept of truth belongs to metaphysics; that of
belief to psychology). And we have seen how our attempt to explicate
foundationalism has led to the need to discuss the notion of
justification.
I shall not attempt to set forth a full-fledged theory of
justification.^ While I shall be concerned with how certain proposi-
tions (basic ones) justify others (nonbasic ones), I shall not be con-
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earned vrtth the notion of justification In general, nor with
developing a complete and adequate theory of justification. Of the
two concepts of justification Introduced In the above dialogue. I
shall be primarily concerned only with one of them, and shall attempt
to define basic propositions In terms of that concept. I shall,
however, try to say enough about both concepts to make clear that
there Is a distinction. This. Indeed. Is my next task, and I find It
helpful to begin It by asking In what way a proposition's being
justified Is related to Its degree of reasonableness or credibility.
Eplstsmic Scales and the PriinltivG
"More Reasonable Than"
When we say one proposition justifies another we are inclined
to say that the first makes the second evident, or reasonable,
warranted, or credible. However, this is only to "clarify" one
obscure concept with others which are at this stage equally obscure.
Let us therefore consider the relation between justification
and the perhaps more fundamental notion of credibility or
reasonableness. We can imagine, as Chisholm does, an epistanic scale
which evaluates a proposition according to how reasonable it is to
believe it. At the neutral point of this scale, a proposition has
neither positive nor negative epistemic value. Typically, the propo-
sitions at the neutral point of the scale will be those for which we
have no evidence one way or the other.
Above this point stand those propositions which the evidence
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favors. That is. the available evidence points, however slightly,
towards such a proposition being true. Chisholm has detailed the
various grades of reasonableness, but there Is no need here to go Into
the details of the various categories he delineates. These will be
discussed in Chapter V. However, It Is Important here to recognise
that there are different degrees of reasonableness. Some reasonable
propositions are more reasonable to believe than other reasonable
propositions. The more reasonable ones will be placed on the eplste-
mic scale higher above the neutral point than the less reasonable
ones. Similarly, there will be grades b^ this neutral point, with
those which are only slightly unreasonable placed closer to the
neutral point than highly unreasonable propositions.
This picture of an epistemic scale uses the concept "more
reasonable than" as a primitive. The concept "reasonable" may easily
be defined in terms of this primitive as follows:
DR; p is reasonable =df it is more reasonable to believe
that p than to believe its negation.
(Compare Chisholm's definition of "h has some presumption in its
favor," 1977, p. 8). DR contains, of course, the undefined "believe,"
as well as more reasonable than," but the former concept is not
essentially an epistemic one. It is more properly defined by theories
within psychology and the philosophy of mind. Whether all epistemolo-
gical concepts and theories can be explicated in terms of the one pri-
mitive "more reasonable than" is a difficult question. Chisholm
attempts to base a good number of central definitions and principles
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in epistemology on this one primitive. I do not believe that his
attempt Is successful, however, and I believe that It Is necessary to
introduce additional primitives before one can accommodate a success-
ful epistemological theory.
I believe that the term "more reasonable than" does satisfy
the requirements, for a useful primitive concept, of simplicity and
intultlveness. Even without a definition. It Is obvious that the pro-
position that Reagan Is President In 1982 Is at this time more reaso-
nable than the proposition that he will be President In 1986. I„ many
cases In which two propositions are eplstemlcally compared. It Is
clear which one is the more reasonable.
Justification and the Evident
What is the relation between the concept of justification and
that of. reasonableness? It seems clear that to say that a proposition
is justified is to say that it has some positive epistemic status. It
ranks above the neutral point on the epistemic scale. But how high on
the scale does a justified proposition rank?
One natural response might be to say that a justified proposi-
tion must be evident. The evident is regarded as a position modera-
tely high on the epistemic scale—not, perhaps, as reasonable to
believe as that which is certain (the top of the scale), but signifi-
cantly more reasonable to believe than that which merely has some pre-
sumption in its favor. One relatively serviceable way of
characterizing the evident is to note that it is that epistemic status
45
which is high enough to allow a proposition to be known, should other
specified conditions also be satisfied for that proposition. More
significantly, In order for a proposition to be evident for a subject,
some sort of epistemic activity would seem to be required of the
subject. That is, the data that serves to make some proposition p
evident to S must at some point and in some way be noted by S and
appropriately applied to p. All the necessary evidence for p may
exist right under S*s nose, as it were. But unless S takes note of
the evidence ^ evidence for p, and applies it appropriately to the
conclusion that p, p may not be evident to S, even if he believes that
It IS here that we run into difficulty with the position that
if a proposition is justified for S, then it is evident for S. The
above characterization of the evident recalls A's characterization of
the necessary conditions for a justified proposition. But B’s alter-
native characterization of justification is not as strong as A's
characterization, and would presumably not require that p be evident
to S in order for it to be justified. B's position was roughly that p
could be justified by some q for S if q (presumably itself justified
for S) simply made p more likely in some objective or external sense,
whether or not S was aware of this connection between q and p. p
would not be evident to S on this account, even though it might be
justified for him.
It is clear that we must explore in more detail what these two
competing senses of justification are.
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Two Concepts of Justif iraM’ nn
Ordinary talk about justification appears to be capable of
being analyzed into two essentially different notions. On the one
hand, there is the objective or externalist sense of the concept,
defended by B. According to this view, a justified proposition p is
one which the available evidence warrants accepting, whether or not
the subject makes use of the evidence to arrive at conclusion p. On
the other hand, there is the subjective or internalist sense,
according to which the subject's belief that p must be the result of
his appropriate use of the evidence available. (I speak here of
ordinary justification, ignoring for the moment basic propositions
which would not require such evidence in order to be justified.)
Further details and a better understanding of the distinction
can be brought out by considering the following example: Sherlock
Holmes and Dr. Watson are confronted with a very difficult case. The
squire is dead. An apparent homicide, but the clues are few. A
letter opener (the murder weapon), a few bits of testimony, dust on
the squire's riding boots, although it was a rainy day, no clue as to
motive. Holmes and Watson gather in what details they can. "Very
little to go on," mutters a discouraged Watson, "What can it all point
to?" "The butler, my dear Watson, the butler."
Holmes and Watson here have, at least prior to Holmes'
revelation, quite different relations to the proposition that the
butler did it. It is justified for Watson in the first, or exter-
sense. But for
nalist sense, but not in the second. Internalist,
Holmes, it Is justified In both senses. We can Imagine that Holmes
and Watson have exactly the same evidence available to them, but that
Holmes has, *ere Watson has not, put the evidence together In an
appropriate way.
This simple example may give rise to the objection that what
It Illustrates Is not a distinction In types of Justification but
another sort of distinction. It might be thought that the proposition
In question differs for Watson and Holmes In its degree of evidence,
or reasonableness, or in the fact that Holmes believes It and Watson
does not, or because Holmes has brought deductive reasoning to bear on
the empirical evidence presented.
But the difference here is not that Holmes has more evidence
for the proposition than Watson does. By hypothesis, they both have
the same evidence. 2 Nor is the proposition more reasonable for
Holmes to believe than for Watson to believe. The evidence, which for
both is identical, does support the proposition that the butler did
it. Watson has not done all that he could have done, epistemically
speaking. Given his evidence, the proposition is just as reasonable
for him as for Holmes. Nor is the difference simply that the proposi-
tion is evident to Holmes, and not to Watson. This difference is a
fact, but what could be the basis of it? As we have seen it is not
simply that there is some increase in the reasonableness of the propo-
sition for Holmes over its reasonableness for Watson. It is equally
reasonable for both to believe. It cannot be this, then, that makes
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the proposition evident to Holmes, and not to Watson.
Is it simply then that Holmes^ believe, and Watson
does not? No, for the mere fact of belief on Watson's part that the
butler did it would not necessarily put him in the same position as
Holmes. Watson may have come to his belief for an unrelated reason,
or for no reason at all. We would not in such a case wish to call
Watson s belief justified in the strong sense in which it is justified
for Holmes. It is not even clear that belief is a necessary condition
for justification in this strong sense. Holmes might have the essen-
tial realization that makes the proposition that the butler did it
justified in the strong, internal sense for Holmes, and yet he may
withhold belief for some reason, or for no reason at all.
Perhaps the difference between Holmes and Watson is Holmes’
- -
Pledge that the butler did it, and Watson's lack thereof. But this
account too is unacceptable. Let us say, indeed, that Holmes does
know, for the butler did not do it. He is the victim of a frameup by
Moriarty, and Holmes does not discover this until the next story.
Still, Holmes is in a superior eplstemic position to Watson. It still
makes sense, as a way of explaining this superiority, to say that the
proposition that the butler did it is strongly justified for Holmes,
but only weakly justified for Watson. Justification, even in the
strong sense, need not amount to knowledge.
The strongest and most interesting objection is that Holmes
does indeed have additional evidence that Watson lacks. Holmes has
noticed certain relations between the evidence presented that Watson
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has failed to see or overlooked. Holmes, It might be Imagined, Is a
better or quicker reasoner, and has taken several deductive or Induc-
tive steps, or some complex combination of them. And this leads to
his more privileged epistemic position.
There is something to this, but it is not correct to say that
Holmes simply has more evidence or data at hand than Watson and that
this is all there is to his strong, versus Watson's weak,
justification. Is it reasonable for Holmes to assume that rules of
deductive and inductive reasoning apply in this case? It is likewise
reasonable for Watson to assume this. Perhaps Holmes is aware of the
relevance of certain conditionals, such as "If the windows of the
butler’s bedroom were sealed shut, he could not have done it."
Suppose then Holmes does believe this conditional, notes its relevance
to the situation, and uses it to form his conclusion about the
butler's guilt or innocence. Does not this internal detective work
grant him new evidence that is beyond that which Watson has?
Perhaps it does, but then we are faced with the same problem
with regard to the proposition cited as Holmes’ "additional evidence"
as we were with the original proposition that the butler did it. For
if it is this intermediate proposition that Holmes first grasps,
rather than the proposition expressed by "The butler did it" directly,
what is to distinguish his grasp of it from Watson's lack of grasp,
since, again by hypothesis, they have the same evidence for it, and
since it is equally reasonable for both of them to believe?
Finally, one might develop an objection along Wittgensteinean
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lines to the effect that the concept—required by our initial
hypothesis-of two people having the same evidence is simply
incoherent. An individual's evidence base would presumably be unique
to that individual and in principle nondupllcatable
. But even if the
case could be made that there is such an incoherence, this would not
adversely affect the view that there are two distinct senses of
justification. Perhaps Watson and Holmes can never have exactly the
same evidence. Then disregard Watson and just consider Holmes. At
some point he acquires the insight that the butler did it. A moment
earlier, he lacked it. Instead of comparing Watson and Holmes, one
may compare Holmes before and Holmes after. Then all the points made
above for a distinction between internal and external justification
apply as before. Holmes before is justified in the external, but not
the internal, sense. Holmes after is justified in both senses. The
supposition is not necessary that two people can have the same
evidence.
These considerations, it seems to me, force us to recognize
that in order to explain how a proposition becomes evident to a
person, we need a new eplstemic category that is not reducible to
reasonableness or degree of reasonableness. We can correctly say that
the proposition that the butler did it is evident to Holmes, and not
to Watson. This marks the distinction. But a proposition’s being
evident is not simply a matter of its being reasonable to a fairly
high degree on the eplstemic scale. Something significantly more is
involved than a quantitative increase in the degree of reasonableness
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when a proposition becomes evident.
The concept that adequately describes Holmes' eplstemlc state
Is. I believe, best described as as type of Justification,
distinguished from justification In the external sense. It Is the
fact that Holmes' belief Is justified In the former sense that makes
the proposition that the butler did It evident to him. Justification
in this sense Is not. I believe, reducible to reasonableness or degree
of reasonableness, although justification In the external sense does
seem to be so reducible.
The Two Concepts in the Literature
Three recent works seem to have made the same distinction as
that made above between external and Internal justification.^ While
other terms are used to mark the distinction (and in still other works
the same terms are sometimes used to mark different epistemic
distinctions cf. note 4), these three works, at least, seem to have
in mind the same distinction that is made here between internal and
external justification. In "Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to
Ethical Concepts?" (1978), Roderick Firth even uses a Watson-Holmes
example to make his distinction between "propositional warrant"
(external justification in our sense) and "doxastic warrant" (internal
justification)
:
This distinction between propositional and doxastic warrant
is dramatized if we now suppose that Holmes shows Watson the
mud and gives him all the other relevant evidence he has,
without telling him what conclusion he has drawn from it. In
one important respect a change has occurred in Watson's
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oachman did it, we cannot therefore conclude tha^Watson, like Holmes, is warranted in believiL that rL
^ p-positi^
hlH f warranted in believing p. But Wat^n'sbelief might not be based rationally on the evidence.
(Firth, 1978, p. 218)
Firth does not significantly elaborate on the dlstlnction-no defini-
tions are provlded-but It Is Interesting to note that his Implication
here Is that a doxastlcally warranted belief Is one that is "based
rationally on the evidence."
In A Plethora of Epistemological Theories" (1979), John
Pollack says no more than Firth about a distinction between
warranted' and "justified" propositions, yet it seems clear that he
is referring to, in our sense, external and internal justification
respectively;
There is a distinction between being justified in believing P
and believing P unjustifiably when you have adequate justifi-
cation available to you but have not made the right
connections. For example, a man might have but systematically
ignore adequate evidence for believing that his wife is
unfaithful to him. However, when his mother, whom he knows to
be totally unreliable in such matters and biased against his
wife, tells him that his wife is unfaithful to him, he
believes it on that basis. Then he is not justified in
believing that his wife is unfaithful to him despite the fact
that he has adequate evidence available to him to justify that
belief. We might say that the proposition is warranted for
him, but he is not justified in believing it. To say that P
is warranted for S is to say, roughly, that S has good reasons
whether he believes P for those reasons or not. Conversely,
to say that S is justified in believing P is to say not only
that P is warranted for S, but also that S’s believing P some-
53
how 'derives from' the way In which It 1 s warranted
.
(Pollack, 1979, pp. 103-104)
It is perhaps not as immediately obvious that Marshall Swain
has this distinction in mind in Reasons and KnowledvP (1981), but I
believe examination of the following passage will show that he does:
The present concern is to emphasize an important distinc-lon between the reasons upon which a person's belief that his based and other reasons a person may have which are rele-
believing that h. It often happens that
believing that h on the basis of R is not justified for S.This can happen even though S has some other set of reasons,R
,
such that If S s belief that h had been based upon those
reasons then S s belief that h would have been justified.When this happens, S's belief that h is not justified and Sdoes not have knowledge. Let us consider an example.
Suppose that Frank and Laura are tellers in a large bank,
ach of them is efficient, responsible, knowledgeable aboutbanking transactions, and well liked by fellow employees. Itis the stated policy of the bank that such employees can
expect to be promoted to higher positions in due time. So,Frank and Laura each have reasons upon which a belief that*
they will be promoted would be justified. Let us suppose
moreover, that each of them does expect to be promoted.
Frank, however, suffers from the illusion that the president
of the bank, who happens to be his uncle, will do anything tokeep him on the premises in order to maintain peace in the
family. His belief that he will be promoted is based on these
reasons. Secretly he believes that efficiency, responsibili-
ty, and such things have nothing to do with promotional
decisions. Laura, on the other hand, is also related to an
officer of the bank but believes correctly that such facts do
not influence her employers’ promotional decisions. Laura's
belief that she will be promoted is based upon her belief that
she is efficient and responsible as well as upon beliefs about
the bank s policy. We may say of Laura that she knows she
will be promoted, but we may not say this of Frank. The
reasons for which Laura believes she will be promoted are also
reasons upon which that belief is justified. Frank’s belief,
however, is based upon something other than those reasons that
would justify his belief.
(Swain, 1981, p. 37)
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I believe that Swain is here In effect pointing out the distinction
between external Justification (which Fra* has) and internal justifi-
cation (Which only Laura has). He has added the twist that Frank does
In fact hold the same relevant belief Laura holds. This would be akin
to the point made In my example above that Watson could have all the
evidence that Holmes has, believe Irrationally or on the basis of
irrelevant reasons that the butler did It. yet not be Internally
Justified In believing that proposition. If we Ignore the compli-
cating consideration of Frank's Irrational and coincidental belief In
the right thing," we have here. It seems, a situation In which
Frank's belief Is externally but not Internally justified, and Laura's
belief is both internally and externally justified.
Swain does not use these terms, and indeed reserves the term
justified belief ' for what we would call an internally justified
belief. He then goes on to develop a full theory of justification
where by "justification" he appears to have in mind the concept of
what I have called internal justification (cf. ibid., Chapter 4).
Use of the Two Concepts in the Present Work
If there is indeed such a distinction between external and
internal justification, how is it to be applied to the task at hand of
defining basic propositions? The first of these concepts is the
simpler one external justification has to do with reasonableness to a
certain degree on the episteraic scale. It would be a difficult enough
task to provide an adequate definition of external justification—no
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such attempt will be made here Tr unnia kn . it would be considerably harder to
define Internal justification. First of all It would have to Include
the concept of external Justification, as Internal justification Is
external justification plus "something more." Secondly, It would be
difficult to Isolate and define what that "something more" Is.
Whether Swain has adequately done so In Reasons and Knowledge I am
not In a position to judge. A critique of his book-length analysis of
justification would take us too far afield.
What I shall do instead is rely on the concept of external
justification. After giving a general account that attempts to
clarify this notion. I shall define basic propositions in terms of
this concept alone.
It will be recalled that the Cornman-Pastin type approach
seemed a workable one if we had one concept of justification in mind,
but not the other. The concept that seems to work with this approach
is that of internal justification. Recall that the counterexamples to
those definitions relied on the assumption that "external" evidence
which the subject may not have actually used in coming to believe a
proposition nevertheless justified that proposition for the subject.
If we were using the concept of internal justification, these examples
would not go through. Hence the Cornman-Pastin approach as so far
developed is not adequate given the present task of defining basic
propositions in the externally justified sense. When I come to define
basic propositions at the end of the chapter, I shall base my defini-
tion on the quite different approach of Roderick Chisholm. But first
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It Is helpful to look more closely at the concept of external
justification.
External Justification
When we say that a proposition Is Justified tor a person In
the external sense, we are saying, roughly, that the proposition Is
reasonable enough that the person would be In good eplstemlc standing
It, on the basis of the available evidence, he believed that
proposition. We say Watson Is justified In believing that the butler
did It, In this external sense of justification, because he has the
data available to come to the conclusion that the butler did It.
Given his available data, the conclusion is reasonable, even If Watson
doesn't arrive at it.
Two questions arise from this rough sketch: The first is "How
reasonable must a proposition be before it can be justified in this
external sense? The second is, "Just what constitutes evidence which
is available to a person?"
Presumably, a proposition that merely has some presumption in
its favor is not strong enough, epistemically speaking, to be
justified for a person, even in the weaker external sense of
justification.
A plausible minimal condition for an externally justified pro-
position might be set at that level required for a proposition to be
evident, were that proposition justified not only in the external
sense, but in the internal sense as well. A proposition, then, can
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be justified in the external sense only once it has attained the level
of reasonableness by which it could, at that level of reasonableness,
be an evident proposition. Let us use a Chisholmian term in a
slightly non-Chisholmlan way by saying that at this level of reaso-
nableness a proposition is "beyond reasonable doubt." Hence, while
agreeing with Chisholm that a proposition may be beyond reasonable
doubt yet not evident. I would disagree with him in holding that such
a proposition is not less reasonable than an evident propos ition.5
The second question gets at the heart of the notion of an
externally justified proposition. The idea is that such a proposition
is highly reasonable for a subject to believe. He ought to believe it
insofar as he is following his epistemic duty. But just what is it
for a proposition to be so reasonable?
In one sense it would seem that all and only true propositions
are reasonable to believe. If my epistemic duty is to believe those
propositions which are true, then I would seem to be in epistamically
good standing (at least) in believing those propositions. And if the
external sense of justification refers to those propositions which I
would be in epistemically good standing in believing whether I
actually do so or not. then apparently I am (externally) justified in
believing all and only true propositions.
Clearly something has gone wrong. I should not be epistemi-
cally required to believe those true propositions of whose truth I
have not the faintest suspicion. And I should not be called justified
in believing them, even in the external sense. IVhat is needed is a
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recognition that justification, even in the external sense, requires
some reference to the individual's epistemic situation, to his
intellectual abilities and to the data that is actually available to
him as opposed to that which is available in principle, or not at all.
How do we demarcate that evidence which is available to a
given individual in a given situation? I believe that this is one of
many circumstances in which we are intuitively quite clear about the
applications of a concept in the majority of situations and can thus
be said to understand the concept, even though at the borderlines of
Its applicability there are many situations in which it is not clear
whether the concept applies. Concepts such as "bald" and "person"
are cases in point. It seems to me that the concept of that evidence
which is available to a person follows a similar pattern. It is
pretty clear that when Watson bungles the case, and just can't see the
conclusion that the evidence he has taken in clearly points to, we
will say that the conclusion is epistemically available to him, that
it is reasonable for him to believe and indeed that it is justified
(externally) for him. But we will not say that the special theory of
relativity, which he, in 1891 and untrained in physics, couldn't have
had the foggiest notion of, is reasonable for Watson to believe, or
externally justified, for such a theory is not epistemically available
to him.
That there is a distinction to be made between evidence which
is available to a person and propositions which are not epistemically
available should therefore be clear. But it is not a particularly
59
n
precise distinction. There will be borderline cases where It will be
difficult to say whether a certain proposition Is epistemlcally
available to a subject, and hence whether it and other propositions
are justified for that subject in the external sense.
It is helpful to give examples of just how evidence might
proceed from being merely available and not evident to a subject to
being actually evident to that subject. If my contentions are
correct, this improvement in the epistemlc status of a proposition ca
take place even though no new empirical evidence has been admitted and
even though no additional deductive calculations or other calculations
or reasoning have been undertaken. This discussion, although it does
take us somewhat into the realm of the internally justified, does help
us more clearly demarcate the realm of the externally justified.
Wittgenstein has brought to philosphers' attention, though for
quite different reasons, certain phenomena which we may characterize
as "seeing as" phenomena. His duck-rabbit drawing^ can be seen now
as a duck, now as a rabbit. Even more familiar is the foreground-
background ambiguity in a drawing which allows what is first (usually)
seen as a vase to be seen as two silhouetted faces when what was ini-
tially seen as foreground is seen as background.
I believe that a subject’s sudden realization, in such a case,
that what he is looking at can be seen as depicting two faces in
silhouette is a new epistemic condition that cannot be explained by
reference to any additional empirical evidence that has been acquired
nor by reference to any deductions or other reasoning processes under-
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taken by the Individual .7 If so, this shows that this feature
distinguishing external from Internal justification can occur even at
the level of immediate observation.
Concerning this level of immediate observation, there are, I
think, examples more typical than pattern recognition of the distinc-
tion between evidence which is merely available yet not evident, hence
externally but not internally justified, and evidence which is both
available and evident to the individual, and hence internally
justified as well. It is illustrated, for example, in those cases
where empirical data is, or is not "noticed," and hence is or is not
evident. Once again this difference will not be explainable in terms
of more data or inference. In one such case, a clock’s continual
ticking may cease to be noticed by the subject, and so cease to be
evident. This phenomenon itself is brought to our attention on occa-
sion when a clock stops ticking and we are suddenly aware of the new
quiet and of the fact that the clock had been ticking. In some fairly
subliminal sense, then, the sound does, apparently, register with us.
But it is clear that we often can sit through an evening in the pre-
sence of a ticking clock or chirping crickets without ever noticing
these phenomena. Afterwards, if asked if there had been a clock in
that room, or crickets on that evening, we may be at a complete loss
to answer. In such cases it does not seem at all appropriate to say
it was evident to us that a clock was ticking or that crickets were
chirping. Thus whatever subliminal awareness there may be, it does
not appear to be sufficient to make these propositions evident.
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This juggests that we may mark the difference between the
externally and the Internally justified as the bringing of a proposi-
tion to conscious awareness. When non-evldent, a proposition has not
been brought to conscious awareness. When evident, it has been raised
to his level.
I believe that this does demarcate the difference when we are
discussing propositions about Immediate conscious perceptions, but not
when we are discussing other types of propositions, for such
propositions, it is generally accepted, may be evident. Indeed known,
even though they are not propositions which the subject Is at chat
time consciously aware of or considering.
It is, I believe, certainly the case that all types of
propositions, not just those concerning sensations and observation,
can take on this dual aspect of being on the one hand externally
justified yet not evident, and on the other hand both externally and
internally justified, or evident. A subject may do all the reasoning
required, and still not "see” that the conclusion follows. He may
truly believe, and be aware, that he has promised to meet Smith in the
local restaurant at 1 P.M. on Tuesday, and also that he is committed
to remaining at home on Tuesday at 1 P.M. to receive a phone call. He
may believe and be aware that he cannot do both at once, and he may be
expert in describing the logical relations between the propositions in
question. But all this information may not yet have come together for
him in a way that makes it evident to him that there is a conflict in
his schedule.
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can say, then, that a proposition becomes externally
justified for a person when it acquires that degree of reasonableness
that marks it as being beyond reasonable doubt, but that such a propo-
sition becomes internally Justified only when it also attains the sta-
tus of being evident. This heightened status does not, as we have
seen, require the introduction of any additional evidence or of new
reasons to believe it. Hence, the evident is not more reasonable to
believe than that which is merely beyond reasonable doubt. That which
is externally but not Internally justified may Include both proposi-
tions pertaining to sensory observation and propositions of a less
immediate and observational nature. I do not believe that aU sense-
based propositions are capable of being externally yet not Internally
evident. The proposition that I am in pain is, I believe, necessarily
such that if it is externally justified for me, it is also Internally
justified for me.
It would thus seem that if one proposition p externally justi-
fies another proposition q for a person at a time, then both proposi-
tions are beyond reasonable doubt for that person at that time (q must
have that status, as noted above, and it seems hardly likely that p.
iri justifying q, could have a lower epistemic status than q). Also, p
is evidence available to the person and that person must have the abi-
lity to conclude that q from p. Is this all that is required? No,
for p and q must stand in some appropriate epistemic relation. It's
not just that p and q are both beyond reasonable doubt. It is rather
that p in some sense makes q beyond reasonable doubt. It constitutes
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evidence for Exactly how this condition Is spelled out depends on
one's theory of justification. A probabilistic analysis might say
that p makes q probable to a specified degree. One might also attempt
a subjunctive conditional or a causal analysis. It Is beyond the
scope of the present work to develop a theory of justification. In
Ueu of such an analysis, we must rely on the Intuitive notion that p
constitutes a good reason for accepting q, or that p makes q very
likely.
Where p is not a basic proposition, we can also say that p Is
externally justified for S at t If and only If there Is some q such
that q externally justifies p for S at t.
Although I have here given a sketch of the concept of external
justification rather than a fully developed theory, it is to be hoped
that what has been said is sufficient for the purpose of defining
basic propositions. It is to that project that I now return.
The Definition of Basic Propositions
I have attempted to show that the Cornman-Pastin type approach
to defining basic propositions is successful only if justification is
understood in the internal sense. Our task, however, is to define
basic propositions in the externally justified sense. To accomplish
this it seems to be preferable to turn from the Cornman-Pastin
approach to the approach presented by Roderick Chisholm in Theory of
Knowledge . Chisholm's account of a basic or "self—presenting
"
propo-
sition is as follows:^
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DBl: Bpst =df Tpt & D(Tpt -> Epst)
That is, to say p is basic is to say it is true and that necessarily
if It is true then it is evident. While not like the "structurar
definitions of the previous approach. Chisholm's definition does
appear to offer an approach that can be acceptable to the Cartesian
foundatlonallst at least. For the Idea is that the mere truth of p is
enough to make it evident, l.e. it is immediately evident and does not
require Intervening propositions or eplstemlc stages in order that it
be evident.
However, Chisholm's DBl in Itself will not do, if the distinc-
tion between the externally and the Internally justified is on the
right track. DBl Includes the concept of the evident, which is
appropriate to the internal, not the external, concept of
justification. "Externally justified" need not mean indirectly
justified. It need only mean justified in the sense of being beyond
reasonable doubt, as opposed to actually being evident. Hence it
appears that we can appropriately modify DBl to:
DB2: Bpst =df Tpt & DClpt Rpst)
where R means "beyond reasonable doubt."
DB2 shall be understood as restricted to empirical
propositions. In general, I am concerned here with the justification
structure of empirical propositions, rather than with that of logical
or analytic truths.
According to DB2, propositions entailed by basic propositions
will be basic, since they will be beyond reasonable doubt if the
65
entailing propositions are. (This will be so at least when the
entailing relation Is a simple and obvious one, e.g., the relation
between p S q and p. In a more complex case. It may not be eplstanl-
cally available to a person that one proposition entails another. The
present discussion assumes a relatively simple entailing relation that
is eplstemlcally available to the subject.) Given DB2, a proposition
entailed by a basic proposition can be beyond reasonable doubt, and
hence basic, even if the subject has not reflected on it or considered
that It Is entailed by another proposition. Hut this result is in
line with the fact that DB2 Is based on the concept of external
justification. This requires only that a proposition be beyond reaso-
nable doubt for the subject, and not that It be considered by or evl-
dent to him.
I believe that one can distinguish "primary" from "secondary-
basic propositions in this context, and define a primary basic propo-
sition as one which is necessarily such that if it is beyond reaso-
nable doubt, then it is evident. Secondary basic propositions, then
would be, roughly, those which are entailed by primary basic
propositions. (Compare Chisholm's distinction in Theory of Knowledge
between the "self-presenting" and the "directly evident," 1977, pp.
22-24.) However, I will not propose this as a formal definition.
Such a definition would depend on the concepts of the evident and the
internally justified, which have been little discussed here.
It might be objected against DB2 that a perceptual proposition
which ought to be basic, such as that S is in pain, might be true but
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not beyond reasonable doubt for S because S Is a child who has not yet
learned a language and thus does not understand the concept of pain.
I a. not sure that this Is a correct objection. It ^y be that so„e
simple perceptual propositions can be beyond reasonable doubt for a
person even If that person does not understand the concepts contained
In the proposition In question. Perhaps basic sensory evidence Is
available even to a preconceptual child. This may not seem at first
sight a plausible contention; however, I am not convinced that It Is
obviously false. I will not try to argue that It Is true, but I will
discuss In later chapters points that have some bearing on this
issue
If the objection is correct, however, it is a relatively
simple matter to revise to:
DB3: Bpst =df Tpt & Uspt & D[(Tpt & Uspt>>Rpst]
where U means "understands."
Although the difference is relatively minor, DB2 and DB3 can-
not both be right. Since DB2 is simpler, and since, as I believe,
nothing significant within the scope of this work turns on the issue
between DB2 and DB3, I prefer to use DB2 in subsequent discussion. It
must be recognized that it may ultimately be necessary to move to DB3.
I believe, then, that for our purposes DB2 is satisfactory as
a definition of basic propositions.
How successful is this definition in meeting the criteria of
adequacy noted at the beginning of Chapter I? It appears to meet the
first two criteria quite well. The terms of the definiens are either
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wen understood or defined (for Chlshol.'s own definition of "beyond
reasonable doubt" cf
. Chisholm, 1977, p. 7), so It should allow us to
clearly distinguish basic propositions from nonbaslc ones. It also
helps us understand the concept of basicness. We see that a proposi-
tion Is basic because It Is an Immediately reasonable one. Its truth
,
rather than its relations to or dependency upon other propositions. Is
enough to guarantee Its reasonableness. This does seem to capture the
foundatlonallsts' notion of basic propositions as the starting point
for knowledge, as propositions which (because they are beyond reaso-
nable doubt) can justify other propositions but which (because their
truth Is sufficient for their being justified) do not require positing
further propositions which justify them in turn.
It is only partially successful in meeting the third
criterion—compatibility with foundationalists
’ differing views about
what to count as basic propositions. The definition is certainly
broad enough to include those foundationalists who deny that basics
are certain or incorrigible, hence it is preferable in that regard to
the definitions of Lehrer et al., which seemed to pose inappropriate
or irrelevant conditions that did not appear essential to a definition
of basic propositions. (At the same time, the definition does not
exclude those foundationalist who do hold basics to be certain, since
a certain proposition is a fortiori beyond reasonable doubt.)
However, DB2 may be incompatible with some external world versions of
f ounda t ionali sm . Such foundationalists who hold that propositions
such as that expressed by "Moore has two hands" can be basic for a
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person would not be able to accept DB2. For such a proposition ™ay be
true but not at all reasonable tor a person who does not know Moore.
However, It does not appear that e;^ external world toundatlonallst
would have to reject HB2. Many
.Ight deny that the above proposition
about Moore Is basic, and Insist that what is basic is a proposition
such as that expressed by "I see Moore's two hands." And that, they
might say, such that whenever It Is true It Is beyond reasonable
doubt for the Individual In question. I an. Inclined to think the
latter claim is Incorrect, but that Is because I am a Cartesian
foundatlonallst. Given the sorts of arguments that external world
foundatlonallsts direct against Cartesian foundatlonallsts. It would
seem that many of the former foundatlonallsts would agree that the
proposition expressed by "I see Moore's two hands" fulfills the con-
ditions of DB2.
So the exclusion of some foundationali sts is a limited one,
and perhaps an inevitable one given the tension already noted between
the first criterion and the third. Nevertheless it does prevent me
from saying that DB2 is a definition that is perfectly adequate to all
forms of foundatlonalism, and this is disappointing insofar as ray task
has been to give a general characterization of foundatlonalism that is
adequate to all its varieties. On the other hand, insofar as ray task
is to clarify and defend a specifically Cartesian form of
foundatlonalism, I believe that the preliminary goal has been
accomplished, for it seems to me that DB2 is an entirely adequate
definition for the Cartesian foundatlonallst.
69
And insofar as this chapter has not been entirely adequate to
so.e versions of foundatlonalls™. that deficiency can perhaps be «de
up in part by discussing and further clarifying *at the various fonts
and varieties of foundatlonallsm are. That Is the topic of the next
chapter.
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to contextualism parallels the applications to coherentlsm andto foundationalism noted above.
2x discuss a few paragraphs farther on the Wittgensteinean
objection that this hypothesis—that Holmes and Watson have the same
evidence—is incoherent.
2This objection has been suggested in conversation with philo-
sophers at the University of New Hampshire. I have not seen a
suggestion in print that there is such an Incoherence, and I am not
sure exactly what path a development of this suggestion would take,
but it would seem to be based on comments of Wittgenstein and Malcolm,
regarding difficulties surrounding the concept "the same." See
Wittgenstein (1972, numbers 215-216, pp. 84-85; number 350, p. Ill)
Malcolm (1962, pp. 78-79).
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where the latter evidence is totally unknown to the subject. Thesediscussions appear to have in mind the distinction noted later on inthe present chapter between evidence which is available to a subject
and evidence which is not available, rather than our more complexdistinction between the internally and the externally justified.
The early causal analyses of justification by Swain (1972,
1978) and Goldman (1967) do not appear to make our distinction,
although as noted above Swain's new account (1981) does appear ’to give
conditions for justification in our internalist sense.
Bonjour (1980) discusses "externalist theories of empirical
knowledge in terms that make clear that he has in mind something
quite close to our concept of external justification (cf. Bonjour,
1980, p. 55). He also contrasts his externallsm with another concept
of justification which he does not spell out at all, but one suspects
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p stemlc status beyond that Is more difficult. I am, however
w lling to say this: If such a proposition is not strong enough to beevident, it is also not strong enough to be beyond reasonable doubt Inmy sense or to be externally justified.
1-
precisely categorizing some propositions interms of their epistemic status can be brought out by reflecting on
^ propositions between that expressed by "I will not liveto be 35 and that expressed by "I will not live to be 200." Theformer is probably unreasonable to me to believe, but the latter is
almost certain. T^at then are the age boundaries—the points at which
the epistemic status goes from unreasonable to reasonable, from reaso-
nable to beyond reasonable doubt, etc.? Clearly, these epistemic
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categories are artificial, and there will inevitably be propositionswhose precise epistemic status will be difficult to deteLiL.
^Cf. Wittgenstein (1972, p. 194).
or "TV,-!
the subject is told "These are the rabbit's ears,"This is the nose of a silhouetted figure," he may still not seethe new pattern. The subject’s new realization is not reducible tonew factual knowledge such as could be pointed out in this way.
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Chapter V
Awareness
Cf. Chisholm (1977, p. 22). Originally labelled D2 . 1
.
Cf., e.g.. Chapter IV, "Basics and Background Knowledge,"
,
"Defending the Given Without the Thesis of Nonpr opos itional
,
Chapter VII, "EP4 and the Understanding of Concepts."
chapter III
WHAT IS FOUNDATIONAHSM? HI; THE VARIETIES
OF FOUNDATIONAL ISM
some varieties of foundatlonallsm are dlstlr^ulshed and
discussed, with special emphasis on Cartesian foundatlonallsm. The
philosophical motivations behind Cartesian foundatlonallsm are
detailed, and an argument against coherentlsm Is briefly noted.
The Need to Distinguish Different
Types of Foundatlonallsm
The essential tenets of foundational ism, stated at the
beginning of Chapter I, provide only a bare sketch of a theory—
a
sketch which working foundationalists often flesh out with additional
tenets considered important adjuncts to any "interesting" foun-
dationalist theory. The essential tenets say nothing, for example,
about the ^ntent of basic propositions; but a Cartesian
foundationalist will insist that basic propositions can only be about
a subject's mental states.
It is important to recognize such "nonessential" foun-
dationalist tenets, not only because they are considered important
aspects of foundatlonallsm by the formulators of such theories, but
also because advocates of foundatlonallsm and their critics alike
often misunderstand these varieties of foundatlonallsm and their rela-
tionships to one another. An advocate might fail to appreciate that
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in defending fhe existence of basic propositions he has done nothing
to enhance the reasonableness of the specifically Cartesian foun-
datlonallsm he thinks he has established. A critic of
foundatlonallsm, In attacking phenomenalism, Carteslanlsm, Iterative
epistemological principles, or other views often associated with
foundatlonallsm, might mistakenly think he has refuted foundatlonallsm
as such when he has said nothing against Its essential tenets.l And
both advocates and critics of foundatlonallsm have, I believe, failed
to realize with respect to certain aspects of foundatlonallsm that
there are additional alternatives to those often thought to be
exhaustive. Hence the value of a systematic classification not only
of foundatlonallst theories that harc^ proposed but also of some
of the more Important and distinctive of those that could be proposed.
Some Varieties of Foundatlonallsm
in Outline Form
Perhaps the clearest way to proceed is to outline some of the
most important varieties of foundationalism. This outline will serve
as a handy reference for the more detailed discussion of these
varieties in the following sections.
These variations on foundationalism fall into two main
classes, related to the two essential tenets of foundationalism.
First, different foundationalist theories put different constraints on
the nature of basic propositions. Second, there are different ways of
construing the relation between basic and nonbasic propositions.
The outline is as follows:
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I. Constraints on nature of basic propositions.
A. Content
1 .
2 .
Limited
Include
to propositions about subjective mental
external world propositions
states
B. Epistemlc status
!• Issue of certainty
a. Must be certain
b. Need not be certain
2. Issue of incorrigibility
a. Must be incorrigible
b. Need not be incorrigible
C. Iteration" requirements
1- "p is basic" must itself be basic
2. p is basic need not be basic
D. Belief status
1. Proposition can be basic only if subject believes thatproposition
2. No such requirement imposed
E. Context dependence
1. Impossible for a basic proposition to function in dif-ferent context as nonbasic
2. Possible
a. Context dependency based only on different subjects'
^LLfsi^ant relations to given proposition
b. Context dependency based on major social, cultural, or
conceptual change that makes different class of propo-
sitions basic
II. Specifics concerning the relation between basics and nonbasics
A. Logical relationships (sources of justification of nonbasics)
1. Inductive and deductive only
2. Others besides these, e.g. basics justify nonbasics via
synthetic a_ priori epistemlc principles
B. Phenomenalist relationships
1. Phenomenalism: nonbasics are logical constructs from sense
data
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C.
2 . Denial of this (various versions*
scientific realism, etc.)
direct realism,
Extent of justification
1 .
2 .
Complete justification of nonbasics by basicsrartial justification
JustU?cat"i"“°''* additional source
for
of
efore I proceed to discuss in detail the varieties of foun-
datlonallsm here outlined, a few general remarks are in order on this
system of classification.
First, the variants on foundationalism outlined here are by no
means exhaustive. I have only meant to identify some central
alternatives. For example, other types of foundationalism are
possible besides those listed as lAl and IA2 (basics as restricted to
subjective mental states versus basics as including external world
propositions). One might hold that only theoretical scientific propo-
sitions can be basic. It is not clear that anyone holds this view,
2
but it can qualify structurally as a version of foundationalism in
that it can meet the two essential tenets of foundationalism. Also,
there may well be other major categories (i.e. at the level of
generality represented by the capital letters in the outline) not
Included above which identify other ways in which specific foun-
dationalist theories may differ. And there will of course be
variations even within the most specific variants I have here
outlined. For example, within category lAl, there may be various ways
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o£ Identifying those subjective mental states considered to be basic.
Second, vAlle most of the specific alternatives listed within
a general category are mutually exclusive (e.g. Id and IC2: either
P Is basic" must Itself be basic or It is not necessary that It be
basic), there are not very many ways In which a commitment to one spe-
cific type of foundatlonallsm In a general category commits one to
another specific type of foundatlonallsm In a different general
category. For example, a commitment to a foundatlonallsm that
restricts basics to subjective mental states (category U) does not
commit one to the view that basic propositions are certain or Incorri-
gible (category IC) or to the view that phenomenalism explains the
relation between basics and nonbasics (category IIB). In Chapter IV I
will attempt to show in some detail that this is the case.
For the present, I shall simply note that if indeed commitment
within one of the categories of the above outline does not require
commitment within another category, then even within the limits of
this outline there are potentially a large number of theoretically
distinct varieties of foundationalism. Two founds tionalists who agree
in restricting basic propositions to those about subjective mental
states might disagree as to whether basics must be certain, and so
advocate slightly different versions of foundationalism. Or they may
also agree that basics must be certain, but disagree as to whether a
basic proposition is one that is believed by the subject, and so on.
In this way, schools within schools of foundationalism can be
generated
.
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A plethora of logically distinct versions of foundatlonalls.
does indeed ^he It difficult for the critic to sweep away foun-
datlonallsm In a single stroke. But the foundatlonallst, for his
part, is faced with the task of distinguishing his theory fr„n the
other
.yrlad posslhllltles. He ^y fmd that the specific coe^t.ents
which render his version of foundatlonallsm distinctive and
interesting h^ been challenged, and that alternatives «,y be closer
to pure coherentism than he would wish.
Relative Importance of These Categories
for the Present Work
My main concern here is to defend the possibility of a foun-
dationalism of type lAl—that is, a foundatlonallsm which limits basic
propositions to those about subjective mental states. This type of
foundatlonallsm I will refer to as Cartesian foundatlonallsm. I
should note that Cartesian foundatlonallsm as I discuss and defend it
IS not a historically accurate representation of Descartes' theory of
knowledge. Descartes' theory differs from what I am calling Cartesian
foundatlonallsm in several important respects. Descartes apparently
held that the propositions that served as his starting point were
absolutely certain. 3 He seemed to assume that the derived or nonbasic
propositions were related by logical deduction to the initial or basic
propositions.^ Most Importantly, Descartes did not use propositions
about sensory impressions as the direct bases for specific proposi-
tions about the external world. Rather he used the proposition that
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he existed, togethet with Innate truths of reason revealed by the
natural light, to deduce the existence of God. thence, again
deductively, to general and then ultimately to singular truths about
the external world.
5
Nonetheless, the term Cartesian" Is not entirely out of line
here. Descartes did elaborate a recognizably foundatlonallst theory.
And his Initial skepticism about the external world and consequent
turn to subjective mental states Is diametrically opposed to the
external world foundatlonallsm that Is the chief alternative In this
category.
In addition to the Cartesian foundationalist tenet lAl, I
accept tenets IBla (basics as certain), IC2 (no iteration
requirement), ID2 (no belief requirement), IE2a (limited context
dependency), HA2 (justification relations not limited to induction
and deduction), IIB2 (rejection of phenomenalism and sense data), and
IIC2b (role for coherence relations). But with one exception I am not
concerned to defend these tenets. That is, I would not regard a great
deal of consequence to have been lost should one or more of these
tenets prove to be Incorrect (unless of course this could be shown to
entail the incorrectness of lAl as well). The exception is IE2a.
This tenet is an important part of any foundationalist theory I would
find of interest and worth defending. In conjunction with lAl, it
forms the theory that basic propositions are necessarily restricted to
the class of subjective mental states. The opposing doctrine, IE2b,
allows different classes of propositions to become basic as a result
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Of social or linguistic change. 1 do not believe the class of basic
propositions Is vulnerable to such change, and It seems to me that
foundatlonallsm as traditionally conceived would be seriously compro-
mised were basic propositions shown to be so vulnerable. This Issue
Is discussed in the "Conceptual Change" sections of chapter IV.
The project of taking seriously and defending a foun-
datlonallsm that combines tenets lAl and IE2a Is, If nothing else, at
least Interesting and controversial. Coherentlsm became a respectable
and frequently discussed theory within modern analytic philosophy
after the demise of logical posltlvlsm.6 while 1 would doubt that a
majority of analytic philosophers today would class themselves as
coherentists, it .ay well be that a n^jorlty do now regard coherentist
and other critics of foundationalism as having levelled decisive cri-
ticisms against foundationalism as traditionally conceived. Recently,
within about the last five years, there has been a perception that
these criticisms do not address more moderate, less traditional ver-
sions of foundationalism. 7 Perhaps as a result, there has been a ten-
dency to move away from both pure coherentlsm and traditional
foundationalism, toward these more moderate forms of
foundationalism. 8 Specifically, it has become popular to reject IE2a
in favor of IE2b, the view that what are to be taken as the foun-
dations of knowledge depend on the cultural or linguistic context, and
can vary from place to place or time to time. For other reasons,
James Cornman and John Pollock, who have been quite sympathetic to
traditional foundationalism, have more recently come to prefer more
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moderate theories that combine foundatlonalist and coherentist
elements.9 Chisholm Is perhaps the only prominent contatporary philo-
sopher who advocates one of the more traditional forms of
f ounda t ional i sm • ^ ^ Xn seneral t-hot-a -lg , here seems to be a perception that
the "extremes" on the foundatlonallst-coherentlst spectrum are very
likely If not surely false, and that the truth Is to be found
somewhere in the middle.
This is an appealing perception, but I believe that the
doctrine of moderation in all things is questionable if it is meant to
apply to epistemology. Perhaps because of its appeal as a reasonable
compromise, the move to the moderates' bandwagon is proceeding too
hastily, abandoning more traditional foundatlonalist views—
specifically, views which accept tenets lAl and IE2a—before they have
even been seriously challenged. Foundationalism of the more tradi-
tional variety ought not at this stage to be rejected, but it ought to
be regarded as a viable theory on a par with other current theories
about the structure of epistemic justification. This, at any rate, is
what I hope to go some way toward showing.
In the following sections I will briefly describe some of the
Issues Involved within each of the categories as outlined and state
their apparent relation to Cartesian foundationalism. Then, in accord
with my emphasis on Cartesian foundationalism, I will say more about
this doctrine, specifically about the motivations for accepting and
defending it. The important subsidiary doctrine that the status of
Cartesian propositions as basic is not vulnerable to socio— linguistic
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change will be discussed, as noted above. In Chapter IV.
In explaining the outlined categories, I am primarily con-
cerned vrith the theoretical distinctions rather than with determining
which If any philosophers have actually held the views categorised.
Some of the views categorised are. as I have already noted, those that
could be rather than have been proposed. Also, some of the views are
ideal types >*lch may or may not fit well the often more complex views
of specific philosophers. However, wherever possible I shall try In
the notes to match these views as categorized vrtth those of actual
philosophers
.
——
2£^teslan and External World Foundatlonalism
The Cartesian variant of foundationalism (lAl) asserts that
basic propositions are limited to those about a subject's mental
states. It does not say that ^ proposition about a subject's mental
states must be basic for that subject. Nor does it say that any such
proposition must be potentially basic. It says only that any basic
proposition will be taken from this category of subjective mental
propositions
.
What constitutes a proposition that is about a subject's men-
tal states? These are propositions about the subject's sensations,
emotions, thoughts, beliefs, memories, and intentions. They must not
be confused with statements about the world external to the
subject. Thus, the proposition expressed by "S sees a red apple"
might be taken to be about S's subjective mental state on the grounds
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that seeing Is a subjective mental state. Howevet. seeing, when It Is
successful, has to be more than a subjective mental state. As the
above sentence Is usually understood (and as we will understand it)
plies that there Is a red apple which S observes. Thus, It is as
much about the world external to S as It Is about S's mental states or
processes
.
In order to isolate the purely subjective from the "mixed-
propositions we must restrict the class of subjective mental proposi-
tions to those which have no direct implications about the state of
things external to S. Such propositions can be expressed in terms of
beliefs ("S believes he is looking at a red apple"), how S takes
something ("S takes there to be a red apple before him"), how S is
appeared to ("S is appeared to redly," or "S is appeared to
red-apple-ly"), and in other ways ("S is experiencing red-apple sense
data, "S's visual data present him with a red-apple-appearance,"
etc
.
)
.
The possibility of speaking in some such way as this of purely
subjective experience presupposes that a distinction can be made bet-
ween what is given in experience and the external world. This possi-
bility has been challenged by those who hold that it is Impossible in
principle to mark off a realm of the purely subjective, or that the
notion of the given in experience is incoherent. These views will be
discussed in Chapter V.
On the external world account (IA2), propositions about the
external world, for example that expressed by "I see an apple," do not
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themselves require any further Justification. They are directly
justified. If one were to ask, "What Justifies the proposition that
you see an apple?" the only response could be. "Nothing Justifies it,
except the fact that I ^ see an apple. "H
IB Eplstemic Status of Basi cs
Many criticisms of foundationalism are based on the view that
no propositions, even those about one’s experiences, are incorrigible,
or that the propositions that the Cartesian foundatlonalist takes to
be basic cannot be epistemically certain for the subject in question.
Such criticisms implicitly assume that if a proposition is to be
basic, it must be incorrigible or epistemically certain. Sometimes,
definitions of these eplstemic values are given, sometimes not.
Certainty is defined in a variety of ways. Incorrigibility is often
defined in terms of the impossibility of being mistaken. ^2
Ultimately, there may be no significant difference between these
terms. In any case, what never seems to be recognized as needful is a
demonstration of why foundationalism. Cartesian or otherwise, must be
committed to the view that basics have the high eplstemic status in
question. Granted, any form of foundationalism will have to hold that
basic propositions are justified (in one or both senses) and hence
that they have some positive eplstemic value. But there is nothing,
on the surface at least, that appears to logically require that basics
have the ultimate or highest eplstemic status, although this is often
attributed to them.
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What Is necessary, if Cartesian foundational Ism Is to be
refuted by the certainty Issue. Is 1) a definition of certainty (or
incorrigibility, depending on td,lch term Is being used to attack foun-
datlonallsm), 2) a demonstration that Cartesian foundatlonallsm Is
committed to Its basic propositions being certain (Incorrigible), and
3) a demonstration that these basic propositions are not after all
certain (Incorrigible) In the sense defined. 1 „iu consider In
Chapter IV whether any critic of foundatlonallsm has succeeded in
establishing these points.
IC Iteration" Requirements
Another criticism of foundationalism sometimes made is based
on the fact that the definitions of basic proposition, the arguments
given for the existence of basic propositions, the epistemic prin-
ciples used to state the existence of basic propositions or the ways
in which they are used to justify nonbasic propositions do not them-
selves appear to be immediately justified. The definitions,
arguments, and principles used by the foundationalist are almost
w
always complicated and derivative, as far from being directly evident
as the propositions of any modern analytical theory in philosophy.
These facts seem, to many critics, to pose a problem for
foundationalism. However, the problem turns out to apply only to what
William Alston has called "iterative foundational! sm" This sort of
foundationalism requires that the proposition expressed by "p is a
basic proposition" itself be a basic proposition. Or perhaps it
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requires that the eplstemlc arguments or principles of the foun-
daticnallst be basic. It Is difficult to tell, because so tar as
can determine, no foundatlonallst explicitly states or Is clearly
mltted to Iterative foundational Ism. 15 The use of Iterative toun-
datlonallsm by these critics, and Its relation to Cartesian
foundational Ism, are topics discussed In Chapter IV.
I
com-
ID—Belief Status
Foundatlonallst theories may differ according to whether they
Insist that In order for a proposition to be basic for a subject, It
must be believed by that subject. Most accounts seem to hold that
basics must be believed. An alternative account, and the one which I
discuss In Chapter VII as the most plausible account, holds that a
basic proposition need only be true of a subject, not believed by him.
On this account. It Is not only what one believes that Is basic, but
also what one experiences. (Strictly: It Is propositions about what
one experiences that would be basic.) Other non-belief accounts of
basics could be developed, but It Is the experience-based account
which I take to be the most plai^slble and which I concentrate on.
Thus, criticism which held that basic propositions cannot con-
sist of what Is believed by a subject would not touch that variety of
foundatlonallsm which holds that basic propositions state a subject's
experiences without requiring that he believe these propositions to be
true.^^
Both variants here are, I believe, compatible with Cartesian
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foundationalism. The Cartesian may hold that a subject’s experiences
alone, independent!, of his beliefs about the., fo™ the propositions
which are basic for that person. Other Cartesians
.ay insist that
propositions about the subject's experiences do not becce basic
unless and until the subject believes the. to be true.
The tt,o variants would collapse into one belief-based sche.e
if the following thesis were true:
N: Necessarily, if s has sensory experience e. Chen Selieves that he has sensory experience e.
This so-called naturalistic theory of belief, derived fro. Hu.e.l7
would not allow a proposition to be basic in the Cartesian sense
without also being believed. If this were so. then the second variant
(ID2) would not be viable. These matters will be discussed
.ore fully
in Chapter VII. Here we need only note that there appears to be
nothing within Cartesian Foundationalism as such, in dependent of the-
sis N, that is incompatible with either IDl or ID2
.
IE Context Dependence
Under what conditions is a proposition basic? Can a proposi-
tion that is basic be in some contexts nonbasic? To deny this is to
affirm one version of foundationalism within the above category. Such
a foundationalism would insist that the proposition expressed by "It
seems to S that there is something red before him," for example, must
be a basic proposition in all contexts.
To this rather inflexible foundationalism one may compare a
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mcr. flexible foundatlonallsm (IE2a) which would still Insist that all
basic propositions will always he fro. a certain general class of
propositions, e.g., the class of subjective propositions tor the
Cartesian foundatlonallst. But It would also hold that these proposl-
may be basic In some contexts, nonbasic in others, depending on
the eplste.lc conditions of the .o.ent, while recognizing, of course,
that the proposition expressed by "It seems to S that there Is
something red before him" can be a basic proposition for S, this ver-
sion Of foundatlonallsm also recognizes that the same proposition may
be nonbasic for person T. For example. It may be Indirectly justified
for T by S s verbal report about his experiences. Nevertheless, any
proposition that can ever be basic Is drawn from a limited, unchanging
category, e.g. that of subjective propositions about a person’s
experiences. It is this more flexible alternative which I would
regard as the most plausible and with which the theory discussed in
Chapter VII is compatible.
The third theory represented under heading IE in the outline
IS one which holds that even the categories from which basic proposi-
tions may be drawn are variable (IE2b). In principle, there is one
sub-version of this alternative which would hold that at one given
time and place, basic propositions may be drawn from different types,
depending on the epistemic context. For example, both external world
and subjective propositions may be basic for the same or different
persons at a given time, depending on the epistemic context. David
Annis is the only philosopher I am aware of who may have developed
90
such a theory ( cf
. Annl<? 1 Q 77 ^ ^nls, 1977. especially p. 351). Certainly more
popular and influential al Is a different sub-version of this alternative
which states that what functions as a hao-i.c b s c proposition is histori-
cally or culturally relative Wha»- k . ry r r . at is basic from one cultural
perspective or historical era a^y „ot be basic from another such
perspective. Or perhaps It Is scientific progress that requires a
change In the propositions that are basic for a culture at a given
stage of scientific development. 18 A major tradition descending from
(but not including) Kant and asserting the cultural or historical
relativity of categories is at least compatible ulth this version of
foundatlonallsm, even though this compatibility is often unrecognized
and even chough in fact It has generally been assumed that the
theories within this neo-Kantlan tradition are Incompatible with
foundatlonallsm. Most likely, those who assume such an Incom-
patibility have In mind more traditional versions of foundatlonallsm.
But there is nothing In principle to keep theories of this
sort from being described as foundational. They can retain the two
essential tenets of foundatlonallsm and remain structurally Identical
to a more traditional theory that accepts variants lAl and IE2a.
'-Ihether they remain compatible with the spirit of Cartesian founda-
tlonallsm Is another question. I doubt that a Cartesian foundatlon-
alist would feel he was making only minor concessions if he found
himself forced to adopt this "shifting foundations" view. The
Chlsholmlan theory discussed In Chapter VII of the present work Is
incompatible with this view Insofar as the eplstemlc principles there
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discussed are taken to be universally true rather than culturally or
historically relative. Nevertheless, although these two different
types of foundatlonallsm are Incompatible, from a structural point of
view they both seem to be properly described as foundational.
IIA—Logical Relationships
on
on
non-
I turn now from variations on foundatlonallsm dependent
different notions of basic propositions to variations dependent
different accounts of the relation between basic propositions and
basic Justified propositions. The first category to be discussed
deals with the logical relationships which might be said to exist bet-
ween basic and nonbaslc propositions. The two alternatives I
distinguish within this category are: first, one which requires a
strict logical relationship-deductive or induct Ive-be tween basics
and nonbasics .(IIAl), and second, one which does not require such a
relationship (IU2). (By an Inductive relationship I am referring to
one based on Induction by enumeration: after a series of observations
one arrives at a probable conclusion.) According to the first
alternative, a basic proposition must logically imply (deductively or
inductively) the nonbasic proposition it justifies. According to the
second alternative, the relation need not be one of logical
implication.^^
There are, I suppose, a variety of ways in which the relation
between basics and nonbasics might be specified according to the
second alternative. I will mention here only the one discussed in
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Chapter VII. On this vle„. basics Justify ncnhaslcs In accotdanca
with eplste.lc principles. These principles, taken to he necessarily
true, state the conditions under >*lch a basic proposition Justifies a
nonbaslc one. This "eplstemlc principles approach" Is based on that
of Roderick Chisholm.
Cartesian foundatlonallsm Is compatible with either of these
alternatives. The Cartesian foundatlonallst might hold that Che
"objective" world Is a logical construct from sense data or the
subject's experiences and hence that a proposition about this world
can be deductively implied by a proposition about the subject's
experiences. Or he might deny this and hold that the subject's
experiences Justify external world propositions because of universally
true eplstemlc principles which specify the conditions under which
such Justification occurs. No Incompatibility exists between
Cartesian foundatlonallsm and either position on the logic of Justlfl-
cation relations.
IIB--Phenomenalist Relationships
Foundationalism is often associated with phenomenalism. A
recent monograph uses the latter term to describe all foundationalist
theories. But phenomenalism is distinct from foundationalism, and
this distinction ought to be kept clear. The former is a theory of
perception which holds that propositions about the "external world"
are logical constructs from sense data or some other sort of men-
talistic entity. On this view, statements about one's experience will
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deductively or analytically entail ordinary stat^ents about the phy-
sical world. A statement by a subject that he sees a red apple before
him Just means that he Is having such and such sensory experiences, or
that such and such sense data are presenting themselves to him.
That foundatlonallsm and phenomenalism are distinct theories
should be clear. IJhat may not be clear at this stage is how a foun-
datlonallst could avoid being a phenomenallst as well. In Chapter IV
I will try to show not only that the two theories are distinct, but
also that they are logically Independent. It Is quite possible to
accept foundatlonallsm while rejecting phenomenalism.
Extent of Justification
The last theoretical division I shall consider distinguishes
between foundatlonallst theories which hold that basic propositions
completely justify all nonbaslc justified propositions (IICl), and
those which assert that nonbasics are justified only In part by basics
and that some of their justification derives from other nonbasics
(IIC2). Theories of the latter type may go on to specify the extent
or type of justification relations that exist between basics and non-
basics and between nonbasics and nonbasics. They may hold, for
example, that basic propositions are necessary but not sufficient con-
ditions for each nonbaslc proposition being justified (IIC2a). They
may hold. In addition to this view, that coherence relations between
nonbaslc propositions provide an additional source—besides the rela-
tion to basics propositions—for the justification of nonbaslc
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propositions (IIC2b). The second of the essential tenets of foun-
datlonallsm only prohibits a nonbaslc proposition's deriving M of
Its justification from coherence relations or some other relations
that have nothing to do .rtth basic propositions. Basic propositions
must have something to do >rtth the justification of e^^ empirical
proposition.
There Is much that would need to be clarified In these
accounts were they to be adequately developed. And while It certainly
appears that Cartesian foundatlonallsm Is compatible with any of these
alternatives. It may turn out that admitting coherence relationships
to any extent might have broader Implications that would require the
Cartesian foundatlonallst to give up much or all that he felt was
worth defending In his theory. Criticism has been made along these
lines concerning Chisholm's allowance of coherence relations In his
theory. This criticism will be discussed briefly In Chapter IV.
The Philosophical Motivation Behind
Cartesian Foundationalism
I have said something about the variety of theories within the
foundationalist framework. In the next two chapters I shall attempt
to defend some of these varieties against criticisms that have been
made in the literature before going on in the two concluding chapters
to discuss specific theories of Cartesian foundationalism. But what,
it might be asked, is the motivation for all of this? Given that I am
not going to establish that Cartesian foundationalism is a superior
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theory to Us coherentlst and moderate fonndatlonaist rivals, why
choose this out of such a wide array of alternatives to discuss In
detain Something should be said to motivate the discussion on which
Che rest of the present work Is based.
It seems to me entirely adequate to say simply that Cartesian
foundatlonallsm, in conjunction with the view that the class of basic
propositions Is not relative to changing cultural or linguistic con-
ditions (IE2a of the above outline), Is a theory which has been
regarded as Important by many philosophers and which has not been
seriously challenged by Its critics. This latter point of course has
not yet been established, but If It Is true, as I hope to show In the
next two chapters, then that In Itself seems significant to the debate
on theories of eplstemic justification. And If In addition It Is
true, as claimed above, that there has been a recent tendency to
discount traditional foundatlonallsm without convincing argument In
favor of more moderate alternatives, then It would seem that tradl-
tional foundatlonallsm Is worthy of reconsideration.
This seems to me sufficient justification for examining the
theory In some detail. It says nothing, however, about the positive
merits of the theory. Short of providing detailed arguments for It,
which Is beyond the scope of the present work, I can only briefly men-
tion some general reasons why traditional foundatlonallsm (more
precisely, Cartesian foundatlonallsm Including tenet IE2a) might be
considered preferable to Its alternatives. It Is difficult to be cer-
tain of the reasons why a particular view Is Important to a
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com-
philosopher, but one can pick up soma hints from the work of
Cartesians such as Descartes himself and Chisholm. These hints,
blned with reflections on my own philosophical concerns as a Cartesian
foundatlonallst, give rise to the following list of concerns, each of
»hlch the Cartesian foundatlonallst Is likely to feel needs to be
addressed. The major alternatives to Cartesian foundatlonallsm,
however, fall to address one or more of these concerns.
1) Antl-relatlvlsm. The concern here Is to maintain that
there Is a way the world Is that Is Independent of cultural beliefs
and expectations, conceptual schemes, language, and experience. The
Cartesian foundatlonallst wishes to oppose the radical relativism
which Insists that there Is no way the world Is, there are only
culturally or Individually different ways of perceiving and
conceptualizing
.
The foundationalist will not, of course, as an epistemologist,
address directly the metaphysical issue posed by ontological relati-
vism ("There is no way the world is"), but he will address epistemolo-
relativism. ( Competing knowledge systems are all equally
adequate. It is impossible to evaluate one from the perspective of
another. None can be said to objectively reflect the way the world
is. ) He will try to establish that all justified propositions are
adequately related to the actual world and that epistemological sets
of beliefs can be more or less adequate—epistemlcally better or
worse depending on how accurately they reflect the way the world is.
One major problem the Cartesian foundationalist has with both
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coherentism and the more moderate forms of foundational! sm that reject
IE2a in favor of IE2b Is that they at least leave th^selves open to
form of relativism. For the coherentist, propositions are eva-
luated according to v*ether they Internally cohere with the other pro-
positions within a belief systeo,. How then is one belief system to be
evaluated with respect to another equally coherent but quite different
belief system? It does not seem to the foundatlonallst that this
theory ties beliefs down to the way the world Is In an adequate
manner. As to the "shifting foundations" theory, this too Is open to
the same problem. How are we to evaluate the different foundational
belief structures of different cultures or different historical eras?
Some advocates of these anti-Cartesian theories explicitly
affirm relativism or strongly imply it. Others, who may not have
said anything about relativism as such, have been interpreted as
relativists .22
2) Taking skepticism seriously. The Cartesian foun-
dationalist takes skepticism as a challenge to be met. That we have
knowledge is a proposition which, at least at some point, needs to be
questioned and, if possible, explained and justified. It is
legitimate, it seems to me, to assume that skepticism is false, as
long as one also attempts to explain how knowledge is attained, and as
long as one holds skepticism as ultimately true if such explanations
turn out to be unsatisfactory.
3) Taking the relation between experience and reality to be
problematic. Given my experiences, how do I know they reflect accura-
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can
tely a world external to me? Descartes’ specific concerns are
reflected here; I could be dreaming. I could be deceived by an
evil genius, or made to have these experiences by sophisticated
neurophysiological techniques, mat eplstemlc principles, If any,
get me from propositions about my experiences to propositions stating
that I am Justified In believing some proposition about the external
world? The Cartesian founds tlonallst will try to set up a plausible
justificatory relationship between propositions about one's experien-
ces and chose about the external world, taken as an Independent and
objective world which Is the object of our knowledge.
These last two concerns explain the Cartesian foundatlonal-
ist's dissatisfaction with external world foundatlonallsm. It does
not seem to the Cartesian foundatlonallst that It Is appropriate, in
light of the skeptical hypotheses generated by Descartes and others,
to simply Ignore the possibility of skepticism and Insist that we do
have unproblematic knowledge of the ordinary things we think we know.
Even If skepticism Is ultimately rejected, a philosophical problem has
been posed, and a response to It that Includes an explanation of why
skepticism does not follow seems required.
The reason the Cartesian foundationalist believes we must
retreat from asserting that we have unproblematic, immediately
justified knowledge of ordinary external world propositions, and that
it 1^ pemissible to assert that we have at least immediate justifica-
tion (if not knowledge) about our experiences is that propositions
about the external world, but not those about our experiences, are
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vulnerable to the skeptical hypotheses . 23
A word should be said here. In discussing motivations for
Cartesian foundatlonallsm. about the regress problem, which Is taken
to be an Important argument for foundatlonailsm. The argument,
reduced to Us simplest form. Is that there must be basic
proposltlons-unjustlfled justlf lers-because otherwise an Infinite
regress is generated. Such a raoroco ^ j iD n eg ess is absurd, hence there must be
some end to the chain of justification. 2^
I do not find this argument compelling. It seems to me to
generate as many puzzles, and to be ultimately as unresolvable, as
cosmological arguments based on the supposed absurdity of an infinite
causal chain of events. Cartesian foundational ism, or at least some
form of foundationalism, may well be the most adequate theory we have
about the nature of epistemic justification. But I would be very
surprised if some version of the regress argument ever proved this.
It should be recognized that arguments for foundationalism can come
from other sources than the regress problem.
What’s Wrong with Coherentism?
As a final way of explaining the motivation behind Cartesian
foundationalism, I shall quote a recent and, it seems to me, plausible
objection to coherentism. This does not, of course, close the door on
the debate. There may be a response to the objection, and in any case
there are other alternatives to turn to besides Cartesian
foundationalism. I am not intending to portray this as a decisive
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refutation of coherentism. but simply as a prlma facie plausible
objection Chat can help explain why a philosopher might be motivated
to take foundationalism
tlon is Ernest Sosa's,
in at least some form seriously. The
in The Raft and the Pyramid" (1980).
objec-
belilTs amongD i et is open to an objection from alternative coherentsystems or detachment from reality, depending on one’s
latter perspective the body of beliefss held constant and the surrounding world is allowed to varv
worirthft°T
P^’^apectlve It Is the surroundingld tha is held constant while the body of beliefs isallowed to vary. In either case, according to the
any‘'be^^ef^
“““ Justification for
( 1 )
Let us sharpen the question before us as follows. Isthere reason to think that there is at least one system B’
a ternative to our actual system of beliefs B, such that B'contains a belief X with the following properties:
in our present nonbelief circumstances we would
not be justified in having belief X even if we
accepted along with that belief (as our total
system of beliefs) the entire belief system B'
in which it is embedded (no matter how acceptance
of B' were brought about); and
that is so despite the fact that belief X coheres
within B at least as fully as does some actual
Jnstified belief of ours within our actual
(il)
belief system B (where the justification of
that actual justified belief is alleged by the
coherentist to derive solely from its coherence
within our actual body of beliefs B)
.
The coherentist is vulnerable to counterexamples of this
sort right at the surface of his body of beliefs, where we
find beliefs with minimal coherence, whose detachment and
replacement with contrary beliefs would have little effect on
the coherence of the body. Thus take my belief that I have a
headache when I do have a splitting headache, and let us sup-
pose that this does cohere within my present body of beliefs.
(Thus I have no reason to doubt my present introspective
beliefs, and so on. And if my belief does not cohere, so much
the worse for coherentism, since my belief is surely
justified.) Here then we have a perfectly justified or
warranted belief. And yet such a belief may well have rele-
vant relations of explanation, logic, or probability with at
most a small set of other beliefs of mine at the time: say.
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that I am not free of headache, that I am In pain chatsomeone is in pain, and the like. If so, then an’ea^llvcoherent alternative is not far to seek. Let ever^^rinv
the splitting headache^exc^t for
he £ii:r?hat n ^ headache Sthtn belief tha I do have a headache, the belief that Tn pain «th the belief that 1 am not in’paln, thrLurf hatsomeone Is In pain with the belief that someone Is not inpain, and so on. I contend that my resulting hypotT^ical
system of beliefs, and yet my hypothetical belief that I dohave a headache would not therefore be justified.
(Sosa, 1980, pp. 18-19)
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Notes to Chapter III
^In Chapter IV I
tics of foundational ism
dationalism as such, or
actually attacked other
foundationalism, but not
shall be primarily concerned with those
who, thinking they have attacked foun-
a specifically Cartesian foundationalism,
tenets often associated with Cartesian
essential to that theory.
cri-
have
does not give a snecifnV ^ .u. basic. Cornman
^L'po'sslbnjnL"^""’" Sellars d"es\t Ua^r^ava'^pln^cne ssibi ity that our conceptual framework based on observatiL^I
(s”xia?‘ri,i^;;p-3%rT3sr
cL?rtta?“thls'
“ shlars Is making thr«rr;psUi:e"
case Sellars
framework shift will occur. In any
rhl lh
rejects the view that we sh^d now regard
353-358r^
statements of science as basic (cf. ibid., pp.
^
Meditations, Descartes undertakes to "withhold my
rD^c.rr “ f entirely certain and indubitable"
[of withh^’d-^^
’
vol. 1, p. 145). "I shall ever follow in this road
[ ol ing assent] until I have met with something which iscertain, or at least, if I can do nothing else, until I have learned
nothing in the world that is certain"(ibid. p. 149). I^en Descartes arrives at the proposition he uses to
econstruct his knowledge, he is quite explicit about its epistemic
status: I am, I exist, that is certain" (ibid., p. 151).
Descartes claims to have adopted the geometer’s method of
exact demonstration from known premises: "Having aimed at writing
nothing at all in this Treatise of which I do not possess very exact
emonstrations
,
I am obliged to follow a similar order to that made
use of by the geometers, which is to begin by putting forward as pre-
mises all those things upon which the proposition that we seek
depends, before coming to any conclusion regarding it" (ibid., p.140). His proofs of the existence of God, and of the general ’veracity
of our senses, are clearly intended to proceed deductively from
established premises (which have come to include not only "I exist"
but, more controversially, various general propositions which
Descartes claims are evident by the natural light).
103
5cf. Meditations III-VI (ibid., pp. 157-199).
lytic trJdUioTsel no^e'forctplerj!^
the relation of logical positivism to cohereitlsr^ri^cite Neurath's "Protocol Sentences" (19?9 0" ^ ’,^ l\fP°ttant to
Foundation of KL'ledgf " l«f"^i:L^l
on the other hand. alfhougi^f;e:b”f
-rciifi:\er“S^what was interpreted (e.g., by Schllch, Ibid . "p! 2 S-^i) : %
twe of ^ Actually, Neurath'^ vLws Le c oser tohose the moderate foundatlonallsts *0 accept IE2b-the "sMftlnefoundations view. (Cf. Neurath, 1959, especially, pp. 203-205^)®
-n/cb ^
example Alston (1976a and 1976c), Annis (1976 n
(1981)
(1978), Pastln (1978), Robinson (1979) and Lld^ln
specific examples of this move to moderate foun-dationalism see note 18 below.
’Cornman (1978), Pollock (1979). For Pollock's earlier foun-dationalist views see Pollock (1974).
^^Chisholm (1977 and 1980).
foundationalists include Descartes himself andisholm. Although, as noted above, there are significant differencesbe^een Cartesian foundational ism In the narrow sense It is used hereand the actual views of Descartes, It would seem that with respect tothe specific debate between Cartesian foundationalists in our sense
and external world foundationalists, Descartes should be classified
with the former. For Descartes, our judgments about the external
world call for further justification, whereas this is not the case
'^ith respect to our feelings and thoughts:
I am the same who feels, that is to say, who perceives certain
things, as by the organs of sense, since in truth I see light,
I hear noise, I feel heat. But it will be said that these
phenomena are false and that I am dreaming. Let it be so;
still it is at least quite certain that it seems to me that I
see light, that I hear noise and that I feel heat. That can-
not be false; properly speaking it is what is in me called
feeling, and used in this precise sense that is no other thing
than thinking.
(Descartes, 1911, vol. 1, p. 153)
Chisholm s Cartesianism is evident when he discusses what
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4a S ^ “£ Justificatory
Propositions aLut e«erLl wo'rlH^"® ‘ ' •'")•
for one can appropriately ask one'f us'uLltl'orfor'ta??^"®proposition. This is not
i^icati n for holding that
thoughts and beliefs.
"Thinking and^bll i ^digm cases of the directly evidLt" fChishor^
cM.^....
..
: ,
Chl^hows p*U^,nt „
that G.E Mo: e 5s TirLTf'. foundatlonallsts, It U posslbir
External World" L cLlL ^taf^^e 4 In "Proof of an
is another" can be known to be tr
hand, and here
i/.A. ^
o K ue without proof (Moore 1959 n146, cf. also Moore, "A Defence of Common Sense," 1966 Part l^ This
“Ite:e::5'"h'“t"P"“ founhtlonaiut ll^hha?
servHs he taSls for'^T"" justified and
says th^t 5: 5: ::t
ampincal knowledge. However, Moore only
5:rht5 loof :f :: PP°P<= premise in turn in order
n
^ external world to be a good one. This is essen-
luaie^
^ ^ practical logic about how best to eva-
propositions abouthe external world without being able to construct proofs of them isyet to adopt the external world foundational ist view that it isappropriate or even impossible to ever ask for the justification for abaste external world proposition. Also. Moore does not talk euLrthese essays about the structure of known or justified
propositions. Thus it is difficult to assess from them whether he isa foundationalist of any sort.
nP 77 external world foundationalists are Annis
y\V-l->T^ Swain (1981, cf. especially pp.44/228). Annis contextualist theory" (1977 and 1978) is essen-
t ally a version of the "shifting foundations" view (IE2b) that
asserts that in appropriate contexts (including nonproblematic obser-
vational contexts) ordinary propositions about the external world canbe basic for some observers ( cf
.
Annis, 1977, p. 351).
12Cf. e.g., Lehrer (1974, p. 83).
Foundationalists who have held that basic propositions are
certain or incorrigible have included Descartes ( cf
.
1911, vol. 1, cf
.
note 3 above), Lewis ( cf . e.g., 1946, p. 30), and Chisholm (cf. 1977,
p. 11). These philosophers, in characterizing basic propositions as
certain or incorrigible, have not worked these concepts into their
definitions (if any) of basic propositions. (At one point Chisholm
did include the certainty requirement as part of his definition of the
self-presenting. This is discussed in note 4 of Chapter IV.)
105
^^Cf. Alston (1976c, p. 171).
above, note 4). One might Infer ftom thl^took his methodological principles to be certain bur^hL"^
''
required that these be basic as well arthr'rs ’identified as certain f ^ propositions he
feel heat!” etc )
® =>'P'^«3ed by ”I exist," "I seem to
ges from examination of passa-
which eventually support a genuine probability ” i e flng!^!r Lsi
in
_Mlnd and the World Order n’gss
.3^2) in a passage which appears to be making the same point
thrLrt!!«ytf !Lf’T ’^hat his argument establishesne certaint of singular propositions that serve as the data sut^porting nonbaslc propositions to the conclusion that it establlstesthe certainty of "antecedent general truths" (emphasis mln^r Lw salso speaks of the knowledge which depends on . . . theseprinciples, as though Che eplstemlc principles which determine e.gwhich propositions are basic, are themselves not only certain, but
’
foundational and basic.
Even in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation itself Terjic*
comments might betaken to imply iterative assumptions. In arguingthat nothing can be probable unless something is certain, Lewis holdsthat a basic proposition that is only probable will allow us to say of
nonbasic propositions only that they are probably probable. And thisleads, according to Lewis, to a circle or an Infinite regress (cf.Lewis, 1946, p. 186). This again seems to assume that the epistemicjudgments of a foundationalist theory (e.g., propositions' such as
those expressed by "p is probable," "q is basic", "r is evident,"
etc.) must themselves be certain. In Chapter IV I will attempt ’to
show that there is no obvious circularity or infinite regress in
holding such eplstemlc judgments to be merely likely or plausible.
Chapter I, Lehrer (1974, p. 76), Williams
(1977, p. 61), and Pollock (1979, pp. 93-94), seem to assume in their
defining statements of basic propositions that anything which is basic
must be a subject’s belief, or at any rate that only such believed
basics can eplstemically support nonbasics. This assumption is then
used against foundationalism, e.g., when Pollock writes:
According to [foundationalism], all epistemic support derives
ultimately from what epistemologically basic propositions one
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believes. Unfortunately, one rarpl v Koi
gically basic propositions at all.
eplstemolo-
Wlll (1974, p. 144), Annls (1978 n
230), and Pastin (1978 p. 286') do •’ (1978, p.
basic propositions in their Hpfi
^™P°se such a restriction on
22). ChlLl™ is even expLclf ?•
mlc principles statin, bo n‘
"hen he formulates his eplste-
does so li te?ms of ban?""'
P-^oPO-tlons justify nonbaslc ones le
believed by t” s^bjecJ ^,cr. e.g., ibid., principle C, p. 78).
624).
Cf. Hume, ^Treatise of Human Nature (1888, pp. 183-184,
18
Wlttgensteln“r?hlloLphlcaj''f ^ view include
V
v-L^Di;, ana bellars Empiricism and the
se1v ^
f° (1563). These authors probably did not see them-
have ?h:; b^:: :o“i:?“;^:u:iH"acleJ,“^?ir;p!%^^i.,-^
iEE{:~~coherentism has been made, rt may be plausible to place such phllo-sophers as Quine and Sellars within the former category. (HoLver
Ic«rIlnrto“'rr f^plrlclsm" In "The WohdA co ding t Quine Chapter IV. On Cornman's Interpretation ofSellars, cf. note 2 above.)
Works which are less directly tied to epistemology, but whichnonetheless have been closely allied with and perhaps itJLnced bythe epistemological views of Wittgenstein, Quine, and Sellars, includestudies in the philosophy of science such as Hanson’s Patterns of
^
iscovery (1958), Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions(1970), and Feyerabend’s Against Method (1975). Kuhn’s inflnpnri.ibook in particular has in turn had its influence in epistemology
elping to make the "shifting foundations" view, here interpreted asparadigm shifts in the scientific community over time, more popular
and accepted.
l^Among those who, whether foundationallsts or not, seem to
assume the first alternative are Descartes (1911, vol. 1, p. 140),Quine (1969; cf. in the present work the Chapter IV section "Can Basic
Propositions Be Properly Related to Nonbasic Propositions?" for a
detailed discussion of Quine’s position), and Harman (1973, p. 164).
Explicit recognition that the second alternative is available to foun-
dationalists is to be found, for example, in Chisholm (1977, pp.
64-67) and Cornman (1978, p. 252).
^^Williams, Groundless Belief (1977; cf
.
p. 1 for his
discussion of this usage). Ayer, in The Foundations of Empirical
Knowledge (1940) defends a phenomenalist version of foundationalism
.
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(1977,
spearor-Joie""'’ "I;useSoPhe Pe™ concuPPence.- On P.: "iSclL
P f his position as relativistic (Kuhn, 1970).
2 3Cf. the passage from Descartes quoted above, note 11.
2 ACf. discussions of Chisholm (1964 do 261 2 ft 7 -9 A«^WUllap,s (1977, Chappep 3), and Foley (1978).
’
chapter IV
THE CRITICS OF FOUNDATIONALISM I: FROM
INCORRIGIBILITY TO CONCEPTUAL SCHEMES
A variety of crltlclsns of foundatlonallsm are assessed, tron,
the point of view of determining whether they are successful against
Cartesian foundatlonallsm. It Is shown that some criticisms are
directed against tenets associated with but not essential to Cartesian
foundatlonallsm. Other criticisms attack Cartesian foundatlonallsm
more directly, but are shown to be unsuccessful.
A Plethora of Critics
Is foundatlonallsm false? Has it been refuted? Many philoso-
phers have thought so. In some circles the received opinion is that
W.V.O. Quine and Wilfred Sellars have dealt the decisive blows that
have spelled the end of foundatlonallsm as a viable theory. 1 Others,
using different approaches, have been equally critical of
foundatlonallsm. 2 However, there are a few who have criticized the
critics William Alston, for example, argues that critics of foun-
dationalism have at best challenged a few tenets which have been asso-
ciated with foundatlonallsm but which are not essential to
foundatlonallsm as such (Alston, 1976a, 1976c). And James Cornman has
argued that, far from refuting foundatlonallsm, Quine and Sellars have
actually taken foundationalist positions of a moderate sort (Cornman,
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1978. pp. 249-251 ). A. sa.e ll„e. however, new crUlcls^s of
foundatlonallsm have emerged which In some Instances avoid the errors
pointed out by Alston. Most significant here Is the work of Michael
Williams (1977) and Laurence Bonjour (1978).
the next two chanters T Qhai i u iP ) sn il try to show that none of the
critics of foundationalism has refuted Cartesian founda tionali sm
. It
is Cartesian foundationalism specifically, when allied with the tenet
that the foundations do not shift over time (tenet IE2a of the Chapter
III outline), that I wish to defend. I would not consider particular-
ly interesting or successful a defense that salvaged some more moder-
ate form of foundationalism, along the lines that Cornman says Quine
and Sellars adopt, while giving up the "stable foundations" version of
Cartesian foundationalism. On the other hand, I shall not be con-
cerned to defend all the claims that have been made by foun-
dationalists or that have been associated with foundationalism,
provided that those claims are not essential to this version of
Cartesian foundationalism.
The present chapter will be concerned with a number of dif-
ferent criticisms, while the subsequent chapter will focus on the so-
called myth of the given. The topics of the present chapter, together
with the critic or critics mainly discussed within a topic, are as
follows
:
The Certainty or Incorrigibility of Basic Propositions
(Lehrer, Will)
Foundationalism, Sense Data and Direct Realism (Dilman)
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p?opo*:f4'„:r(Q:f„e;
Iterative Foundational ism (Peirce, Aune)
Are Basics Adequate to Support Nonbasics? (Foley)
Conceptual Schemes and Conceptual Change (MargolisLehrer, Armstrong, Quine, Sosa, Sellars)
The Certainty or Incorrigibility
of Basic Propositions
A frequent criticism of founda tionali sm has been that so-
called basic propositions do not or cannot have the epistemic status
required of them if they are really to function as basic propositions
Critics taking this line hold that the foundationalists' basic propo-
sitions must have the high epistemic status of certainty or
incorrigibility, and that they do not have this status, or cannot be
proved to have it.
The concept of certainty is usually taken by these critics to
mean having the highest possible epistemic status: a proposition is
certain if it is justified and such that no proposition can be more
justified than it is. 3 Incorrigibility is usually taken to mean inca-
pability of being in error or mistaken. As Keith Lehrer defines it:
S has an incorrigible belief that p if and only if (i) it is
contingent that p and (ii) it is logically Impossible that S
believes that p and it is false that p.
(Lehrer, 1974, p. 83)
Frederick Will takes incorrigibility in a wider sense, to mean not
just impossibility of error, but impossibility of justified revision:
Ill
blUty of malfunction Is Itself but one LSc^ofpossibility that Is represented in incorrigibility
^”Like
exMbir^eiriLMli'r'^"'": dlscrii;i;atlon
!„a K ;
liability to change, improvement, deteriorationand obsolescence in the dependence they exhibit at allupon individual and social needs and the coiditl^nsWhich these needs are filled.
vwxxj., i^/4, p. zu/)
Although Will distinguishes Incorrigibility from certainty (cf. Will,
1974, pp. 206-208) he lists both these eplstemlc properties as among
those required by the foundatlonallsts' basic propositions:
There is [according to the foundatlonallst] a class of claimscognitions, that are known in a special direct, certain
ncorrigible way; and all epistemic authority resides inthese. The philosophical question of the epistemic status ofany claim is always a question of the relation of that claimto this class of first cognitions. A claim can be establishedto be a genuine example of knowledge, or at least a claim
worthy of some kind of reasonable adherence, only if it can bedisclosed to be, if not a first cognition Itself, in somedegree authenticated by one or more of such cognitions.
(Will, 1974, p. 142)
Will then attacks foundationalism on the grounds that these epistemic
properties do not in fact belong to "first cognitions" or basic propo
sitions (Will, 1974, Ch. 7, cf . especially pp. 196-211).
In a similar vein, Lehrer sets up stringent epistemic stan-
dards which, at least in an early chapter, he asserts that any basic
propositions must meet:
... a basic belief must either be irrefutable, or, if refu-
table at all, it must only be refutable by other basic
belief s
.
(Lehrer, 1974, p. 76)
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Basic beliefs are basic
truth is guaranteed.
because they cannot be false; their
p. /g)
A central thesis of [ foundationalism] is that beliefs whiVhare Justified by basic beliefs are safe frorsub
.r t ^ justified by basic beliefs might be
^ basic beliefs themselves were refuted. In
Similarly’ Tf the 1
^ foundation for justification,b , i justification of basic beliefs did notguarantee their truth, then such beliefs would be open torefutation on the grounds that, though they are self-justified, they are in fact false. If there is nothing toensure that such basic beliefs are true, then, ipso ffctrthere IS nothing to ensure the truth of those biTi^fTTf^yjustify. Hence, they too are open to refutation.
(Ibid., p. 79)
Lehrer then characterizes this notion of irrefutability more
precisely as the definition of "incorrigible" noted above. He
attempts to show that no empirical propositions—including even
Cartesian propositions about one's mental states—are incorrigible as
so defined (cf. ibid., pp. 83-100).
Others who have made similar criticisms of foundationalism
include Delaney (1973, p. 240), Rescher (1974, pp. 702-704), Margolis
(1974, pp. 121, 125-7), Cornman (1978, p. 252), Rorty (1979, p. 171),
and Aune, (1967, p. 41). Not all of these authors regard such criti-
cisms as decisive against all forms of foundationalism, and many go on
to defend what they consider to be more moderate forms of
foundationalism.
The first question to ask about such criticisms is whether
they are accurate in attributing to foundationalism the requirement
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that basic propositions be certain or Incorrigible. Only 1( this Is
an accurate attribution Is It relevant here to consider the validity
of these critics' arguments that basic propositions are not certain or
incorrigible.
Historically speaking, it does seem an accurate attribution.
One of Descartes' most obvious concerns was with achieving
certainty, not only in a set of basic propositions, but in those pro-
positions derived from such a set. In a sense of Cartesian foun-
dationalism which attempts to be fully adequate to Descartes’ actual
views, the question whether basic propositions are certain or incorri-
gible is surely relevant. But I am not discussing Cartesian foun-
dationalism in any such strictly historical sense. Cartesian
foundationalism, as I am using that term, insists with Descartes that
propositions about the subject's mental states are basic for that sub-
ject without insisting, at least not explicitly, that these proposi-
tions be certain or incorrigible. Is there then some implicit
requirement that commits our Cartesian founda tionali st to incorrigibi-
lity or certainty? It does not appear so. The only requirement that
the Cartesian founda tionali st, in our sense, need add to the two
essential tenets of foundationalism is that those propositions which
are basic for a subject be taken from the set of propositions about
that subject’s mental states and sensations. And all one can conclude
from these requirements is that a basic proposition be justified, not
that it have some higher epistemic status.
William Alston makes just this point against Will’s criticism.
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He formulates Minimal Foundatlonallsm^^ as follows:
Every mediately justified belief stands ar ^ /
(Alston, 1976a, p. 290)
This is roughly equivalent to the second of our essential tenets. Let
us add to this, as any founda tionali st must (Alston's minimal founda-
tionalism is a bit minimal), that there are immediately justified
beliefs (i.e., basic propositions) and, as our Cartesian foundation-
alist must, that these immediately justified beliefs are about the
subject’s mental states and sensations. I do not believe that these
additions in any way alter Alston’s conclusion against Will:
m// targets of Will’s criticism are not to be found inMinimal Foundationalism. What that position requires of a
oundation is only that it be immediately justified, justified
y something other than the possession of other justified
e lefs. And to say that a certain person is immediatelyjustified in holding a certain belief is to say nothing as to
whether it could be shown defective by someone else or at some
other time.
(Ibid., p. 291)
Nor is it to say, one might add, that the belief is certain, or
incorrigible in Lehrer’s sense. Points similar to Alston’s have been
made by Pastin (1974, p. 709) against Rescher and by Goldman (1981, p.
425) against Rorty.
Will, Lehrer, and other critics of foundationalism may have in
mind Lewis’ claim that in order for anything to be even probable,
something must be certain ( cf
.
Lewis, 1946, p. 186). The critics of
foundationalism do not make this point, and it would certainly need to
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be defended. But even If It were to be successfully defended, it
would not follow that^ propositions would be those that would
have to be designated as certain.
It is important to note too that, while Descartes was con-
cerned that not only basic propositions but those derived from them be
certain, modern founda tionali sts have not taken certainty as the^
Sua of basic propositions. Although Chisholm has taken Cartesian
propositions to be certain (cf. Chisholm, 1977, p. U), certainty has
not been a structural requirement of Chisholm’s system. Even if
Chisholm’s claim of certainty for Cartesian propositions were shown to
be in error, this would not require the revision of any of his defini-
tions or principles. His definition of the self-presenting, for
example, requires only that a self-presenting or basic proposition be
evident for the subject (cf. ibid., p. 22).^ Similar considerations
apply to the concept of Incorrigibility. While a self-presenting pro-
position must, by Chisholm’s definition, be true, the subject whom
that proposition is true of has no epistemlc guarantee of its truth.
The epistemic status of that proposition for him is that of being
evident, and as Chisholm notes, a proposition may be both evident and
false (cf. ibid., p. 15).
Other founda tionali sts who do not require certainty for their
basic propositions include Pollock (1974), Cornman (1978) and Pastin
(1978). These philosophers would appear to go further than Chisholm
in saying not only that basic propositions are not defined as certain
but a.lso that such propositions are not in fact certain.
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What about the specific Cartesian foundatlonallst theory dis-
cussed in the present work? Clearly, the definition I have adopted In
Chapter II (DB2) does not require certainty of a basic proposition.
It requires only that It have the considerably lower eplstemlc status
of being beyond reasonable doubt. Nor does DB2 appear to require
incorrigibility In Lehrer's sense. Since It does not require that
when p Is basic for S. S must have a belief that p, It can hardly
require chat when p Is basic for S, S must have an Incorrigible belief
that p. And since propositions which are beyond reasonable doubt can
and should be rejected when they conflict with propositions with
higher eplstemlc status, DB2 seems to allow at least the structural
possibility that a basic proposition Is susceptible to Justified
revision. Thus, DB2 does not appear to require Incorrigibility In
Will's sense either. Of course, basic propositions may turn out to
have such properties as certainty and Incorrigibility after all. The
point Is only that DB2 does not require that they have these
properties
.
Foundatlonallsm, Sense Data, and Direct Realism
Founda tlonali sm has frequently been associated with the hypo-
thesis that sense data mediate between the percelver and the objects
of the ex-ternal world. On this hypothesis, objects are not perceived
directly .ectXlne directly perceives only sense data, not the objects
themseiv^,-"! ’e
It is -easy to understand why this association has been made.
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Cartesian foundationalists have taken subjective experience as episte-
mically primary. This is often thought of as direct knowledge. The
external world is. by contrast, known indirectly. It might be dif-
ficult to imagine, given such descriptions, how the founda tionalist
could £vold positing sense data or other phenomenological
intermediaries. Sense data would explain what is known immediately,
inferences from sense data what is known mediately.
And yet it would be a mistake to assume that the foundatlon-
alist is thus comitted to sense data. It would be just as mistaken to
assume that founda tlonalism is inconsistent with direct realism-the
view that it is possible to directly perceive ordinary physical
objects such as tomatoes. Thus. Michael Williams misunderstands the
nature and commitments of founda tlonalism when he says, after his
extended critique of founda tlonalism. that his own "no-foundations"
view amounts to a defence of direct realism" (Williams. 1977. p.
179). So too does Ilham Oilman seem to misunderstand that when philo-
sophers (typically foundationalists. though Oilman does not mention
foundationalism by name) speak of external world propositions as being
mediately or indirectly known
.
this does not commit them to the view
that such propositions are mediately or indirectly perceived . The
metaphysics of perception is a quite different issue from the episte-
mology of justification and knowledge. It is logically possible that
my perception of an apple can be direct even though my knowledge that
I am seeing an apple is indirect or mediated.
Oilman appears to think that the issues of whether an object
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Is directly known and whether it Is directly perceived are. If not
numerically Identical, at least so closely tied that an answer to one
question will automatically give us the answer to the other. And he
feels that the sense-data hypothesis obscures the correct view that
ordinary objects are directly known (and perceived):
The answer to the first question ’Can we know the truth of anyphysical object proposition directly and without inference”Can we perceive physical objects directly?’ leads to the
’
question Whenever we perceive a physical object, do wealways and necessarily perceive sense-data?’ It is because weimp icltly take the answer to the second question to L“e"
(Dilman, 1975, p. 88)
Note that Dllman’s two ways of formulating the "first question" are
actually put in quite distinct ways—the first in epistemological
terms of direct knowledge, the second in metaphysical terms of direct
perception.
Dilman goes on to argue that we do directly perceive ordinary
objects and, because of his equation of distinct questions, believes
he has legitimately concluded that our knowledge of such objects is
direct. Indeed, part of his conclusion is put in epistemological
terms
:
I have argued that one can avoid skepticism, that one can
admit and even Insist that we can and do often know directly,
non-lnferentially
,
that before us stands a tree, or that there
is an ashtray before our eyes, without having to deny that
these objects exist independently of being perceived, that if
we cease to perceive them this does not mean that they have
stopped existing, in the sense that this is true of our after-
images and our aches and pains. How? By recognizing that
when we look at trees and ashtrays what we see are these
objects themselves and not sense impressions; or rather by
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recognizing the confusion in the idea thfl^
(Ibid., pp. 94-95)
Note again that Dll^an's conclusion that „e have direct knowledge Is
derived from his claim that we see trees, ashtrays, etc. directly,
unmediated by sense impressions or data.
But the claim that we have direct knowledge of external world
objects clearly incompatible with Cartesian foundatlonallsm. For
the Cartesian foundatlonallst (unlike the founda tlonallst who holds
that external world propositions are basic) holds that external world
propositions are Justified (and hence known) tor a subject only when
they stand In a proper derivative justificatory relation to proposi-
tions about that subject's mental states. Hence such knowledge is not
direct but dependent on eplstemlcally prior propositions. These
Implications of Dllman's argument tor Cartesian foundatlonallsm are
obvious, even If Dllman does not mention foundatlonallsm by name.
The dilemma that seems to be posed for the Cartesian foun-
dationalist may be summarized thus:
DA. (1) If Cartesian founda tionalism is true, then proposi-
tions about the external world are justified and
known only mediately.
(2) If external world propositions are justified and
known only mediately, then external world objects are
perceived only mediately and indirectly.
(3) External world objects are perceived immediately and
directly.
(4) Cartesian founda tionalism is not true.
Philosophers such as Dilman and Williams seem to assume the
truth of premise 2. And if something like (2) is correct, then direct
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realism is surely incompatible with Cartesian
believe, however, that no successful defense
and that no incompatibility between Cartesian
direct realism has been established.
foundational ism. I
of (2) has been given
foundational ism and
What can be said In defense of (2)? Apparently Oilman feels
that to say that a proposition cannot be known directly Is to say It
Is known. If It can be known at all, only by inference. For the only
thing Oilman says that can be construed as a defense of (2) Is that
the subject does not make any Inference from sense Impressions, sense
data, or Internal mental states, to ordinary physical objects:
... the idea chat whenever we make a claim about such thingsas chairs and tables we are making an inference from our sense
aTtabJer::d,rb^''“a^'''”'”'°”‘®’ of the chairsnd tables which produce these symptoms In us is a confusedone. It Is true, of course, that we are sometimes deceived bvour senses. But this does not mean that we may always bedeceived ... ^
The case where we know Moore is lifting his hands because
we can see him doing so quite clearly is different from the
case where a blind man knows the same thing from hearing Moore
say so. As I argued, given that certain conditions are
ulfilled e.g., that the light is good, our eyes in order
and Moore not a conjurer—it is not conceivable that we may be
mistaken and there is nothing that we would call "making sure"
that what we see are Moore's hands. . . . This surely means
that in that case there is no inference from what I see to
what I know. If what I know is that Moore has lifted his two
hands, then this is just what I see.
(Ibid
,
pp. 91-92 )
Inference thus seems to be the key to determining whether knowlege is
direct or indirect, according to Oilman. If the knowledge of a par-
ticular proposition involves inference, it is indirect; if it does
not, it is direct. Since we do not infer the existence of trees and
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ashtrays, we have direct knowledge of them anH ho pr n , d hence Cartesian foun-
datlonallsm Is not true. Or so the argument would run.
Obviously, much hangs on what DUman means by Inference here.
I take him to mean roughly that an external world proposition Is
inferred by a subject If he consciously or unconsciously reasons from
how things appear to him to how things actually are in the world. In
this sense, I agree with Oilman that simple external world proposi-
tions are not ordinarily Inferred. It takes considerable intellectual
sophistication even to conceive of the idea of sense Impressions or
how one Is appeared to as something distinct from how the world
actually is. Even when a subject has such sophistication. It does not
seem that he normally reasons, however unconsciously, from the
existence of sense Impressions to the conclusion that something out
there Is causing those Impressions. His belief that that Is an
ashtray Is not the conclusion of an argument. On rare occasions, he
may make an inference, but only, it would seem, when he has some
reason to doubt the accuracy or adequacy of his sensory apparatus or
to suspect trickery, etc.
But this does not in itself show that Cartesian foun-
dationalism is incompatible with direct realism. For it does not
follow from the fact that a known or justified proposition has not
been inferred that it is Immediately known or justified (i.e., that it
is epistemically basic).
And it seems quite consistent for the Cartesian foun-
dationalist to say both that an external world proposition is unin~
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f erred and involves direct perception on the one hand, and that it is
nonbasic on the other. How can this be? Suppose that Smith is in
fact looking at an ashtray, and suppose that direct realism is the
true theory of perception. So Smith is directly perceiving the
ashtray, and not sense data or other metaphysical intermediaries. Nor
is he making any inferences about the ashtray. Is Smith justified in
believing that he is looking at an ashtray? Well, that depends on all
sorts of factors Uiat are independent Uie fact that direct realism
IS and SmM^ as ^ happens^ dj^^tly perceiving th^
ashtr^. Smith may not be justified because someone he had good
reason to distrust told him, falsely, that he was being tricked by
mirrors or hypnotism, etc. The epistemic issues are independent of
the metaphysics of perception issues. Whether Smith is justified is
not a function of the fact that he is directly perceiving the ashtray.
What is the basis for Smith’s justification, or lack thereof?
This too is independent of the direct realism issue. The Cartesian
foundationallst will say that in any case Smith’s justification for an
external world proposition exists because of some relation this propo-
sition has to propositions about Smith’s mental states or about how he
is appeared to. The external world proposition is not, on this
account, the sort of thing that can be immediately known or justified.
It is epistemically more complex than that, even if in normal cir-
cumstances the perceptual situation is the relatively simple and
straightforward one of direct awareness.
How can the Cartesian foundationallst who is also a direct
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realist explain >*y the eplstemlc situation could be relatively
complex and mediated while the perceptual situation Is simple and
The reasoning here is similar to the reasoning why a subject
may have a belief that Is true yet not Justified, or a Justified
belief that Is not true. That a subject is in f^ directly per-
ceiving an ashtray is something that Is not always known to him, and
his Justification for It, says the Cartesian foundatlonallst, is not
ediate or obvious. It depends rather on other eplstemlc factors.
Suppose again that the subject is In fact directly perceiving the
ashtray. Our direct realist Cartesian foundatloanllst will
acknowledge this. But he will also note that the subject could be
having similarly compelling experiences even though he was not
directly perceiving the ashtray. He could be having a very realistic
dream. He could be a brain in a laboratory, etc. Now these possibi-
lities do not serve to "de Justify" the belief for the subject. But
they do serve, according to the Cartesian foundatlonallst, to require
eplstemlc mediating steps^ that make the proposition a Justified one
for the subject these possibilities serve to show that while the
w
experience can be directly justified, the belief that one is in fact
actually directly perceiving an ashtray is not directly justified.
According to the Cartesian foundatlonallst, it is appropriate to ask
what the subject's justification is for holding some belief about the
external world all such beliefs have some distinct justificatory
basis while it is not appropriate to ask what the subject's justifi-
cation is for holding some belief about what seems to him to be the
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case or what he is now experiencing. But it need not follow from this
that the subject cannot at tl.es directly experience the external
world. Presumably, he Is when he Is In tact lookln* at an ashtray.
But he is not when he Is merely dreaming that he Is looking at an
ashtray. (m such a case perhaps sense data or sense Impressions will
make their appearance.) Such a possibility represents an eplstemlc
complexity that may well mean that even In the direct perception case
the subject does not have direct or Immediate Justification tor his
belief s
.
It is in no way incompatible with direct realism to suggest
that specified conditions must prevail before a subject can be said to
have justification for a belief about the external world. For
example, one might require with Chisholm that the belief be without
ground for doubt (cf. Chisholm, 1977, p. 76). Epistemlc principles
might well state what these conditions are, without thereby denying
that direct perception may well occur under some of these conditions.
The conditions stated by such principles would not necessarily include
the requirement that the subject make inferences from his experiences
to conclusions about the external world. Chisholm's principles would
again serve as examples here.
To return to the passage from Dilman most recently quoted
above, it is Interesting to note that Dilman there includes conditions
that a Cartesian foundationalist might want to include in stating why
we can know that Moore is lifting his hands: the light is good, our
eyes are in order, Moore is not a conjurer, etc. Dilman is attempting
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to explain here ho» „e have dl^ knowledge that Moore Is lifting his
hands. The Cartesian foundatlonallst might well point ont that It Is
not always Immediately apparent that the light is good, that onr eyes
really^ l„ order, that Moore really is trustworthy (perhaps he Is
trying to trick us somehow the way John Austin did when he presented
his class with a stick half In the water that looked bent, and In fact
really was bent). Given that we must first be justified in believing
that trustworthy conditions obtain, the Cartesian foundatlonallst
might insist contra Dllman that knowledge that Moore Is raising his
hands is not direct knowledge In the sense of being Immediately and
unproblematlcally justified. Is not Dllman himself stating as much
when he states the conditions that must obtain In order for us to
directly p^ercelve Moore lifting his hands?
None of this of course shows that the Cartesian founda tional-
ist is correct. What it shows, it is to be hoped, is that there is no
demonstrated incompatibility here between Cartesian founda tionali sm
and direct realism.
Can Basic Propositions Be Properly Related to
Nonbasic Propositions?
Another criticism that Cartesian founda tionali sts have met
with is how basic propositions can be related in the appropriate way
to nonbasics so that the former provide the proper justification for
the latter. One specific criticism of this type has been that neither
deductive nor ( enumerative ) inductive relationships could explain how
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basics justify ncnbaslcs. Barring the truth of phencenallst., state-
ments about a subject's experiences do not deductively entail state-
ments about ordinary physical objects. And no aggregate of
experience-statements would seem to provide Inductive support for
external-world statements. As Nicholas Rescher notes:
... no amount of claims in the language of appearance—however extensively they may reach In terms of tow twLsappear to me and what I "take myself" to be seeing
toeihr*’ 1" any theoretically guaran-e able result regarding what is actually the case in the
Thlsf; appearaL:-t e es will fall short on the side of objective content.
(Rescher, 1977, p. 703,
emphases omitted)
Rescher Is actually touching on a host of issues in this passage, but
the problem of how one can move from sense-based propositions to those
about the external world is clear enough.
W. V. 0. Quine, in "Epistemology Naturalized," also feels that
foundationalist programs come to grief in through a failure to bridge
the gap between experience and the world:
Just as mathematics is to be reduced to logic, or logic and
set theory, so natural knowledge is to be based somehow on
sense experience. This means explaining the notion of body in
sensory terms; here is the conceptual side. And it meansjustifying our knowledge of truths of nature in sensory terms;
here is the doctrinal side of the bifurcation [of a theory
into its meaning (conceptual) and truth (doctrinal) aspects].
(Quine, 1969, p. 21)
Quine is willing enough to accept that the conceptual requirements for
a theory of knowledge based on sense experience can be met. Two
methods of conceptually explaining body in sensory terms would be
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acceptable to Quine: one alternative Involves using
contextual definition to show how for each physical object sentence a
translation can be made to a sentence about sensory Impressions; the
second alternative Involves the use of set theory to reduce physical
Object statements to
-some subtle construction of sets upon sets of
sense Impressions" that would determine "a category of objects
enjoying Just the [desired] formula properties ... for bodies"
(ibid., p. 73). Quine thinks the first method Is "unassailable,
-
while the second-though apparently acceptable to Qulne-would pro-
bably be too drastic for eplstemologlsts skeptical about the ontology
of sets. Such eplstemologlsts settle for bodies outright over sets
(cf. ibid.).
It is in its doctrinal aspect that Quine feels the attempt to
base natural knowledge on sense experience fails:
. . . The mere fact that a sentence is couched in terms of
observation, logic, and set theory does not mean that it canbe proved from observation sentences by logic and set theory.The most modest of generalizations about observable traits
will cover more cases than its utterer can have had occasion
actually to observe. The hopelessness of grounding natural
science upon immediate experience in a firmly logical way was
acknowledged. The Cartesian quest for certainty had been the
remote motivation of epistemology, both on its conceptual andits doctrinal side; but that quest was seen as a lost cause.
To endow the truths of nature with the full authority of imme-
diate experience was as forlorn a hope as hoping to endow the
truths of mathematics with the potential obviousness of ele-
mentary logic.
(Ibid., p. 74)
Quine holds that this failure means that we ought to abandon
epistemology as traditionally conceived—we ought to abandon the pro-
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ject ot
-justifying our knowledge of truths of nature In sensory
tents. Instead we should
-naturalize" epistemology and regard It as
the mchologlcal study of how stimulation of the sensory receptors
does lead to the subject's construction of his picture of the world.
Quine proceeds:
Such a surrender of the epistemological burden to psycholoev
restoZ: If T - c^rcula?*"
gro::ds ®0£ empl L^rsc'Jrn^^L^l^^^f validation of the
psychology or other empirical science in the valuation.However such scruples against circularity have little pointonce we have stopped dreaming of deducing science fro^
serva on. If we are out simply to understand the link be-
avallabirr? advised to use anyilable information, including that provided by the veryscience whose link with observation we are seeking to
understand. ^
(Ibid., pp. 75-76)
Whether such a purely descriptive psychology could ever
explain how propositions come to be justified, I have my doubts. But
in any case, the point here is to examine Quine’s clams about the
failure of traditional epistemology to explain how justification of
natural facts and laws could ever derive from sensory experiences. It
seems to me that Quine is far too ready to dismiss traditional episte-
mology for his naturalized sort without sufficient evidence against
the traditional approach.
Here again there may be a historical point to Quine's
criticisms. Descartes unquestionably, and Carnap possibly, sought
certainty not only in propositions about immediate experience, but
also in those about the natural world. There has indeed been concern
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a^ong traditional foundatlonallsts with att«pts to^
fro. l..edlate experience. But as we have already seen In discussing
the issue Of the incorrigibility or certainty of^ propositions.
It is a mistake to assume that certalnty-^hether of basic or of non-
basic propositions—is an essential requirement of a founda tionali sm
that holds statements about Immediate experience to be basic. Quine
is surely right (cf. Ibid., p. 74) that It Is a forlorn hope to su^
pose that the truths of nature can be endowed with the full authority
of Immediate experience. But this does not mean that the truths of
nature' may not be Justified or rendered evident by Immediate
experience. And again this, rather than eplstemlc certainty. Is all
that Is required by the Cartesian foundatlonall st In our sense.
Quine Is also right that no number or amount of sense
experiences can jrl ^emselves Inductively justify generalisations
(nor, I would add, even singular propositions) about the external
world. Appearance statements cannot lend inductive support to
external-world statements. Inductive support Is understood as a
relation between singular statements of a certain type and generaliza-
tions of that same type, e.g., between singular propositions about the
external world and generalizations about the external world.
Induction in itself does not allow us to bridge the gap between
appearance and the external world. That I was appeared redly to on
three successive days does not itself seem to make more probable the
conclusion that I was looking at a red object. And Quine is right too
that we can no longer dream of deducing science from appearance
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statements.
But none of this provides grounds tor giving up the task of
iHitlfzlng external world statements fr™ appearance statements.
Induction and deduction do not exhaust the possibilities by which one
proposition might justify another. John Pollack has argued that
meaning relationships themselves can serve tor. In Quine's terms, not
the conceptual but rather the doctrinal aspects of epistemological
theory: meaning Is a function of justification conditions rather than
truth conditions (Pollack. 1974, Oh. 1). Another approach Is
available-one adopted by Chisholm and used In the present work. On
this approach justification relations between basic and nonbaslc
statements are given by eplstemlc principles which state the con-
ditions under which a basic proposition justifies a nonbaslc one.
These conditions may well be, and are In Chisholm's principles, for
example, entirely Independent of whether the basic propositions deduc-
tively Imply or Inductively support the nonbaslc propositions they
justify. Thus, It Is not an a priori requirement of Cartesian foun-
dationallsm that basics provide Inductive or deductive support for
nonbasics. Those who abandon foundatlonall sm because such support Is
not forthcoming do so prematurely.
Harman is another who seems to assume from problems with the
notion of deducing ordinary beliefs from more basic beliefs that we
must move to a less traditional epistemology that in his case embraces
a coherentlst perspective (cf. Harman, 1973, p. 167). Comments simi-
lar to those made above on Quine would apply here.
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Iterative Foundational i Qm
Claimed
In his 1868 paper,
'Questions Concerning Certain Faculties
for Man, Charles Sanders Peirce notes that:
in inM\sr:irI fact invariably connected, so that we can always In^ul-
.in:d''by':“^hfr!''
^
(Peirce, 1960, p.
Peirce has already explained his use of "Intui tion.
"
136)
^tuition here will be nearly the same as "premiss not itself
concr r
’
the only difference being that premisses andnclusions are judgments, whereas an intuition may, as far asIts definition states, be any kind of cognition whatever
. . .cognition not [determined by previous cognitions] and there-fore determined directly by the transcendental objlct, irtobe termed an intuition.
(Ibid., pp. 135-136)
Peirce pretty clearly has in mind basic propositions in something like
our sense when he speaks of intuitions.
Peirce then goes on to answer, in the negative, his question
whether we have an intuitive power of distinguishing an intuition from
another cognition. Peirce uses this conclusion to establish that we
have no intuitive self-consciousness," no "power of introspection,"
and finally that there is no cognition which is not determined by a
previous cognition ( cf
.
ibid., pp. 143-155). This is effectively to
deny that there are intuitions or basic propositions.
Peirce does not mention the theory of founda tionali sm
,
but his
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vle„s see. .o be easily Interpreted as an attack on foendatlonalls.,
and indeed they have been so Interpreted as a .ore or less successful
attack In Peirce’s Critique of FoundationalIsm” by C. F. Delaney
(1973).
Peirce connects up his denial of the existence of Intuitions
with his first point—chat we cannot Intuitively distinguish
intuitions from ordinary cognitions—as follows:
• .
. s nee it is impossible to know intuitively that a givencognition is not determined by a previous one, ^he only way in
oh^^ hypothetic inference fromserved facts. But to adduce the cognition by which a givencognition has been determined is to explain the determinations
fL explaining them.For something entirely out of consciousness which may S sui^posed to determlue It, can, as such, only be known aL L^y"^adduced in the determinate cognition in question. So, that tosuppose that a cognition is determined solely by something
a solutely external, is to suppose its determination incapablef explanation. Now, this is a hypothesis which is warranted
under no circumstances, inasmuch as the only possible justifi-cation for a hypothesis is that it explains the facts, and tosay that they are explained and at the same time to supposethem inexplicable is self-contradictory.
(Peirce, 1960, p. 153)
In the latter half of this passage, Peirce seems to be making
the following argument:
PA: (1) If a cognition (or "hypothesis") is determined solely
by something external, and not also by another
cognition, then its determination is incapable of
explanation.
(2) If it is incapable of explanation, then it is
warranted under no circumstances.
(3) If a cognition (hypothesis) is warranted under any
circumstances, then it is determined (at least in
part) by another cognition.
In order to keep as close as possible to Peirce's wording, I have not
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made this argument formally valid; however,
so
.
it could be easily made
The first premise In particular seems to call for explanation,
'fhy would Peirce vrish to assert It? When Peirce speaks of a cognition
being determined by an "absolutely external" object, he Is referring
to a "transcendental object" (cf. the first passage cited In this
section), more or less equivalent to a Kantian thlng-ln-ltself
.
beyond
the reach of our cognitions. If that Is the sole determinant of a
cognition, then we can have no cognition of this determinant, hence
the original cognition remains unexplained. If we are to have any
explanation at all of a cognition. It must be by yet another
cognition—an uncognlzable thlng-ln-ltself could never serve the
purpose
.
One might then ask why we need a cognition (i.e., an explana-
tion) of another cognition in order that the latter be warranted. At
this point Peirce’s initial claim stated again at the beginning of the
passage quoted above seems to be relevant. He apparently feels that
unless one knows what the determination of a cognition is, that cogni-
tion cannot be warranted. He does not explicitly make this claim, but
It IS otherwise difficult to see what else might constitute a defense
of premise 2 of his argument as reconstructed above, or why he would
here re-emphasize his point that the only way to know the determina-
tion of a given cognition is to infer from observed facts. Why would
it be so important to know the determination of a cognition unless
this were a necessary condition for that proposition being warranted?
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But If Peirce Is assuming chat we must know what Che deter-
mination Of any warranted proposition Is. then Insofar as his argument
provides any ammunition against foundational Ism, It provides ammuni-
tion only against some version of what William Alston (1976c) calls
"iterative founda tionali sm:
"
«rtaln argument against founda tlonal-ism a foundatlonalist thesis would have Co require of fo^-
the b2lever°be''lmmedl'’r
Justified, but also thatn e iever be I mediately justified In believing that thev
wl mir A position that does^equlre rtlse ay call iterative foundatlonallsm.
(Alston, 1976c, p. 171)
Iterative founda tionali sm requires of a subject that if a pro-
position is basic for him, he must not only be immediately justified
in believing it, he must also possess some knowledge, explanation, or
further justification that it is immediately justified. Alston posits
that this second-level epistemic state also be a state of immediate
justification. Peirce speaks instead of requiring that the subject
have "knowledge" that a cognition is not determined by previous cogni-
tions (i.e., that a proposition is immediately justified) or that the
subject have an "explanation" of the determination of the cognition.
Although this seems slightly different from what Alston has in mind,
the central idea is clearly the same: It’s not enough that p be imme-
diately justified for S. In order for that to occur, the proposition
expressed by p is immediately justified for S" would itself have to
have some relatively high epistemic status for S.
If Peirce s argument does indeed depend on some idea such as
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this, then It only attacks Iterative foundatlonallsm. The relevant
question for us then Is:
-ust the Cartesian (oundatlonallst be an
Iterative foundatlonallstl The answer to that Is no. Consider again
Chisholm's eplstemlc principles approach. These principles state the
conditions under which, when a subject falls under those conditions, a
given proposition Is justified for the subject. Tte su^^^^
^ aware^ rtose condl^^ Indeed, as I shall show in
chapter VI, It would be very difficult Indeed for a subject unac-
quainted with epistemology to know In all cases that the appropriate
epistemlc conditions prevail.
One need not be a Chisholmian epistemologist to avoid itera-
tive foundational ism. Indeed, noniterative founda tionali sm seems to
embrace the most natural and simple assumptions about the nature of
justification. We commonly assume that children, antifounda tional-
ists, and philosophically unsophisticated adults can be justified in
believing at least some propositions. If an eight-year-old knows that
his parents are Catholics, then he has justification for that belief.
We would still, I think, want to Insist that he possessed this
knowledge even if we found he had only the most rudimentary concept of
epistemic justification, or no such concept at all. We can often know
things without understanding why we know them, it would seem. The
Iterative founda tionali st would of course require much more than a
sophisticated concept of justification. The subject would also have
to have the concept of a basic proposition or of a cognition deter-
mined by previous cognitions. It seems natural to suggest that a sub-
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Ject need not have this level of eplstemlc sophistication In order to
be justified In believing ordinary propositions. As Alston notes:
• • • it is all too possible to have adequate erounds for
dol f for'a^^lL^'"? o^-^ved
b?r ! t ^ adequate reasons for supposinghim to be msure of himself, without being able to spe^fv
reLons"’" l^pSr^
of his bearing and behavior provide those
of t^e An
P>'^;°®°P';‘ioally unsophisticated person (and many
iustlfled
sophisticated as well) may be amplyj i i in believing that there Is a tree In front of hiswide-open eyes, but not be able to show that he Is sojustified
.
(Alston, 1976c, p. 178)
Alston's tree example reminds us that much of what was said in
the previous section about the possibility of a Cartesian foundation-
alist being a direct realist also goes to support our current conten-
tion that a Cartesian foundationalist need not embrace iterative
foundational ism: a subject may in fact be directly perceiving a tree,
but whether he is also justified in believing that he is perceiving a
tree may depend on epistemic conditions unknown to him. If he is in
fact justified, he would not necessarily know, or be justified in
believing, that he is justified.
At any rate, there seems to be good reason to think that
Cartesian and other foundationalists need not embrace iterative
foundationallsm. If Peirce's argument were to tell specifically
Cartesian foundationallsm, it would have to be shown that
Cartesian foundationallsm entailed iterative foundationallsm.
It must be remembered that we are here assuming that Peirce is
using his iterative claim—we cannot intuit that a given cognition is
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an intuition, and so such an Intuition Is unaxplalnad and unuattanted
-to substantiate precise 2 of his argument as reconstructed above.
Certainly. Peirce could use his claim to support the premise, and he
mentions It just tdten he makes his argument that all cognitions are
determined by previous cognitions. But he makes, so far as I can see,
no specific connection between his iterative claim and the second pre-
raise of his argument.
But If Peirce Is not using this claim here. It Is difficult to
see what can be said in favor of premise 2. Indeed, we can say more:
premise 2 unsupported seems to embody a simple confusion between the
explanation for a proposition and the justification of It, or between
one event causing another event and one proposition justifying another
proposition. "The only possible justification for a hypothesis," to
repeat one of Peirce's central claims from the passage quoted above,
'is that it explains the facts" (Peirce, 1960, p. 153).
Note that Peirce has here suddenly taken to calling the puta-
tive first cognition a "hypothesis." It does make sense to say in the
philosophy of science that any adequate hypothesis must explain the
experimental facts. But such hypotheses are by their very nature
general propositions very high up in any epistemic structure the
Cartesian foundationalist would want to construct. First cognitions
—
those undetermined by any previous cognitions—would not be hypotheses
in this sense. When we consider what the Cartesian foundationalist
would take first cognitions to be, the difficulties in Peirce's at
first sight common sensical claim become apparent: Is "S is in pain"
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a hypothesis for S? Does It better explain the facts than some alter-
native hypothesis? What would these facts be?
Note also that Peirce has shifted from saying that any cogni-
tion must have a determination or explanation to saying here that the
hypothesis explains the other facts. That which explains need not
itself have an explanation.
Finally, there is the central question whether "p has q as its
explanation" is synonymous with "p has q as its justification."
Presumably, there are different ways of explaining "S is in pain." We
might be asking for a doctor’s diagnosis, or for the events that led S
to experience pain, or for a neurophysiological analysis of the cause
of S s pain sensations. "S has a ruptured appendix," "S got into a
fight at the bar last night," or "S’s C-fibers are firing," might all
serve, in different contexts, as acceptable explanations for "S is in
pain. But it seems doubtful that any of these serve the role of
Justifying S is in pain" for S. Nor does it seem that S needs to
know that any of these explanatory statements are true (he may have
been too drunk to remember the fight in the bar, for example) in order
to be justified in believing that he is in pain.
Peirce may in response wholly abandon his iterative assump-
tions and simply assert that the various explanations for "S is in
pain" serve as the justification for the sentence, whether S is aware
of them or not. But it does not seem plausible to assert that these
explanatory sentences serve as s justification for the proposition
that S is in pain, not even in the external sense of justification if.
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for example, neurophysiological evidence about C-flbers Is not
available to S.
Peirce was not the last philosopher to criticise foundational-
Isn, on the basis of Iterative assumptions. Such criticisms have per-
sisted to the present. In Knowledge. Mind and Nature. Bruce Aune
writes as follows:
’i"
point of view of common experience, there Is noplausibility at all In the Idea that Intrlnslcali; acceptabir
Philosophers defending such pre-ises fail to see this because they always ignore the
evaluated^
situation in which an empirical claim is
I have already given arguments to show that introspective
claims are not, in themselves, intrinsically infallible; theymay be regarded as virtually certain if produced by a reliable(sane, clear-headed) observer, but their truth is not a con-
sequence of the mere fact that they are confidently made. To
establish a similar conclusion regarding the observation
claims of everyday life only the sketchiest arguments are
needed. Obviously, the mere fact that such a claim is madedoes not assure us of its truth. If we know that the observeris reliable, made his observation in good light, was reaso-
nably close to the object, and so on, then we may immediately
regard it as acceptable. But its acceptability is not intrin-
sic to the claim itself. Thus, philosophers who, like G. E.
Moore, attempt to prove by direct inspection that they have
hands do not proceed just by taking a quick look at their
hands; they rather turn them over, look at both sides, pinch
them, and the like. The certainty they arrive at is thus
based on a whole group of observations, as well as on numerous
tacit assumptions concerning the general reliability of their
senses, the accuracy of their memories, the sort of things
hands are supposed to be, and so on. I would venture to say
that any spontaneous claim, observational or introspective,
carries almost no presumption of truth when considered
entirely by itself. If we accept such a claim as true, it is
only because of our confidence that a complex body of
background assumptions—concerning observers, standing
conditions, the kind of object in question—and, often, a
complex mass of further observations all point to the conclu-
sion that it is true.
Given these prosaic considerations, it is not necessary to
cite experimental evidence illustrating the delusions easily
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brought about by, for example, hypnosis to spptaneous claim is acceptable wholly on its own merits'^° Orthecontrary, common experience is enMrpiv aa n th
Clear-headed
.en nev^er
c^rselrif^made without regard to the peculiarities of Che agent and ofconditions under which It Is produced. For such mL the
lnfe?en^ Tf°^ determined by’
acceptablht
* “ take these standards of
rraH-^t*^
®^“ously, we must accordingly admit that thet ditional search for Intrinsically acceptable empirical ore-mises IS completely misguided. ^ ^ ^
(Aune, 1967, pp. 42-43,
emphasis in original)
Aune, like many anti-foundationalists, is here attacking
possibility of Intrinsically acceptable or basic propositions,
like Peirce, he does this by assuming some version of Iterative
the
And
foundationalism, as William Alston has pointed out
1
*
1
*-! arguing that whenever
a claim (belief) is justified it is justified by inference (by
relation to other justified beliefs); and that would be thedenial of "There are directly justified beliefs." But look
more closely. Aune is discussing not what would justify theissuer of an introspective or observational claim in hisbelief, but rather what it would take to justify "us" in
accepting his claim; he is arguing from a third-person
perspective. Now it does seem clear that cannot be imme-
diately justified in accepting your introspective or obser-
vational claim as true. If I am so justified it is because I
am justified in supposing that you Issued a claim of that
sort, that you are in a normal condition and know the
language, and (if it is an observational claim) that con-
ditions were favorable for your accurately perceiving that
sort of thing. But that is only because I, in contrast to
you, am justified in believing that
_g.
(where what you claimed
is that and where I have no independent access to p) only
if I am justified in supposing that you are justified~in
believing that My access to is through your access. It
is just because my justification in believing that presup-
poses my being justified in believing that you are justified,
that my justification has to be indirect. That is why I have
to look into such matters as conditions of observation, and
your normality. Thus what Aune is really pointing to is the
necessity for "inferential" backing for any higher-level
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that D (I
someone is justified in believing
b^iefL') higher-level beliefs epistemic
epistemic belief
shows anything, shows that not c can be immediately iustified R„h -t ^ a
nothing to Show that the original obsrrver^s ^r intrispe^t^r’
s
^ immediately justified. Hence hifargu-
belLf an introspective
circ^LLnces ^le
(Alston, 1976c, pp. 168-169, empha-
ses in original)
To put matters in our terminology, Alston is here saying that
Aune’s argument tells against neither Cartesian founda tionali sm nor
external world foundational ism. It may tell against iterative
foundationalism, for if Aune’s arguments are successful, they show
that "epistemic beliefs," such as the belief that p is justified for
S, can themselves be only indirectly justified. But this is, I
believe, only to be expected: epistemic beliefs about when a proposi-
tion is justified for a person are high level theoretical beliefs that
should not be expected to be basic or directly justified. And, as
Alston notes, this does not tell against the view that perceptual or
introspective beliefs themselves are directly justified. No reason
has been given by Aune for holding, nor does it seem at all necessary
to hold, that in order for, e.g., a perceptual belief to be directly
justified, the epistemic theory which explains this (or the epistemic
belief based on such a theory) must also be directly justified.
Alston notes above the error Aune makes in moving from the
question whether a person is justified in believing his own introspec-
tive or observational reports to the question whether others are
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justified in believing these reports. Let us call this the error of
assuming a third-person perspective, for others besides Aune have ™ade
this error, and we will have occasion to refer to It again.
We n^y conclude, then, that neither Peirce's nor Anne's argu-
ments appear to have refuted Cartesian foundatlonallsm, and that It
does not appear that the assumptions peculiar to Iterative toun-
datlonallsm need be embraced by the Cartesian founds tlonall st.
Are Basics Adequate to Support Nonbasics?
Although Alston rightly points out that noniterative or
simple" foundatlonallsm Is a more defensible form of foundatlonallsm
than Iterative foundatlonallsm, he Is himself skeptical whether any
form of foundational! sm can be made to work:
Although I am convinced that simple foundatlonallsm is the
most defensible form of foundatlonallsm, especially if it alsodivests itself of other gratuitous claims for foundations suchas infallibility and incorrigibility, I do not claim that it
can actually be made to work. Though it escapes the main
antecedent objection, it still faces all the difficultiesinvolved in finding enough immediately justified beliefs toground all our mediately justified beliefs. And on this rock
I suspect it will founder.
(Alston, 1976c, p. 185)
Similar reservations are expressed by Nicholas Rescher (1974, pp.
702-3 ).
We have already seen that foundatlonallsm survives the criti-
cisms that there are no deductive or inductive relations between basic
and nonbasic propositions. But this is not to say there remain no
problems in explaining the relation between basics and nonbasics. The
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concerns of
.Isfon and Rescher
.ay be .ore speclfdcaUy deUneared as
two distinct problems:
=“PP°®C basic propositions can
p”;o1lt?oisf PHat a^cLs to"Lrba"slc
The first question vrtll be addressed In Chapter VII. The
second question embodies a misunderstanding that once again requires
too much of foundatlonallsm. (I am not claiming that either Alston or
Rescher is guilty of this mlsunderstandlng-they may have had the
first problem in mind.) As we have seen In stating the basic tenets
of foundatlonallsm. It Is not required that a nonbaslc proposition
derive all of Its justification from basic propositions. As EF II
notes, each nonbaslc proposition must derive at least some of Its
justification from some relation to basic propositions (cf. chapter I
above). This recalls Chisholm’s statement that "every proposition we
are justified In believing Is justified, £^, because of some
relation that It bears to the directly evident" (Chisholm, 1977, p.
85, emphasis mine).
Now it could be claimed (and perhaps this is the sort of
assumption Alston and Rescher were making) that founda tionali sm must
commit itself to making all the justification accruing to nonbasic
propositions derive from basics. To allow any other source of justi-
fication is effectively to abandon foundatlonallsm. On this account,
Chisholm s system, which allows relations of coherence between propo-
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Sltlons to help eplste^lcally support those propositions, could not be
considered foundatlonallsm, or at least pure founds tlonallsm. The
question whether Chisholm's system is tmlv ^b c ruly foundational has, for this
reason, been raised by Richard Foley (1980).
This issue is beyond the scope of the present work. It may
turn out that coherence relations can be entirely dispensed with.
Even if they cannot, I rather suspect that if a theory maintains that
no nonbasic proposition has any justification unless it is supported
by one or more basic propositions, then such a theory is distinct
enough from coherentism to stand as an Interesting alternative, even
if it also allows coherence relations to provide additional support
once the basic propositions have provided their essential support.
However, to adequately prove this would require constructing a full
theory of founda tionali st justification that contained a complete set
of principles which explained all the ways in which an empirical, non-
basic proposition could be justified. In the present work, I am con-
cerned only with the first or most fundamental of such principles—
that explaining how a basic proposition can make a very simple type of
external world proposition justified. Given that the goal has been so
elusive in the past, it will be enough if we can find a plausible
principle that bridges the gap between basics and nonbasics. This
does mean, of course, that even at the conclusion of our work we will
not know if there is a viable and complete founda tionali st theory.
For it may turn out that a complete theory requires coherence rela-
tions among a proposition's justifiers, and that this will destroy the
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theory's essentially foundatlonallst character.
can only say, then, that the present criticism of founda-
tlonallsm may prove ultimately to be a quite serious one. That there
will be no further discussion of It here points to the preliminary
nature of the present work.
Conceptual Schemes and Conceptual Change
Some philosophers have held that different cultures, or dif-
ferent historical eras, have or could have widely different conceptual
schemes, and chat this fact Is philosophically Important. The concept
of a conceptual scheme Is explained by Nicholas Rescher In "Conceptual
Schemes :
"
Different cultures and different intellectual traditions, to
say nothing of different sorts of creatures, will, so it hasbeen widely contended, describe and explain their experience—their world as they conceive it—in terms of concepts and
categories of understanding substantially different from ours.They may, accordingly, be said to operate with different con-
ceptual schemes: with different conceptual tools used to
make sense of experience
— to characterize, describe, and
explain the items that figure in the world as best one can
form a view of it in terms of their features, kinds, modes of
Interrelationship and interaction. The taxonomic and explana-
tory mechanisms by which their cognitive business is tran-
sacted may differ so radically that intellectual contact with
them becomes difficult or impossible.
(Rescher, 1980, p. 324).
We are also told that for those who have a different conceptual scheme
from ours "The events and objects of the world of their experience
might be very different from those of our own" (ibid., p. 323).
The relevant philosophical point that is made concerning this
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Idea o, different conceptual schemes Is made In several different ways
by different philosophers. «e will consider some of the more Impor-
tant Of these below. I discern two somewhat different approaches-two
different morals that one Is supposed to draw concerning foundatlon-
allsm (often In this context called
'traditional epistemology") when
one recognizes the possibility of different conceptual schemes.
The first approach is roughly this. It could be that another
culture's conceptual scheme Is so different from ours that "the events
and objects of the world of their experience" are not the same as
ours. If there Is such a radical difference at this fundamental
experiential level, then surely we are rash to assume that what we
regard as the basic raw data of experience Is exactly so regarded by
others. They may not even make the demarcations we do between
experience and the world. The propositions we might take to be foun-
dational and unchallengeable might look this way only from our limited
perspective
.
The second approach is, again roughly, to say that our—or any
conceptual scheme forms an interrelated network of beliefs. It is
impossible to get outside one’s conceptual scheme to "objectively"
test a given belief. So-called basic or experiential beliefs are as
dependent on other beliefs as those beliefs are on basics. So the
foundationalist approach that tries to give epistemic primacy to
experiential beliefs is misguided.
These approaches are related to one another and to other cri-
ticisms of foundationalism, particularly to the so-called "myth of
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the given." which I shall consider In Chapter V. But several distinct
arguments are offered. One type. In line with the first approach,
seems particularly concerned with the differences between cultures or
eras. Another type (the second approach) focuses on the claim that
the experiential part of ones conceptual scheme Is dependent on other
factual and even theoretical parts, and cannot stand alone In the way
the foundatlonallsts require. I shall consider both approaches In
turn.
—
— Approach: Cultural or Historical Relativity
The first approach may emphasize either cultural differences
at one given time or differences across time, in different historical
eras. In "Skepticism, Foundational ism, and Pragmatism" (1974), Joseph
Margolis emphasizes the latter in discussing the significance of
"diachronic conceptual changes" (Margolis, 1974, p. 127). Margolis
claims to have uncovered "the fundamental difficulty of Chisholm’s
foundational! sm" (ibid., p. 126).
There appear to be two elements in Margolis’ criticism of
Chisholm’s foundationalism. The first is the claim that Chisholm’s
self-presenting or directly evident states (Margolis, after Leonard
Nelson, calls them cognitions") "involve a judgment" (ibid., p. 126).
By this Margolis apparently means that Chisholm would regard his self-
presenting states as propositions. Margolis in any case contrasts the
view he attributes to Chisholm with the view of Leonard Nelson in "The
Impossibility of the ’Theory of Knowledge’" (1973) that ordinary sen-
U8
scry perceptions do not require concepts and are not judgn^nts
(Nelson, 1973. pp. 8-9; cl. KargoUs. 1974, p. U8). since CHlsdol™
frequently refers to basic or self-presenting states as propositions
(=f., e.g. Chisholm. 1977. p. 22). u seems that MargollS is correct
here in his interpretation of Chisholm.
The second and crucial element of Margolls' criticism is that
since these self-presenting states are propositions, there Is always
the possibility, based on the Idea of conceptual change over time,
that they are mistaken:
question that Chisholm's formulation ispen to challenge on the basis of the "chance" of beingm staken that is, on the basis of the significance of^
to 1
changes. For, either Chisholm adheresNelson s view of cognitions" (which seems not to be the
involv^L
construes the apparent cognition as
g judgment. .
.; but if he favors the latter
Lehrer’s claim has force. Hence, foun-tionalism ( that is, Chisholm's variety, though not
necessarily Russell's) appears to be subject to a fatal
weakness.
(Margolis, 1974, p. 127)
Lehrer had brought up the issue of conceptual change in
"Skepticism and Conceptual Change" (1973) in order to argue that "no
one ever knows for certain that any contingent statement is true"
(Lehrer, 1973, p. 48). The reason for this, according to Lehrer, is
as follows :
No matter how well entrenched a concept may be in our
beliefs about the world, it remains always and constantly sub-ject to total rejection. To obtain our objectives, scientific
or other, we may discard a concept as lacking a denotation.
Any concept may be thrown onto the junkheap of discarded con-
cepts along with demons, entelechies, and the like. Indeed,
some philosophers have even suggested that mental concepts may
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one day meet that fate.
. .
not apply to <*at »e think (TaL S ^ concept does
Che tav\Lent ol ron^^^lro^a^^; le^lTir.^t^h^rral'^”
Whatever contingent statement you think
,
there is some chance, some probabiH tv ^Vl 3 ^
JrL'r^h^^ state.ent’lacks a Uc“t o^n! ^He«: “retais some chance you are wrong. ’ tnere
(Lehrer, ibid., pp. 50-51)
However interesting the application of the concept of concep-
tual change is to anti-founda tionali st arguments, Margolis and Lehrer
have not used it to make a criticism of foundational ism. They are
only making, in perhaps a more sophisticated way, the point that the
foundationalists’ basic propositions are not epi stemical ly certain or
incorrigible as required. But as we have already seen, the attribu-
tion of certainty or incorrigibility to basic propositions is not a
structural requirement of Cartesian founda tionali sm (in our sense)
generally, nor of Chisholm’s system specifically.
Nevertheless, there is an interesting issue raised here that
goes deeper than the criticism that basic propositions are not
certain. Rather than using the point about conceptual change to
attack the doctrine that basic propositions are certain or
incorrigible, the critic of traditional founda tionali sm might use the
conceptual change issue to press for a "shifting foundations" version
of foundational ism as opposed to the traditional "stable foundations"
view that the types of propositions that can be basic are invariant
and not relative to culture or historical era. Both views are com-
patible with Cartesian foundational ism in the narrow sense in which I
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am using that term. However, as I noted In Chapter III, the type of
Cartesian foundatlonalism which 1 am Interested In defending states
not only that basic propositions are restricted to those about subjec-
tive mental states, but also that this restriction Is not limited to a
particular historical or cultural era.'^
What can be said, then, against the "stable foundations" ver-
sion of Cartesian foundatlonalism? Clearly, the critic will have to
give reasons for thinking that shifts have occurred or will occur In
the class of propositions from which basic propositions are drawn.
Basic propositions will have to be shown capable of being of one type,
say subjective mental propositions. In one era or culture, and of a
distinct type, say singular theoretical scientific propositions. In a
different era or culture. Arguments to this effect are Indeed offered
by the critics of traditional foundational ism.
Note that since the issue here is between the stable versus
the shifting foundations views, more is required of the critics of
traditional foundatlonalism than if the issue were the epistemlc sta-
tus of basic propositions (certainty or incorribili ty versus some
lower epistemlc status). If the latter were the issue, it might be
enough for the critics to show some metaphysical possibility, however
remote, of a foundations shift. A demonstration that such a shift
was, while not likely, at least possible in some sense might be enough
to create the sort of metaphysical doubt that would prevent us from
assigning certainty to basic propositions. It might be enough. I do
not wish to make a positive claim to that effect. The point I wish to
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make Is that In any case snch a demonstration of a bare metaphysical
possibility, while perhaps effective In the certainty Issue, will not
be enough to refute the stable foundations view and establish the
shifting foundations view. If it could be shown that there Is at
least some metaphysical possibility that the shifting foundations view
IS correct, this could most likely be equally well demonstrated for
the stable foundations view. IJhat is needed for a strong argument
against the latter view Is positive evidence that foundations shifts
have occurred or will occur. The stronger Che evidence for this, the
Stronger the case against traditional founda tionali sm
.
The Electroencephalogram Argument
What evidence is there for foundations shifts? The electroen-
cephalogram or EEG argument can be used to attempt to provide such
evidence. It can be viewed as an argument for foundations shifts over
time, from present basics as subjective mental states to future
basics, after appropriate scientific developments, as singular theore-
tical scientific statements. The thrust of the EEG argument is that
in time these scientific statements will come to have epistemic
priority over sensation reports. G. Sheridan states the general idea
as fo Hows :
Situations are envisaged wherein it is claimed that the weight
of neurophysiological and other evidence, in the form of
electroencephalogram readings, etc., would be enough to
discredit or override a person's honestly avowed report about
his present sensations or feelings.
(Sheridan, 1969, p. 62)
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D. M. Armstrong offers a specific example and argument:
.s ;r.‘ r"-and inner experiences. Suppose, tLT th^t I renor7 "visual experience. The brain technician is able to say 7romhis knowledge of brain patterns that (i) I am not lyinL Cii'iy brain is in the appropriate state for some otherexperience; (iii) there are disturbances in the brain pro-
account’^for"^
ive awareness which wLldfor my mistake. On the evidence offered by the tech-cian it ought to be concluded that I have made a mistake.
(Armstrong, 1963, p. 424).
The general conclusion, in the event of such observations on the part
of the brain technician, is presumably that sensation reports would
give way, in terms of epistemic priority, to singular theoretical
statements of science. A new type of proposition would become basic.
Or, if one were an advocate of coherentism rather than the shifting
foundations view, the general conclusion might be that no propositions
are properly called basic.
But let us look again at the specific conclusions Sheridan and
Armstrong make: EEC readings "would be enough to discredit or over-
ride a person’s honestly avowed report about his present sensations or
feelings. It ought to be concluded that (the subject has) made a
mistake. The question is: who ought to conclude this? For whom
would the EEG readings be enough to discredit the subject's sensation
reports? The only answer that could be forwarded with some degree of
plausibility is the brain technician. It might be held with some
plausibility that it is more reasonable for him to believe that the
subject of the EEG reading has made a reporting error than to believe
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otherwise. But that is not what is at issue. What is at issue is
what the sub^ is most justified in believing. To shift the focus
to what the brain technician or some other "outside" observer is most
justified in believing is to make the third-person error that Alston
has pointed out.8 The Cartesian stable foundations view being
challenged asserts that propositions about a subject's sensations are,
and will remain, basic ^^ sub^. A proper challenge to this
view must establish a situation in which the proposition in question
is not justified or basic for the subject. What the brain technician
ought to believe about the subject's sensations is irrelevant.
When we shift back to the proper perspective of what the sub-
ject of the EEC reading should think, it is far from clear that he
should defer to the brain technician. In the sorts of EEC conflicts
referred to by Sheridan and Armstrong, we have to imagine that that
the subject has what he at least takes to be, say, sharp pain
sensations, while the technician assures him it is not really pain at
all. Or the subject takes himself to be sensing a bright, clear green
color—say an after-image—while the technician assures him that he is
really being appeared to redly. (It is legitimate here to speak of
sharp pain or bright, clear" green, because if it were a borderline
sensation a very mild pain or a blue-green color, for example—the
problem in reporting the sensation might simply be that of how best to
categorize it. The EEC example is not being used to point out any
alleged difficulty in classifying borderline cases. It is to be
understood that the subject grasps all relevant concepts and takes
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himself to be experlencleg a sensation that clearly falls under one of
these concepts). It seems to me that the subject could ,ulte legiti-
mately respond. *en told by the technician *at his machine says, "So
much the worse for your machine."
This Is so, it would seem, even In Armstrong's more complex
case where the brain technician claims to have EK data that Indicate
a brain disturbance that would account for the mistake In Introspec-
tion. It would of course be Interesting to ask how the technician
could establish such a failure of Introspection In the first place.
But In any case, as long as the subject is experiencing the sensation
of bright green. It may well be reasonable for him to conclude chat
there Is some mlswlrlng or misinterpretation of the presumably quite
complex machine. If It comes to it, he might begin wondering about
the technician's own sincerity, or perhaps even about the soundness of
the technician's own Introspective facilities (which would be Involved
In the determination of the technician's own sensations as he reads
the machine). Even If the technician were to hook himself up to his
own machine. It seems to me likely that he would be more justified In
9
believing something Is wrong with his machine than In believing
something Is wrong with his ability to experience his own sensations
properly.
Although it seems to me that justification still rests with
the subject's own account of the sensations he is having, I do not
claim to have proven this. What I do claim to have shown is that the
EEG argument gains its prima facie plausibility from the third-person
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error, and that once we correct for this it is a ^ ii-i xs, 1 C IS t the very least not
obvious that the subiect is iu«5 Cifioa k i •J IS j st ed in believing the technician's
report about the sensations the subject Is experiencing when It
conflicts with that subject's own presently experienced sensations.
So It does not seem to me that the EEG argument even
establishes that a conflict between an EEG reading and the subject's
sensation report must be decided In favor of the former. But the EEG
argument, It It were to touch the stable foundations view of Cartesian
foundatlonallsm (and not just the Incorrigibility thesis) would have
to go considerably further than establishing that the subject should
favor the brain technician's report to his own. It would have to show
that It Is likely that sophisticated sensation-reporting machines of
this type will be developed and that conflicts between machine reports
and subject reports will arise. And here. It seems, there are even
Stronger grounds for rejecting the EEG argument.
These grounds have been brought out by George S. Pappas in
"Incorrigibilism and Future Science" (1975). (His arguments against
critics of the incorrigibility thesis apply a. fortiori to critics of
the stable foundations view). To understand Pappas' argument, let us
note first that EEG machines of the required sophistication can only
be developed if there are, and scientists discover, non-trivial laws
relating sensations to neurophysiological states. These laws must
make correlations of specific brain-states to specific sensations.
Let us grant with Pappas that it is reasonable to expect such correla-
tions to exist and eventually to be discovered.
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But in order to use the EEG argument against the stable foun-
dations view. It must also be shown that it is likely that conflicts
between the EEG readings and the subject's reports
.^11 arise. Pappas
argues that it is not likely to that such "EEG conflicts" will arise:
wl 1 neurophysiology of the futurei 1 consist of well-established correlations! indeed lawsrelating sensations and neural events. So, if it is now
’
reasonable to hold that such laws will be developed as itsurely is and as all parties to these disputes agree it isalso now reasonable to believe that there will be built upextr^ely reliable correlations between reports of sensation.,and machine readings of neural events; and that we canreliably infer from the latter sort of correlations to theformer sort.
Now an EEG-conflict arises when, after making sure that
neldlflTl ^11 the appropriate concepts
and aft
correct reports of his sensatiLs,er taking due precaution to see that the brain machinesare working normally, there is still a machine reading going
one way and the subject's report going another way. Theincorrigibilist can now argue as follows: If it is now reaso-
relating sensations and neural events
will be built up in the future, then it is also reasonable tothink, now, that EEG conflicts will not arise. This is simplybecause in order for these law-like correlations to get
established in the first place, there must be extremely
reliable correlations holding between subjects' reports and
machine readings; and an EEG-conflict would simply be a breach
of these correlations. And surely it is reasonable to hold,
now, that future neurophysiological science will consist, in
part, of laws relating experiences of specific sensations and
specific neural events.
The upshot is that. . .since it is now reasonable to think
that the relevant scientific laws will be developed, it is
also reasonable to think that no EEG-conflict s will’arise.
(Pappas, 1975, pp. 209-210)
It appears to me that Pappas' argument is correct.
In sum, it does not seem likely that EEG-conflict s of the
required sort will ever arise, and even if they did, it is not obvious
that the conflicts should be decided in favor of the machine's reports
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rather than the subject's. The EEG argument, then, does not establish
any llUellhood that singular theoretical scientific propositions will
eventually replace propositions about a subject's mental states as the
propositions that are basic for that subject.
The World According to Quine
I have discussed above some of the arguments of Quine that
are specifically directed against traditional epistemology. Other
arguments of Quine have been interpreted as offering additional
attacks, along conceptual change lines, against founda tionali sm—or at
least against some specific version of founda tionali sm
.
Quine himself
does not, as far as I know, explicitly state that these arguments
challenge foundationalism.^
Quine’s argument for the underdetermination or "inde teminacy
"
of translation can be viewed as an argument against founda tionali sm
.
Where the EEG argument can be interpreted as suggesting a shift over
time in the type of proposition which can be basic, Quine’s indeter-
minacy of translation argument can be interpreted as suggesting a
difference in conceptual schemes across cultures so radical that we
cannot conclude that the type of proposition which can be basic for us
can be so for those of the other culture.
Quine’s argument attempts to establish that two distinct and
incompatible translations of a foreign language may yet both be com-
patible with all the native speech behavior and gestures, as well as
the totality of dispositions to speech behavior," that translators
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have available to then. (cf. Quine, 1960, pp. 27, 72). No amount of
native speech and behavior will be sufficient to establish that one
such translation better captures what the natives 'really mean."
Whatever Its other merits. It does not seem that this argument
offers a conclusion that Is helpful to those wishing to establish the
shifting foundations view. If this conclusion Is Interpreted as
directly challenging the view that mental state propositions are basic
to the individuals of the native culture. It would presumably have to
hold that there Is reason to think that such propositions are not
basic In that culture. But what reason does the Indeterminacy argu-
ment offer for thinking this? It might be taken to show that the
anthropologist/translator could never determine whether a given native
utterance was a sensation report or a report of some other kind. But
such an Interpretation would again make the third-person error. Here
the anthropologist/translator would play the role of the brain tech-
nician in the EEG case. The translator, as outside observer, might
well be unsure how to classify the native's utterances. But it does
not follow that the native speaker himself Is unsure whether he Is
making a sensation report.
Perhaps the point is rather that the natives might have a
completely different conceptual scheme that does not even make the
distinctions we do between sensation reports and other types of
reports. But the indeterminacy of translation argument in fact does
nothing to provide evidence for the view that there are such distinct
conceptual schemes. At best, it is an argument that the act of
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translation In and of Itself does not provide evidence one way or the
other-there are data-coepatlble translations that fit our conceptual
scheme and data-compatlble translations that do not. The argument
does nothing to show that we ought to prefer the translation that does
not fit our conceptual scheme. And even If different conceptual
schemes were established, it would have to be argued that this is
Incompatible with the stable foundations view. It is not an obvious
step from the existence of different conceptual schemes to the view
that epistemologically basic propositions are historically or
culturally relative. We have yet to see an argument for the need to
take that step.
It is important to note that Quine himself would apparently
not feel that it is warranted to apply the indeterminacy argument to
the critique of sensation reports as basic. Quine admits that some
sentences, namely observation sentences, can be directly translated
(cf. Quine, 1960, p. 68). These translations can be confirmed by the
independent evidence of stimulatory occasions" (ibid., p. 72). The
indeterminacy concerns not individual sentences, but whole translation
schemes, and the indeterminacy only arises because the observation
sentences are not sufficient to determine the conceptual scheme on
which the translation of more theoretical sentences depends (cf.
ibid.). The predicament of the indeterminacy of translation has
little bearing on observation sentences" (Quine, 1969, p. 89).
Another position of Quine*s that can be interpreted as going
against the stable foundations view is found in his "Two Dogmas of
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Empiricism" (1961). Quoting from and discussing this work, James
Cornman takes Quine's main thesis to be that "no particular set of
statements Is Immune to refutation and so none Is Irrevocably at the
foundation of empirical justification" (Cornman, 1978, p. 250). He
thus attributes to Quine a moderate foundatlonallsm of the sort that
accepts foundations shifts.
It is not clear, however, that Quine’s article contains any
arguments for the view that propositions about a subject’s mental
events will eventual ly—or perhaps should at present—be given up as
basic in favor of singular theoretical statements of science or other
types of propositions. Indeed, I wonder whether here, as in his
translation argument, Quine does not mean to be excluding certain
types of sentences from his claim that "no statement is immune to
revision" (Quine, 1961, p. 43). Specifically, I do not believe Quine
would here regard propositions about the sensations a subject is pre-
sently experiencing as so immune. Just as Quine gives special status
to his observation sentences in the translation argument, so, I
believe, he would hold these sentences not applicable to his general
claims about revisability in "Two Dogmas." To see that this may be
so, note how Quine uses the term "experience" in the passages
discussed by Cornman:
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from
the most casual matters of geography and history to the pro-
foundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics
and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience
only along the edges. Or, to change the figure, total science
is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are
experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occa-
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contrary experience.
. .
"" ‘"e light of any single
j
•
“^y be held true come *at may. it „e makedrastic enough adjustments elsewhere In the system Fven T
fac^orrelar-f”*^ “ periphery can be held ^rue In thece f rec lcitrant experience by pleading hallucination orby mending certain statements of the kind called logical lawsconversely by the same token, no statement Is Immunf to
'
(Quine, 1961, pp. 42-43)
The term "experience" here seems to play the same role that
the term "observation sentence" played in Quine’s discussion of the
indeterminacy of translation. Experience itself is relatively well
determined and unproblematic. It establishes the boundary conditions
within which one has to arrange one’s nonexperiential beliefs and
hypotheses. Unfortunately, experiences themselves are never suf-
ficient to determine in and of themselves which of the more theoreti-
cal beliefs to adopt. This really seems to be what Quine’s account
comes to. But experiences themselves do not look to be, on this
account, the sorts of things that can be jockeyed around to fit the
other elements of the fabric. One can adjust for a recalcitrant
experience by pleading hallucination (which is in a sense, to
interpret it as just an experience) or even by amending the laws of
logic, but there is no suggestion that the experience Itself, however
recalcitrant, can be adjusted away. A proposition making the bare
assertion that S is experiencing such-and-such a sensation does not
appear to be revisable on this scheme. Quite the contrary, it provi-
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des the boundary conditions to *lch other propositions must be
adjusted. Nor is there the slightest Indication that experience Is
about to lose Its role as provider of boundary conditions In favor of
something more theoretical.
This interpretation seems to make Quine almost into a tradi-
tional Cartesian foundationalist who is simply making the point that
the basic experiential propositions are not in themselves sufficient
to justify highly theoretical propositions, a point Chisholm is happy
enough with to assert more than once in Theory of Knowledge (cf
.
Chisholm. 1977, pp. 63. 82-84). if Quine's epistemology is ultimately
to be treated more radically than this, it is because of what he wri-
tes elsewhere, especially in "Epistemology Naturalized." There, as we
have seen in an earlier section of this chapter, Quine takes a quite
different line against traditional epistemology from the line Cornman
attributes to him. "Two Dogmas" does not appear to be the place to
look for Quine's criticism of traditional founda tionali sm; it cer-
tainly does not seem to be the place to look for a defense of the view
that foundations shifts have occurred or will occur, Cornman'
s
interpretation notwithstanding.
Sosa's Argument from Nonsensory Modes of Knowing
The final argument I shall consider in support of the view
that the foundations are historically or culturally relative is by
Ernest Sosa, in The Raft and The Pyramid" (1980). Actually, this
would be better termed an argument for biological relativity, for it
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Is based on the supposition that other species, or extraterrestrial
beings, might acquire knowledge In radically different ways than we
do.
How could one impose reasonable limits on extraterrestrialmechanisms for nonlnferentlal acquisition of belief? Is Itnot possible that such mechanisms need not always function
necessLSr°be'^d“"'J'"“\°^
1 nde!r J
^ ^ knowledge of their surroundings andeed of any contingent spatio-temporal fact? Let us suntosehem to possess a complex system of^rue beliefs cLcLn^r
^
their surroundings, the structures below the surface ofthings exact details of history and geography, all consti-u ed by concepts none of which corresponds to any of our sen-sible characteristics. I^at then? Is it not possibleThat
asic beliefs should all concern fields of force, wavesema ca structures, and numerical assignments to vari-ables in several dimensions? This is no doubt an exotic
notion, but even so it still seems conceivable. And if it is
beliefs
then shall we say of the noninferential
of such beings? Would we have to concede the exis-tence of special epistemic principles that can validate theirnoninferential beliefs? Would it not be preferable to for-
mulate more abstract principles that can cover both human and
ex raterrestial foundations? If such more abstract principles
accessible, then the less general principles thatdefine the human foundations and those that define the extra-terrestial foundations are both derived principles whose vali-ity depends on that of the more abstract principles. In thisthe human and extraterrestial epistemic principles would
resemble rules of good nutrition for an infant and an adult.
The infant's rules would of course be quite unlike those validfor the adult. But both would still be based on a more fun-
damental principle that postulates the ends of well-being and
good health. \^at more fundamental principles might support
both human and extraterrestial knowledge in the way that those
concerning good health and well-being support rules of nutri-
tion for both the infant and the adult?
(Sosa, 1980, pp. 22-23)
Interesting questions would indeed be raised if we ever
encountered extraterrestrial beings of this sort. I agree with Sosa's
implication that we should then look for more fundamental epistemic
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principles that would explain both human and extraterrestrial
knowledge
.
But Sosa is also right that it "is no doubt an exotic notion"
to imagine nonlnferentlal beliefs of this sort. Perhaps it is
conceivable, in some fairly broad sense of that term, but mere con-
ceivablllty does not give us any reasons for supposing that what can
be conceived is very likely or plausible. Even what is conceived here
is very vague, and I suspect that the more realistic and detailed an
example one tried to construct, the more problematic it would become.
In any case, Sosa has not here provided any strong reason for
thinking that such extraterrestrials do or are likely to exist, and so
he has not provided a strong reason against the stable foundations
view. Even if my task here were not Just to show that there are no
decisive arguments against traditional foundatlonallsm but also to
show that foundatlonallsm is more plausible than its alternatives, I
would not consider Sosa's supposition to count against establishing
this unless some positive reason were given for thinking there were
such modes of knowing, and unless some plausible explanation were
given of how such knowing occurs or might occur.
Second Approach; Basics and Background Knowledge
I have thus far considered one of two general approaches based
loosely on the idea of a conceptual scheme—the first, as we have
seen, holds that an alleged historical or cultural relativity of con-
ceptual schemes implies shifts in the types of propositions which can
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be basic. I shall next consider the second general approach. This Is
the Idea that all o£ our beliefs are connected to one another In an
Interrelated
„et>,ork, and that even so-called basic beliefs depend on
background knowledge which the subject „ust also possess. We cannot
get outside our circle of beliefs to test thea. on some supposed
belief-independent reality. Even our perceptual judgments must be
based on prior conceptions, etc.
One way of making this idea more specific is to deny that
there is a so-called given grounding at least some of our beliefs.
Thus the attack on the given, which is the subject of the next
chapter, can be viewed as a version of the conceptual schemes
argument, and the next chapter as an extension of the present
discussion. But there is another way of making more specific this
idea of the dependency of so-called basic propositions on others
within a conceptual scheme, and that is by arguing that a basic propo-
sition cannot be understood by the subject unless he possesses a
variety of concepts, makes a variety of assumptions, and understands a
variety of other propositions which are not plausibly construed as
basic. This background knowledge vitiates the claim that basic propo-
sitions have some special epi stemical ly independent status. Before I
turn in the next chapter to the arguments against the given, I shall
briefly consider this background knowledge issue.
This issue is brought up in several places in the
1 i teratur e
.
I
shall consider Wilfred Sellars' statement of it in
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind:"
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* * * th6 siithoirxty of tli0 rpnoTf" "tvi-? -f *»
^
called standard conditions’
— coiilrl
its LthorUy'’°''iro^h^^''
green” in recognition ofauthority. In other words, for a Konstatierung report
express observational knowledge," not only
T. r . / ^he presence of a g;eerobiect
tokL^or-Thr'^-*'''"''^’
perceiver must know thatens of This is green are symptoms of the presence of
plrceptJon!'"
^°^ditions which are standard for visual
absurrirthe^^d something obviouslv
could be the expression of observational knowledg^, Jo;es
reUab?r? h° episodes of this kind areli le indicators of the existence, suitably related to thespeaker, of green objects. I do not think that it is[a surd]. Indeed, I think that something very like it istrue. The point I wish to make now, however, is that if it is
ITVa
follows, as a matter of simple logic, that one
couldn t have observational knowledge of any fact unless oneknew many other things as well. And let me emphasize that thepoint IS not taken care of by distinguishing between knowinghow and knowing that, and admitting that observational
knowledge requires a lot of "know how." For the point is spe-
cifically that observational knowledge of any particular fact,
e.g. that this is green, presupposes that one knows general
facts of the form X is a reliable symptom of Y. And to admit
this requires an abandonment of the traditional empiricistidea that observational knowledge "stands on its own feet."
(Sellars, 1963, p. 168)
Although Sellars' terminology is sometimes different from
mine, he seems clearly to be making the general point that so-called
basic propositions are not truly basic because they depend on
background propositions. However, some unnecessary assumptions on
Sellars' part must be cleared away before we get to the heart of the
object ion.
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First, it is not necessary
by the subject for whom it is basic
that a basic proposition be
• It is enough that it be
known
justified
.
Second, If Sellars is to be taken as criticizing Cartesian
rather than external world foundatlonallsm. then it would be better
to express the alleged basic proposition under discussion as "This
looks green," or "S is appeared to greenly," rather than as "This is
green," which can be Interpreted as a statement about the external
world.
Third, it is important to recognize Sellars’ assumption that
"the authority of the report ’This is green’ lies in the fact that
the existence of green items appropriately related to the perceiver
can be inferred from the occurrence of such reports." Sellars makes
it sound as though "This is green" can only be basic if a team of
observers could hear the subject utter "This is green," infer that
the subject is appropriately related to green items, and thereby
confer authority on his utterance. This is again to make the third-
person error. In order for a Cartesian proposition to be basic for a
subject, it does not have to be confirmed "on the outside." It is
certainly not necessary that S make a verbal report. It may not even
be necessary that S be able to make a report, but let us assume for
the sake of argument that such ability is required. If, however, S
IS not required to make a verbal report, it cannot of course be
required that the report be a reliable symptom or sign of the pre-
sence of green objects in standard conditions, and that S recognize
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an this. Yet Sellars does require these things. In ^hlng the
third-person error, Sellars ends up attrlbutlr* to S a conceptual
sophistication that Is needlessly complex and not obviously required
in order tor a proposition expressed by, for example, "This looks
green" to be basic for S. The effect of all this Is to make the
dilemma for the Cartesian foundatlonallst look more serious than It
may really be.
Fourth, I have discussed versions of founda tionali sm in
which what is basic for S need not be believed by S. Sellars seems
to assume that S must believe a basic proposition, indeed that he
‘
must know it. But nowhere, to my knowledge, has it been argued that
propositions which are basic for a subject must be believed by that
subject. I shall, however, for the sake of argument, assume that a
basic proposition must be believed by the subject.
Now, with all these assumptions removed, or granted for the
sake of argument, there still remains, I believe, a core objection
that the Cartesian founda tionali st must contend with. For it does
still seem that S must have some background knowledge or under-
standing if This looks green" or "S is appeared to greenly" is to be
basic for S. What does this background consist of? It does seem
very likely that S must have the concept of greenness. But more than
that (and this seems to be what Sellars was getting at, although he
overstated his claim), it would seem that S must understand something
about the relation of this proposition to other closely related
propositions. If he believes that this looks green, for example, it
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see.s he would have to understand what it is for so.e object to ^
green. And there's the rub. For the proposition that this looks
green, and certainly the proposition that S is appeared to greenly,
seem to be derivatives of the proposition that this is green. The
latter seems to come first I'n c u, i terms of what the subject first learns
and understands. This I take to be the essennp •UU un ce of the objection
based on the background knowledge issue.
it seems to me that there are two sorts of responses to this
criticism of Cartesian foundationalism. One response challenges Che
crucial assumption chat basic propositions are derivative in the
sense required. The other questions whether anything unacceptable
follows from the fact that basic propositions are derivative in this
sense
.
The first response is made by Roderick Firth, in "Coherence,
Certainty, and Eplstemlc Priority" (1973). He presents the "paradox
that it seems at least logically possible to have the concept "looks
red" before we acquire the concept "is red." Yet if, as seems to be
the case, we cannot fully understand the former concept unless we
possess the latter concept, it would seem that it is after all not
logically possible to have the former before we have the latter (cf.
Firth, 1973, p. 461). Firth continues
:
There are many subtle facets of this question which can-
not be explored here, but for our present purpose it is suf-
ficient to point out that the underlying paradox is easily
dissolved if we do not confuse concepts with the words used
to express them. It is a genetic fact, but a fact with phi-
losophical Implications, that when a child first begins to
use the word 'red' with any consistency he applies it to
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should --- - -
appear red by abnormal conditions of
merely made to
child calls white mnarvid" n observation. Thus the
glass. In fact at rtS stLe the'ch red
those circumstances In whrcrwe af ad
say
-looks red to me now." so that ifwi l°a ^ “uthfully
able to assert that the child Is using 'red'fo f ""Reasonprimitive form of the concept "looks red." To calfthls^a
iagvLirhe™rs^°'bf'"=“F“'™°"
red^foffLSs thftfef 1f: --ly look
that the child somehow loses his primltfrcffpfffTe"
?hf“f sophisticated one. As Lewis points out fChapter III of Mind and the World Order the Lief 1st afthe nonscientist are able to share what Lewis calls "our com-mon world precisely because the scientist does not
sefes-Lfd f f nontechnicalens s, an or the same reason there is no inconsistency in
"1 ^ a"
adults we continue to have a conceptlooks red which is logically prior to our concept "irr2!”
(Firth, 1973, pp. 461-462)
If Firth’s supposition here is plausible, as it seems to me
to be, then we need not conclude that the basic proposition "This
looks green" is a derivative of the nonbasic proposition "This is
green." For it may be the former proposition that the child initially
comes to understand, although he may express it incorrectly (from the
adult point of view) as "This is green." (This shows another way in
which important distinctions are missed in Sellars because he looks
at and epistemically evaluates the utterence "This is green" rather
than the proposition expressing the experience which might (or might
not) lead to this utterance.)
But what if, to avoid unwanted ontological commitments, we
insist that what is basic is not the proposition that this looks
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em
green, but rather the proposition c •P l that S is appeared to greenly? Can
that be plausibly construed as something the child understands?
Again, care „ust be taken not to leap to conclusions that merely se
I am Inclined to think that the answer to the question Is
yes. Granted, the child does not express himself m that way.
indeed, only a few Chlsholmlans are likely to understand what pro-
P tion the expression refers to. But as Firth has shown, it is
one thing to use the expression, another to understand the
proposition. The child may very well understand what It Is to be
appeared greenly to. One could argue, I believe, that It Is a very
straightforward proposition that requires little conceptual and no
philosophical sophistication to grasp. At least It should no lo^er
appear that the assumption that basic propositions are linguistically
or conceptually derivative is an obvious one.
But even if Sellars and the other critics are ultimately
right that so-called basic propositions are derivative, there is
still the second response for the critics to contend with. This
response is, again, to ask whether anything unacceptable follows from
the conclusion that basic propositions are derivative.
It is important not to confuse the genesis of the under-
standing of a proposition with the epistemlc status of that proposi-
tion. Sellars, in the passage quoted above, attempts to establish
that observational knowledge has as a prerequisite a good deal of
background knowledge. Then he moves directly from that to his
conclusion: To admit this need for background knowledge requires
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an abandonment of the j . .un craaitional empiricistF-Li.j.«_xbL laea that observational
knowledge 'stands on Its own feet'" (Sellars. 1963, p. 168). But
this is too quick a move away from traditional empiricism, llhen the
Cartesian foundatlonallst says that a basic proposition stands on It
own feet, he means that It does so eplstemlcally. He does not
necessarily mean that It does so genetically or causally. The mere
fact that one can point to necessary causal conditions without which
a given proposition would not have been basic for a subject at a t
does not seem, certainly not In any obvious way, to vitiate its
epistemlc status as a basic proposition. Why should it be any dif-
ferent If we can also point to genetic conditions of conceptual deve-
lopment such that, before a proposition can be understood by (and
basic for) S, there are concepts and other propositions which must
have been learned and understood by him? It Is not at all obvious
that a proposition's epistemlc priority entails Its genetic priority.
Perhaps there are arguments for such entailment that the cri-
tic could offer. But Sellars does not offer any, I am not aware of
such arguments by other critics, and yet it appears that such argu-
ments need to be offered if the background knowledge issue is to be
made into a good case against Cartesian founda tionali sm
.
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Notes to Chapter IV
his
-""fSeiws' attack on ' glvenness-T^ll^e^ I a u nthe crucial steps In undermining the poss^bUl^knowledge’" (Rorty. 1979 n I ssibility of a theory of
LHSi? i
tatlons are 'purely given' or ' i*
’
sitplalning which represen-
Mlchael r ®- conceptaal'- • . . " (Ibid.).
snec?fic»n r his criticism of what seems to be a
posslbllltv^of'T'?*^^°"f^^^^°’’^®''®”°^°®^ a“ach on the veryi i i y of epistemology (cf. Williamc? iQ?? rv n-iia ^
claims Quine and Sellars ll his chief “fluenc ; (if ’ibl •
,
and Bruce Aune claims this of Sellars (Aune 196?' p ijin’ i T
irL!:«“d -"‘ion foundhlonlil^si. iid^iheJi
“
arguments do require some Interpretation to be applied against It
hoid rr o”®'
and Aune can be plausibly re|ardeS L
dimeTi’ Sellars have provided the fun-
“floiSi::?" demonstrate the falsity of
slenff 1 c!i/^rir Influential or
iifii if
approaches In the present chapter. Cf. espe-c ally discussions of Lehrer, Will, Dllman. Peirce, and Foley.
edition a9h"'’p?"io)!'
m Theory of Knowledge, second
^Chisholm has used a definition of the self-presenting which
self-presenting be certain (cf. Chisholm, 1976,p. 25, 1979, p. 338). In the section "Chisholm’s Iterative
Principles of Chapter VI I discuss why Chisholm might have feltforced to add this requirement. His more recent definitions (cf.Chisholm, 1980, p. 549; 1981, pp. 79-80) do not retain the certainty
requirement. In The First Person
, Chisholm explicitly notes thedistinction at issue:
It will be noted that I have not defined self-presenting pro-
perties by reference to certainty. But if we think of cer-
tainty as constituting the highest degree of epistemic
justification, then we may say that a person’s self-presenting
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properties are objects of certainty for that person.
(Chisholm, 1981, p. 82)
^These are epistemic mediating steps, not necessarily subjec-tive mental steps. Reason and inference need not be involved here.
of the discussiondifference between two epistemic propositions:
(A) For all P, if i dearly and distinctly perceive that
P, then I am certain that P.
(B) I am certain that (for all P, if i dearly and
distinctly perceive that P, then P).
r,
„ n , Cleve, 1979, pp. 66-67)Van Cleve s discussion brings out that principle (A) is, in ourterminology, non-iterative:
I maintain that in order to become certain of a proposi-
tion I do not need to know that I am clearly and distinctly
perceiving it, nor that whatever I so perceive is either cer-
tain or true. It is enough that I ^ clearly and distinctlyperceive the proposition. (A) says that this is enough. For(A) says that perceiving something clearly and distinctly is
sufficient to render me certain of it. It follows that
nothing else is necessary
,
unless it is also necessary for the
occurrence of clear and distinct perception in the first
place. But neither knowledge of (A) nor knowledge of the fact
that I am clearly and distinctly perceiving something is
necessary for such perception to occur.
The point I have been insisting upon could be summed up as
follows: (A) is not a principle I have to apply in order to
gain knowledge; I need only fall under it.
(Ibid
. ,
pp. 69-70)
^That is, I am interested in defending tenet IE2a as outlined
and discussed in Chapter III.
Q
Cf . the long passage quoted from Alston and the discussion of
this passage in the "Iterative Foundationalism" section of the present
chapter.
None of Quine's works which seem most relevant to the
foundational! st-coherentist dispute— "Epistemology Naturalized"
(Quine, 1969), which was discussed above. Word and Object (1960) or
"Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1961), both of which are discussed in the
present section—make use of the term "foundationalism. " But as
stated in note 1 of the present chapter, several philosophers have
interpreted Quine's arguments as telling against traditional
foundationalism, and it would seem safe to say that there has been a
general perception among philosophers that certain of Quine's
arguments are or can be directed against traditional foundationalism.
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A
besides Sellars’ include Dewey (1922 p.), Aune (1967, Chapter II, especially pp. 42-43 48 SD'i u-t i i •(1977, p. 69), Bonjour (1978, pp. 1-6), Rescher ({980; pp.’329-33^!
CHAPTER V
THE CRITICS OF FOUNDATIONALISM II: THE GIVEN
Critics of foundationalism have argued that founda tionalists
must posit the existence of "the given" to serve as a foundation for
knowledge, and that either this given does not exist or it could never
serve as an adequate foundation for knowledge. These arguments are
discussed and criticized.
The Influence of Sellars
The classical source for a discussion of "the myth of the
given" is Wilfred Sellars' "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind"
(1963). More recent works have restated or extended Sellars'
critique. My discussion shall consist of a detailed analysis of two
of these works—^Michael Williams' Groundless Belief (1977) and
Laurence Bonjour's "Can Empirical Knowledge have a Foundation?"
(1978). Williams claims Sellars as one of his major influences (cf.
Williams, 1977, p. vii) and both works draw heavily on Sellars. If
Sellars' name is here forgone in favor of those of younger philo-
sophers whose arguments have not yet been discussed in the literature,
Sellars' important influence on these arguments should at least be
acknowledged. Of course, neither Williams nor Bonjour would claim to
have restated or developed every significant argument by Sellars
against the given. Sellars is a particularly difficult philosopher to
interpret; indeed different interpreters have come up with strikingly
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different interpretations of him.l I shall not add my interpretation,
as It would add at least another chapter, and the result would be
another in a series of interpretations which would then themselves
have to be compared and assessed—another chapter still! We are
better off relying on Williams and Bonjour
,
who can at least be
counted on as sympathetic interpreters. In place of additional
chapters, we can simply recognize that there may yet be further argu-
ments against the given to be mined from Sellars' rich work. But
examination of these arguments will have to wait until someone digs
them out.
It should not be assumed from what I have said that Williams
and Bonjour are entirely unoriginal. Indeed, there is much that is
new here, and this makes an examination of their work of particular
interest.
Michael Williams* "Groundless Belief"
The first work to be discussed is Williams' Groundless Belief .
My discussion of Williams' work requires some reconstruction, as the
organization of his arguments is not always clear. However, the argu-
ments themselves are there clearly enough and can be unearthed without
a great deal of interpretation and conjecture in most cases.
Williams construes his arguments as a set of attacks on
"phenomenalism." But he uses this term in such an extremely broad
sense that it is really equivalent to "founda tionali sm" as that term
is used in the present work. He recognizes that founda tionali sm need
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not be committed to sense data or to the view that physical objects
are logical constructs from sensory experiences. He uses the term
"phenomenalism" to describe all forms of founda tionali sm because he
wants to call attention to "the important continuities of thought
which exist between various theories often taken to be implacable
opponents" (Williams, 1977, p. 26).
Why these continuities could not be illustrated using the term
foundationalism rather than "phenomenalism" I am not sure. Be that
as it may, when Williams writes "phenomenalism," it should be
understood to mean "foundationalism." He will not make the mistake of
thinking that if he has refuted some views about sense data or physi-
cal objects as logical constructs, he has thereby refuted foun-
dationalism as such.
Williams' Attack on the Given
The central argument of Williams' book, an argument which
occurs in several stages and which I shall analyze in detail below, is
a criticism of the notion of the given, a notion which he feels is
required by all forms of foundationalism and which he also feels is
ultimately incoherent. Williams claims to be attacking "the idea that
there is a given element in experience" (ibid.). This idea is taken,
in its explicit formulations, from the work of Kant, C.I. Lewis, and
H.H. Price. ^ Kant's well known distinction between intuitions and
concepts is based on the notion of a given in experience. Intuitions
represent the given element. They are received passively by the mind
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(though for Kant they are not representations of what Is "out there:"
even Intuitions are tor Kant In some sense constructs of the human
mind, but constructs which the mind Is Inevitably constrained to
accept). Concepts represent the basic tools which the individual can
actively use to formulate propositional knowledge, but only when these
concepts are properly allied with the given Intuitions.
The more modern doctrine of such philosophers as Lewis and
Price is put this way by Lewis, in a passage quoted by Hllllams (cf.
Williams, 1977, p. 27):
There are In our cognitive experience, two elements, the Imme-diate data such as those of sense, which are presented or
given to the mind, and a form, construction, or interpreta-
tion, which represents the activity of thought.
(Lewis, 1956, p. 38)
Williams calls this the "two-components view" (Williams, 1977, p. 27).
What does this view have to do with founda tionali sm? Williams
is right that there are strong associative links between the two-
components view and traditional founda tionali sm (cf. ibid., p. 28).
The given in the two-components view becomes associated with the basic
propositions of foundationalism. And if the given is taken to be sen-
sory experience or the beliefs closely associated with such
experience, as it usually is, we appear to have some version of
Cartesian foundationalism. Further, the theoretical, interpretative
element of cognition in the two-components view is associated with the
inferential knowledge that is based on or derived from the basic
knowledge in foundationalism. The worry, expressed by C.I. Lewis, is
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that without the given, there Is nothing which knowledge must be true
to and knowledge would be "contentless and arbitrary" (Lewis, 1956, p.
38; c£. Williams, pp. 27-28). with Che given, Lewis and others are
satisfied that we have an absolutely certain data base which provides
both the ground for inferential or Indirectly evident propositions and
the ultimate court of appeal by means of which the reasonableness of
those inferential propositions is judged.
That the two-coraponents view and Cartesian foundational ism are
strongly associated, both historically and theoretically, is clear.
What is not clear is whether Cartesianism entails the two-components
view, specifically the doctrine of the given. Williams does nothing
to demonstrate such an entailment, so in principle one could charge
that Williams’ attack on the doctrine of the given is irrelevant. It
does nothing to show the falsity of Cartesianism since the doctrine
attacked has not been logically linked to Cartesianism.
However, I will not pursue such a course against Williams,
since my own view of Cartesian foundationali sm, as well as any
Cartesian theory I can imagine, relies strongly on the view that there
is a given element in experience. Cartesianism may not entail the
doctrine of the given—I do not know about that—but if Williams were
right that the doctrine of the given were incoherent and must be
rejected, I would have to concede everything, for I cannot imagine
what a recognizably Cartesian foundationalism would be that did not
rely on the doctrine of the given. Other Cartesians have also
accepted, at least implicitly, the doctrine of the given, and I ima-
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gine they would find themselves in a similar situation if Williams'
attack on the doctrine proved successful.
So I am committed to showing that something is wrong with
Williams' attack on the doctrine of the given. What, then, is his
argument against it? Actually, although Williams himself is not very
clear about this, it appears to me that his main argument is not
against the existence of the given as such. It is rather an argument
against the possibility that the given, if it exists and whatever it
might be, could ever provide a foundation for knowledge of ordinary
propositions about the external world. This is really the course the
main argument seems to take, in spite of what Williams sometimes says
about it; and since I think this is a much more plausible approach
than one which tries to deny the existence of any element of givenness
in experience, I will take Williams to be arguing for the more
plausible claim, although I will also consider those remarks which
seem fairly explicitly to be directed against the very possibility of
the given.
I will first reconstruct what I take Williams' argument to be
from various statements of his that are sometimes widely dispersed
throughout the text. I will then present some textual references and
support for the reconstruction.
A Reconstructed Argument against the Given
as a Possible Foundation for Knowledge
The structure of the argument can be most easily discerned by
182
first giving it in a "stripped down" version:
dation for the justification of external worldpropositions, then apprehension of the given itself
a form of non-propos i tional knowledge.
( ) pprehension of the given cannot be a form of non-propositional knowledge; it is impossible to have suchcognitive yet nonconceptual knowledge.
the given to serve as the foun-
ation for the justification of external world
propositions.
In more detail, we have:
WA2. (1) If it is possible for the given to serve as the foun-dation for the justification of external world
propositions, then it is possible that what is givenin a specific case counts in favor of one such propo-
sition rather than another.
(2) If Ic, then the apprehension of the given must itselfbe some form of primitive knowledge or awareness.
(3) The given as such and the conceptual as such are
mutually exclusive.
(4) If 3, then the apprehension of the given must occur
without conceptual mediation.
(5) If 4c, then the apprehension of the given is non-
propositional
.
(6) If 5c, then it is not possible that the apprehension
of the given itself is some form of primitive
knowledge or awareness.
ft is not possible for the given to serve as the foun-
dation for the justification of external world
propositions
.
There is also an argument in support of premise 6:
WA3: (1) Whatever can be known must be the sort of thing which
can be true or false.
(2) Propositions are the only sorts of things which can be
true or false.
ff the apprehension of the given is nonpr oposi tional
,
then such apprehension cannot be of something which
can be true or false.
(4) If the apprehension of the given is nonpr oposi tional
then it is not possible that it is some form of
knowledge .
Scattered among the remarks which go to make up these argu-
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meats are additional remarks which suggest a different conclusion from
that of WA2. These additional remarks suggest an argument that more
directly attacks the Idea that there Is such a thing as the given In
experience. I detect two versions of such an argument:
WA4: (1) If there is a given in experience that is independent
of all propositions, it must be able to be
characterized
.
(2) If it is able to be characterized, then there are pro-positions which adequately express the nature of thegiven.
(3) If 2c then the given in experience is not independent
of all propositions
(4) There is no given in experience that is independent of
all propositions.
WA5. (1) If there is a given in experience, then one should be
able to find the given through introspection of one’s
experience.
(2) Evidence from the psychology of perception indicates
that there is no such thing as a state of sensuous
apprehension utterly unaffected by beliefs, desires,
and expectations.
(3) If 2, then there is no experience of the given as
such.
(4) If 3c, then it is not the case that one can find the
through introspection of one’s experience.
(5) There is no given in experience.
Williams does not explicitly recognize two distinct types of
argument: one concluding that the given cannot be used to provide a
foundation for ordinary propositions, another concluding that there
can be no such thing as the given. I am sure, however, that these two
types are present, and I will treat them in turn. But before I evalu-
ate them, I shall consider what relation these arguments as formulated
above have to Williams’ text.
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Textual Sources for the Above Recon.c;^r,.n^.•
The major source paragraph for WA2 is the follow! ng:
Since the apprehension of the given element is supposed to
itsllf^h^^^
ultimate check upon empirical knowledge, it muste be some form of primitive knowledge or awareness. Butwhen we recall the sharp distinction drawn between the pureoncept and the sensuously given, a problem arises. The pureconcept and the sensuously given are thought by Lewis to he
7t
independent-neither limits the other-but this makesi look as If the mind has to be able to grasp the given
without conceptual mediation. In other words, the knowledge
which IS involved in the grasping of the sensuously given
since it is independent of conceptual interpretation by themind, must be non-propos i tional or, to put the point morepejoratively,, ineffable. But if it is ineffable, it cannotprovide us with a check upon anything, let alone the entire
edifice of empirical knowledge.
(Williams, 1977, pp. 28-29)
For an elucidation of what it is for one thing to provide a
check upon something else, we must turn to a later passage:
The certainty of the given is saved only at the cost of makingit unintelligible how awareness of the given could serve as a
check on anything, how such knowledge could ever count in
favor of one hypothesis rather than another.
( Ibid
.
,
p. 32
)
That is, the given provides a check on an ordinary proposition
about the external world, or a guarantee of some form, if it gives us
some reason for thinking that that proposition is more likely to be
true than some other ordinary proposition—its negation, for example.
Although Williams uses the term knowledge" in these passages,
I believe he is really talking about justification, and have so repre-
sented him in my reconstruction. Indeed, Williams himself recognizes
elsewhere that the real issue being dealt with in these debates has to
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do with the concept of justification rather than the more complex con-
cept of knowledge, of which justification Is merely a component (cf.
ibid., pp. 5-12, especially p. 11).
The general idea behind Williams' argument should be clear
from these passages: if the given is to provide any sort of foundation
for ordinary empirical propositions about the external world, it must
be able to be used to show that one such proposition is more reaso-
nable than another. It would have to do so in order to justify any
specific ordinary proposition. Thus, we have premise 1 of WA2. But,
Williams continues, if we are to keep the given and the conceptual
distinct, as the two components view requires, then apprehension of
the given cannot be in any way conceptual or propositional. It must
be nonpropositional or ineffable. But nothing ineffable can serve to
guarantee that one proposition is more likely to be true than another.
Premise 2 of WA2 is taken almost directly from the first sen-
tence of the main source paragraph. Premise 3 is not to be explicitly
found, but it is echoed in Williams' reference to the "sharp
that must be drawn between the conceptual and the sen-
suously given. This premise must be understood as an essential tenet
of the two-components view. If there is no clear distinction between
the conceptual and the given in experience, then we no longer have the
two-components view of Kant, Lewis, and the Cartesian founda tional-
ists.
Premises 4 and 5 are quite straightforward extractions from
Williams' main source paragraph after his remarks about Lewis.
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williams then concludes chat the Ineffable cannot provide a check upon
anything, but this conclusion does not follow validly from what he has
said thus far. One way to make it valid Is to suppose that Williams
Is here making the unstated assumption that the apprehension of
something that Is wholly Ineffable or nonproposlclonal cannot count as
a form of knowledge or awareness; presumably, cognitive knowledge that
asserts that some state of affairs obtains must always be
prepositional. This assumption, stated as premise 6, seems to be
justified in our reconstruction because it is necessary to make the
argument valid. Further justification for its inclusion comes from
the fact that Williams later defends something very like premise 6
(ibid., p. 36), although he does not explicitly tie in this defense
with his earlier argument.
There are perhaps other ways in which one may reconstruct
Williams' argument. I claim only that the reconstruction I have chos-
en does not do violence to the text, does seem to represent Williams'
intentions, and does provide a valid, interesting, and plausible cri-
ticism that the foundationalist must come to terms with. It should be
clear that in the passages quoted above Williams is not challenging
the view that there is a given in experience. He is rather arguing
that even if there is a given, it could not possibly provide epistemic
support for ordinary justified propositions about the external world.
For the remaining reconstructions I will not give explanatory
comments about how the quoted source material relates to my
reconstructions. The interested reader will have to examine those
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for hxin or h^r<^pl f t oKoI i ^nerseif. I shall only state what the source
material is for my reconstruction of these arguments.
The main question to be raised about WA2 may well concern the
sixth premise. But, as noted, one can find remarks that appear to
defend this premise. These remarks, reconstructed as my WA3, are
quite brief:
Surely, whatever can be known must be the sort of thing whichcan be true or false, a condition not met by the data of senseconceived as phenomenal objects.
(Ibid
.
,
p. 34)
Williams has in addition some remarks in support of this
claim, but these are best stated and discussed when we come to our
evaluation of WA3.
WA4 involves more guesswork on my part. It appears to be an
argument against the given as such, but it could be interpreted as an
argument that the given cannot provide a suitable foundation for ordi-
nary propositions. I shall consider that interpretation later. Here
is the source passage:
In fact, the doctrine of the Ineffability of the given is
impossible to maintain. Necessarily, it breaks down when one
attempts to give some characterization of the given whereby it
is to be distinguished from other elements in experience.
Building on the idea that the given is the element in
experience shared by all conscious beings, no matter what
their peculiar conceptual accomplishments, Lewis offers
unalterabili ty as the criterion for givenness:
My designation of this thing as 'pen* reflects my
purpose to write; as ’cylinder’ my desire to explain a
problem in geometry or mechanics; as ’a poor buy’ my
resolution to be more careful hereafter in my expendi-
tures. . . The distinction between this element of
interpretation and the given is emphasized by the fact
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hat the latter is what remains unaltered, no matterwhat our interests, no matter how we think or conceiveI can apprehend this thing as pen or rubber or cylin-der, but I cannot by taking thought, discover it aspaper or soft or cubical.
[Lewis, 1956, p. 52]
Lewis here implies that the pen is given as non-soft,
non cubical, non-paper and thereby offers at least threedescriptions of the content of the given. To illustrate
notion of the given by contrasting different descriptionsto contradict the idea that the content of the given isineffable.
the
is
(Williams, 1977, pp. 33-34)
I shall first consider this passage as I have, for better or
worse, reconstructed it; only once this is done shall I turn to a con-
sideration of this problematic passage itself.
WA5 is a much more straightforward reconstruction of the
source passage. After presenting, as an "argument" against the given,
the observation that Lewis, Price, et al
. ,
have philosophical presup-
positions that lead them to have a strong theoretical need for there
to be such a thing as a given, and thus they are likely to insist that
there is such a thing even if it is not there to be found, ^ Williams
goes on to say:
To add to this, there may be an even shorter way of showing
that the given could not be identified introspectively.
Evidence from the psychology of perception all points to there
being no such thing as a state of sensuous apprehension
utterly unaffected by beliefs, desires, and expectations and
consequently no experience of the given as such.
(Ibid
.
,
pp. 45-4 6)
I believe that I have identified all the distinct and signifi-
cant arguments which Williams offers that involve the notion of the
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given. At one point (Ibid., p. 31) he hints at another argument that
presents a dilemma: either the given is cognitive and expressible or
noncognltlve and inexpressible, but unacceptable results follov. from
either alternative. However, this argument is not fully developed by
Williams, and since Bonjour does develop Just such an argument. I
shall consider it when I turn to Bonjour.
An Evaluation of WA2 and WA3
These arguments are to be considered together since WA3 offers
an argument for one of the premises of WA2 (premise 6).
I believe that there are two ways to criticize WA2. One way
is to challenge premise 6 (and hence to challenge WA3). This approach
requires the relatively radical step of maintaining that there can be
such a thing as nonpropositional awareness—awareness that is not
awareness of any proposition or state of affairs. Russell may have
held this radical view at one time—this will be discussed below.
The other way to criticize WA2 is to challenge premise 5.
This does not require acknowledgment of any sort of nonpropositional
awareness. But it is equally effective. In fact, it actually amounts
to the same criticism as the first approach. It merely involves a
recasting of the objection in a way that is compatible with the con-
ventional view that any sort of awareness must be an awareness of some
state of affairs.
The reason I mention the first approach at all, and the reason
much of my argument will be formulated in terms of it, is that
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williams seems to have It In mind as the line one would take against
his argument. He cites Russell, and brings out HA3, which Is speclfl-
cally designed to counter this Russellian approach.
My procedure will be to consider the first, Russellian,
approach that criticizes WA2 on the grounds that there can indeed be
some sort of nonpropositional awareness. I will develop a defense of
the given that seems to be in line with this Russellian approach,
recognizing all the while that many would not accept the central
assumption of this approach concerning nonpropositional awareness. I
will then attempt to show that the defense of the given that has been
developed can be recharacterized in such a way as to be equally effec-
tive even though it does not require this assumption.
So I shall for the time being accept premise 5 and consider
how one might challenge premise 6. This of course requires us to look
at WA3, which is offered in support of that premise. WA3 itself is
basically the claim that any cognitive or assertive Icnowledge must be
propositional. Since the apprehension of the given is by hypothesis
nonpropositional, it cannot really be counted as any form of
knowledge or awareness that is the apprehension of some state of
affairs. If it is an apprehension at all, according to a defender of
WA3
,
it is so only in a vacuous sense—an "apprehension" only of a
"this" a particular that cannot even be described. Surely such an
apprehension should not be dignified with the name of knowledge, nor
even with the name of an awareness. I'Jhat could it be an awareness of,
since it is by hypothesis not an awareness of any proposition or state
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of affairs? It cannot be an apprehension that such and such Is the
case. ,^at can It be then but a misleading and ultimately empty way
of talking?
Such are the thoughts which I believe must lie behind an argu-
-ot such as UA3. l^lle wuuams does not express th™. I thlnh they
underlie his explicit claims. Moreover, he has more to say than what
I have thus far attributed to him. As I noted in the previous
section, Williams has some additional remarks In explanation and sup-
port of what I have reconstructed as WA3. Essentially, they amount to
the claim that when we examine closely what philosophers take to be
the given In experience, It turns out to be traditional propositional
knowledge. Any time foundatlonallsts and upholders of the two-
components view try to describe the apprehension of the given, they
end up describing not the given but ordinary propositional knowledge
containing concepts. We can conclude from these remarks of Williams
either that there Is no pure given Independent of concepts, or chat,
whatever this given Is, it cannot have anything to do with knowledge
or with justifying propositions. (As we have seen, Williams seems to
accept both these conclusions In different places In his exposition.)
Phenomenalists are likely to confuse two concepts of the
given, Williams says. One is used when the "phenomenalists" like to
think of the given as pure and completely free of conceptual, proposi-
tional components. The other is used when they need to explain how
the given can serve as the foundation for ordinary propositions.
Unfortunately, they cannot have it both ways
.
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Williams presents Russell's work on perception as an illustra-
tion of "how easy It is to confuse these two conceptions of the
given (Ibid., p. 34). On the one hand
,
Russell Is "commendably"
aware that the given, if regarded as colored patches In the visual
field, cannot be the bearer of truth-values (cf. Ibid.). Hence, our
knowledge of the given cannot be factual knowledge. Correctly
recognizing this, Russell introduces his well known distinction bet-
ween knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description (cf.
Russell, 1959, pp. 46-47). Let us here note a passage from Problems
o f Philosophy
,
quoted also by Williams, in which Russell seems to
commit himself to there being such a thing as nonproposltlonal
knowledge
:
things said about it—I may say that it is brown, that it israther dark, and so on. But such statements, though they make
me know truths about the colour, do not make me know the
colour itself any better than I did before: so far as concernsknowledge of the colour itself, as opposed to knowledge oftruths about it, I know the colour perfectly and completely
when I see it, and no further knowledge of it itself is even
theoretically possible.
(Russell, 1959, pp. 46^7)
When I know the color itself I do not appear to have knowledge about
the color—knowledge of truths. It would seem to be non-factual
,
non-
propositional knowledge, but it is, Russell seems to be insisting,
knowledge nonetheless.
Williams' comment on this passage--"so far, so good"—is quite
odd given that the passage seems to assert the thesis of nonproposi-
tional knowledge which Williams means to be objecting to (cf.
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Williams, 1977, p. 35 ).
WlUlanis' objection comes with this passage of Russell's-
(Russell, 1959, p. 47)
Williams’ objection:
"ith sense-data they are known to meas
_diej are
-that is, presumably as brown, square or
br»nn; 'w of’the daturassquare to be distinguished from knowing that it isbro^^ squ^? The difference is entirely ve?b^t^ ~
uncertainty has been resolved, and acquaintance with objectsquietly transformed into factual ’knowing that. ’5
(Williams, 1977, p. 36)
In other words: insofar as Russell is talking about knowledge at all,
he is talking about ordinary propositional knowledge—knowledge Unat
this patch is brown, for example. He cannot be talking about non-
propositional knowledge because there is no such thing. Russell is
merely confused about a certain type of propositional knowledge con-
cerning visual sensation reports. That it is really propositional
knowledge inevitably comes out when philosophers try to say anything
about it. (If one were to respond to Williams here with the point
that perhaps this sort of awareness, precisely because it is
nonconceptual
,
is not the sort of thing one can describe using con-
cepts, Williams would be likely to respond that such awareness could
not possibly amount to anything the founda tionali st could use. More
on this below.)
Williams may be misinterpreting Russell here. Russell does
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not seee to be agreeing with Williams that ^en "sense-data" are Unown
to .e "Just as they are", they are necessarily Unown to »e as brown,
or as square, etc. Russell Is not claiming, or It does not seem he
has to claim, that In being acquainted with "sense-data" they are
Unown to me as brown, or square, or whatever. Indeed, In the first of
the passages quoted from Russell, he seems to be insisting on Just the
opposite: any Unowledge by acquaintance Is not Unowledge that this
colored patch Is brown and rather darU, or of other such facts.
Knowledge of this latter sort would be propositional and conceptual.
To have It, I would have to have the concept of brown, for example.
But Russell seems to feel that there can be some other type of
apprehension which is nonpropositional
.
Perhaps Russell is going too far if he is claiming that one
can apprehend something that is not a proposition or state of affairs.
But why can’t he be right at least in the more modest claim that there
can be some sort of awareness that does not require any concep-
tualizing on the part of the subject? In order to know that this is
brown, I presumably need to have the concept of brown. But I need not
have this concept in order to have the sensory experience Russell is
talking about. At least I know of no arguments from Williams or
anyone else which successfully show that I cannot have the sensory
experience if I lack the concept.
It may well be an Illegitimate step from the claim that one
can have a sensory experience without possessing any concepts by which
to type or categorize that experience to the claim that this sort of
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situation is a case of nonproposltlonal awareness-awareness that Is
not an awareness of any state of affairs. As noted above. I will take
this step for the ttae being, and later show how the arguments
.ade
against Wllllaas can be applied just as well without taking this step.
But the immediate point I want to make is that It does not seem
implausible to suggest that a subject can have a sensory experience
yet not possess any concepts. To Illustrate this I will consider an
account of experience which Is intended to fill out Russel Is'
suggestion that there Is a distinction between seeing a color and
knowing any truths about that color. This account will be compatible,
I believe, with both the view that this distinction requires that we
posit some form of nonproposltlonal awareness and the view that
accepts the distinction but denies the possibility of such awareness.
A word about how all of this relates to the given might be
helpful at this point: if there is a distinction between the
experience of seeing a color and knowing truths about that color, then
what is given is the experience of that color. The given, if it
exists, is this sensory experience that is distinct from any concepts
that might be formulated in order to describe that experience.
Clearly, an account of sensory experience that makes such a distinc-
tion is necessary to defend this doctrine of the given. (Accounts of
what precisely the given is depend more on one's theory of perception
than on one s theory of justified belief. Thus if some sort of
realism is true, the given might well be, in ordinary cases of percep-
tion, the physical object itself. The realist can of course still
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speak of the subject’s experience of the
account, the given might be sense data or
fuller discussion.) When I speak of the
experiences, I do not mean to presuppose
theory of perception.)
object. On a phenomenal
images. (See below for
given as what one
or reject any particular
i s
a
t
An Account of Experience
The following two situations both seem to me to present
plausible accounts of experience:
First Situation : A normal adult observer looks out on a
clear bright day and has certain sensory experiences of color,
of movement, of sound, etc. These experiences, although he
may not conceptualize this, are characterized by certain
qualities: they are specific, particular, ever-changing, con-
taining an enormous amount of detail—detail which he may (or
may not) come to conceptualize as, for example, the veins on a
leaf of the apple tree in the foreground. He does in any case
Interpret conceptually at least some elements of this
experience, along such lines as these: "There is a white
sailboat with a blue sail on the river." "The grass has some
brown patches." "I thought that brown patch was a duck
swimming but I see now it is some dead grass waving in the
wind .
"
Second Situation : A child who has not yet acquired
language or concepts looks out and has similar sensory
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experiences vAlch are, like the adult's, characterised by
specificity, particularity, and detail. Not knowing the
concept of sailboat, not even knowing the concept of brown or
of a colored patch, he has no thoughts of sailboats or brown
patches-lndeed no linguistic thoughts or conceptual Interpre-
tations at all. Yet he Is conscious and aware. He Is aware
of these sensory experiences In all their detail and
specificity. This does not mean he takes note of the details.
Hls experiences are specific In the sense that they provide
the data by which he could, had he the conceptual
sophistication, make quite precise discriminations, such as
that the blue color of the sail Is lighter than that of the
river, or that exactly twelve apples are visible on the apple
tree, or that there are veins on the leaves of the tree.
What is wrong with this account? Presumably Williams would
object to it, but has he shown it to be inconsistent or incoherent?
The objection to the account would seem to center on the assumption
made in this account that the adult and the child can have the same
visual experience. The child, on this account, sees just what the
adult sees, only without the concepts. The child has sensory
experiences, and these are similar to the adult’s as they view the
same scene. The difference lies only in what concepts they do or do
not form about these experiences.
This account of experience is unpopular among many
philosophers, Williams presumably included. Experience and concepts
198
ara not no easily demarcated, they would say. and It cannot really be
said that the child and adult see the same thing. Johannes Kepler
and Tycho Brahe do not see the same thing when they watch the sun from
a hilltop at dawn. So goes a popular example by Hanson that Is
thought to Illustrate this point against the above account of
experience. But does Hanson Intend It to Illustrate such a point?
Consider some of his comments about the example:
Tycho and Kepler are both aware of a brilliant yellow-
^ expanse over a green one. Such ase a urn picture is single and uninverted. To beunaware of it is not to have it. Either it dominates one'svisual attention completely or it does not exist.
If Tycho and Kepler are aware of anything visual, it mustbe of some pattern of colours
. . . This private pattern isthe same for both observers.
. .
So something about their visual experiences at dawn is the
greL aL M yellow-white disc centered betweeneen nd blue colour patches. Sketches of what they see
Kenlfr bo?h
In this sense Tycho andp e t see the same thing at dawn. The sun appears to
the same way. The same view, or scene, is presentedto them both.
(Hanson, 1958, pp. 7-8)
Careless readers of philosophers of science such as Hanson and Kuhn
have sometimes interpreted them as making very broad claims about the
nature of experience or the experience-concept dual! ty—cla hns that
reject the above account of experience. But it is not obvious that
Hanson and Kuhn would wish their claims to be extended that far, and
there are passages such as the one above which seem to reaffirm a tra-
ditional account of experience.
Be that as it may, it remains for Williams to show just what
is wrong with holding that we can have sensory awareness that is
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distinct fro. conceptual knowledge. One could even ™ake the case that
there be such awareness, for how else could knowledge acquire Its
particularity? Conceptual knowledge. Insofar as It relies on
concepts. Is general. "Brown,"
"square," "rather dark," etc, are
general terms In the sense that they can be applied to many distinct
particulars. But propositions Involving these general terms may not
be what I come to apprehend when 1 apprehend the given as such. That
apprehension is quite particular. That may be why It cannot be
described using concepts, for concepts generalize and hence remove me
from the particularity of my direct apprehension of the glven-my
unique sensory experience as I am having It at this specific time.
None of this means that the given Is a sort of undifferen-
tiated, amorphous blur, as It Is sometimes represented to be. On the
contrary. It Is finely differentiated and specific. Within sensory
experience there is enough specific information that I can distinguish
the veins on one leaf of an apple tree fifteen feet away from me. I
may not, of course, come to conceptualize any of this, but I can If I
possess the requisite concepts. And how could 1 do so If the sensory
experience Itself did not contain considerable de tall—enough to allow
this to become a bit of conceptual information?
Indeed, if anything deserves the epithets undifferentiated and
amorphous, it is the conceptual element of knowledge, not awareness of
the given. The thought that there is a white sailboat with blue sails
on the river could be an appropriate interpretation of any number of
distinct sensory experiences. It is that thought, if anything, that
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is rather vague and Indeterminate, not the Immediate sensory
experience itself.
V^llliams* Response and the Thesis of
Nonpropositional Awareness
Williams is likely to respond to all of this along these
lines: "But if you insist that there is some pure, nonconceptual
awareness, what can it be an awareness of? The only thing you can say
(except
-unhelpfully—that it is an awareness of the given, or an
awareness of
_t^, as you resort to pointing) is that it is not an
awareness of anything that can be described. For If you try to
describe It, you are back In the realm of the conceptual and
propositional. You claim there Is some form of awareness, but you
can't describe what It Is an awareness of or give It any content.
Such tnys tery—mongering ! "
It is at this point, in replying to Williams, that the thesis
of nonpropositional awareness comes to the fore. This thesis is,
again, the view that it is possible for one to be aware—to have sen-
sory experiences, for example-^i thout being aware of any proposition
or state of affairs. It posits some form of awareness that is not an
awareness that some state of affairs obtains. Defenders of this thes-
is will point to the paradigmatic case of a preconceptual child who,
they will say, is surely aware, but since he does not possess any con-
cepts he cannot be aware of any propositions. As already noted, I
first consider a response to Williams based on a defense of this
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thesis, then a response that does not requite such a defense.
I believe that If make the assumption that In order to be
aware of a proposl tlon-that Is. In order to have a state of affairs
aa an object of awareness-one must understand the concepts contained
in that proposition or state of affairs, then under that ass^ptlon
the thesis Of nonproposltlonal awareness becomes a quite plausible
It seems very reasonable to assert that a preconceptual child is
aware, and If such awareness cannot be of any proposition since he has
no concepts, then It would seem there must be a nonproposltlonal
awareness.
What can Williams say against this? (He could, of course,
challenge the assumption that awareness of propositions requires con-
ceptual understanding. That response will be considered in the next
section.) Consider his charge that the doctrine of nonproposltlonal
awareness Involves mystification and talk about the Ineffable, talk
which Is Inevitably self-defeating because It attempts to describe
what on its own grounds is indescribable.
I believe that this sense of mystification can be largely
removed by explaining what the object of this alleged nonproposltlonal
awareness is. This is not necessarily a self-defeating exercise.
There is no obvious absurdity in using concepts to discuss whether a
nonconceptual given exists, or even to assert that is exists and to
state one's reasons for thinking that it exists. On the other hand,
if the given does exist and one's awareness of the given is
nonproposltlonal, then obviously one cannot state what proposition it
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is one is aware of where one Is aware of so.e aspect of the given.
But here too an explanation of what the given is or „lght he can help
to ease the sense that some Impossibly obscure doctrine Is being
advocated. Finally, an explanation can be offered of how the given
might plausibly be construed as providing a basis for the justifica-
tion of the propositions we ultimately come to believe.
Thus I will primarily be discussing the given. It will be
helpful to relate this discussion to the thesis of nonproposltlonal
awareness. As 1 have hinted In the above paragraph, the given Is the
object of this nonproposltlonal awareness. The given Is what the pre-
conceptual child Is aware of, and since his awareness cannot Involve
any concepts, it is nonproposltlonal. Those who reject the thesis of
nonproposltlonal awareness will also take the object of awareness to
be the given, as I will explain In a later section. But for now I
will characterize the given as the object of one's nonproposltlonal
awareness
.
I should note too chat In discussing the given I only mean to
be offering a plausible doctrine. I do not mean to be affirming or
establishing that It is true. The point Is only to respond to
Williams' call for clarification— "What could such a doctrine possibly
amount to?"—by giving a plausible account.
What the Given Might Be
What, then, is this object of nonproposi tional awareness? It
is what one has direct sensory experiences of. Exactly what the given
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is will depend, as I have
if direct realism is true
parts of them
— the facing
noted above, on one's theory of perception.
then ordinary physical objects, or at least
surface of a tomato, perhaps—may constitute
part Of what Is given. On other theories of perception, the given may
be sense data, sensory Images, or similar phenomena.
But on any account. It would seem that what is directly given
to us through sensory experience Is something we are Intimately fami-
liar with. When we refer to the given we are referring to colors,
shapes, pains, the taste of strawberries or the feeling of dizziness.
Is this "Ineffable"? Perhaps It is In the sense that the experience
of these sensations can occur even if one does not have the concepts
by which to categorize, understand, or describe them. But If this is
ineffable, the charge of mystery-mongerlng or of obscurantism begins,
I believe, to lose much of Its force. The nature of sensory
experience would seem to be obvious to everyone who experiences, and
It would also seem obvious what the difference Is between experience
itself and descriptions of that experience.
It would seem necessary to call these experiences forms of
awareness. The person who has tasted strawberries, for example, would
seem to have acquired an awareness which one who has never tasted them
lacks, even if neither of these individuals has any language or con-
ceptual knowledge. The prelinguistic child does not apprehend that
the tree is green. What he apprehends, quite nonconceptually
,
is what
he sees—no more, but, significantly, no less. Perhaps this idea is
behind Russell's comment, possibly misunderstood by Williams, that
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things with which I have acquaintance are things immediately known to
just as they are. Russell «,y not at all mean to be speaking of
propositional knowledge that such and such Is bro™, for example.
He may mean to be speaking of knowing the feel, the look, the taste of
be Insisting that such knowledge Is distinct from knowing
that it is the feel (look, taste, etc.) of x AnH nf> c ; t X. d if one grants such
a possible distinction, one can begin to see how knowing the feel,
etc. of X, and other such nonproposltlonal awareness might serve as
the basis for ordinary propositional knowledge, for example, knowing
that It Is the taste of strawberries. But more on that later. As for
the alleged Impossibility of such nonproposltlonal awareness. It Is no
argument at this stage, given what has been said so far, for Williams
to simply respond "That's ineffable, so it must be Impossible."
The Given as a Basis of Justification
Suppose Williams grants the possibility of a nonpropositional
awareness of the given. He could still insist that it could never
serve as the foundation for the justification of ordinary
propositions. How could the "ineffable" guarantee anything about any
ordinary proposition, "let alone the entire edifice of empirical
knowledge" (Williams, 1977, p. 29)?
How-could-it-be-possible?" arguments begin to lose whatever
force they had when one begins to spell out an account of how it could
be possible. How could the given support the entire edifice of
empirical knowledge? Let us consider the account of the given that
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has been offered.
On this account, sensory experience, far from being an
amorphous blur devoid of content. Is extraordinarily rich In content-
perhaps most or even all the content of empirical propositions Is
derived from this sensory content. Oranted, one cannot s^clfy „hat
this content Is without going over to the propositional and leaving
the given behind. But to simply Insist that there can then be no real
content Is to beg the question against the two-components view.
Indeed, on this view, experience Is much richer in content
than concepts are. In order for the concept brown to be adequate to
cover a range of different experiences. It must carry less content
than any one of those Individual experiences. And It Is for this
reason that It is very plausible to suppose that experience, with all
Its detail and relatively high content, can provide eplstemlc support
for propositions, with their more general nature and carrying rela-
tively less content. To move, as Cartesian foundatlonallsts require,
from what Is given In a particular experience to a proposition such as
that expressed by "There Is a brown object In front of me now" can be
not only plausible, but extremely modest, since we are moving from
higher content to lower content. It seems just as legitimate as the
move from "There are 5849 beans In this jar” to the lower content
Statement "There are a number of beans in this jar."^
At any rate, this is one way it could work. If the question
is only "How can it be possible?" then this is one answer.
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Back to WA3
we .ust relate the above considerations, based on the thesis
of nonproposltlonal awareness, directly to WA3. My reconstruction of
Wlllafs here Is taken fairly directly from the text (cf. Ibid., p.
34). Premise 2 Is Implicit In the text, but It Is quite obvious that
Williams Is assuming something like this, given both his claim that
Whatever Is known must be the sort of thing which can be true or false
and his clear dismissal of the nonproposltlonal as a candidate for
knowledge
.
ml se 1
As WA3 stands, however. It Is Invalid. The wording of pre-
(Wllllams' own statement) is not close enough to the wording of
the conclusion of premise 3 to allow us to extract the conclusion
Intended. I have left It that way thus far because I think Williams
use of the term 'known” Is misleading and the whole argument should be
recast anyway.
The problem with talking about knowledge here is that, if the
traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief is
accepted, then premise 1 becomes true by definition. If premise 2 is
also accepted, as it is, quite reasonably, by many philosophers, then
it seems that the conclusion of WA3 can be made to follow validly
from the premises of the argument with only a few minor adjustments.
But Williams should not be talking about knowledge. For what
we are talking about here is the apprehension of the given, a cogni-
tive state which may not yet qualify as knowledge. Indeed it cannot
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qualify as knowledge in the a aS full-blooded propositional sense. The
question is whether there can be any such sort ofy n nonpropositional
^^3.1T0ri0SS
• Xri OtHpT nr\t- 1- 1 •beg this question, we need to further
reconstruct HllUan,s’ argument, revising HA3 to:
WA3': (1) For all x. If x is an object of awareness then x isa member of the set of i-i, • ’ rn
true or false
caLwe of ^ '^'’ose things
Tf it 1 _ LUL^t
'
hf
X is a proposition.
' IS not t e case that that which is given in
rtat"thar h: K then it is not the Lse
awareLsL " - object of
The conclusion of line 3 follows from premises 1 and 2 with the
instantiation of "that which is given In experience" for "x"
. It
would perhaps be more appropriate to instantiate a specific case of
what is given for a particular person in a particular experience, but
since this could not, by hypothesis, be specified, the argument is
formulated more generally.
If the account of the given which has been presented above is
correct, then WA3 ’ is defective. And it is clear that, according to
this account, premise 1 of WA3 ' should be rejected. For the above
account is based on the view that not all objects of awareness are
propositional. When one is having a sensory experience but not con-
ceptualizing (perhaps because one is a pr e- ling ui s tic child), one is
not, on this account, entertaining a proposition. One is not aware,
in even the most rudimentary sense, that any proposition obtains.
What one is aware of, presumably, is the sensory experience itself.
But an experience, like a tomato, is not the sort of thing that can be
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true or false. Propositions^ experiences and tomatoes can, of
course, be true or false, but not the experience Itself, or the to.ato
Itself. But since there Is undeniably, on this account, some sort of
awareness. It simply follows that not all thirds that one can be aware
of are the sorts of things that can be true or false; l.e., some
awareness is nonpropositional
.
If one accepts the thesis of nonpropositional awareness. It
seems to me that the account presented in this section and the pre-
vious two sections constitutes an entirely plausible reply to
Williams' argument.
Defending the Given Without the Thesis of
Nonpropositional Awareness
As I have already noted, however, it is not necessary to
accept this thesis in order to respond to Williams. Essentially the
same considerations and reasons apply even if one holds that any
object of awareness, even awareness of the most rudimentary sensory
experience, must be propositional.
For the debate over whether there can or cannot be nonproposi
tional awareness turns on matters that are Irrelevant to the response
that has been made to Williams. I believe that the debate turns on
the assumption noted above that in order to be aware of a proposition
one must understand the concepts contained in that proposition. The
proponents of the thesis of nonpropositional awareness simply make
this assumption, and then conclude that since pr econcep tual children.
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tor example, are obviously capable of being aware, their awareness
must be nonpropositlonal
.
But It does not seem to me at all Implausible to deny this
assumption. It may well be that every object of awareness is a
proposition, and that understanding a proposition need not be required
in order to be aware of it. Some propositions may simply be given to
a subject, and need not be ^derstood by him. Suppose, for example,
that S Is a preconceptual child who Is experiencing sensations of
blue. One may well maintain that S is aware, and that the object of
S's awareness is ^^ the proposition that let us say, S is
experiencing something blue or perhaps. S Is appeared to bluely. This
supposition requires that we say the object of S's awareness can be a
proposition which S does not grasp or understand. But this may In the
end be no more paradoxical than the obvious truth that I can be
acquainted with someone who Is in fact the winner of the grand prize
in the state lottery without being aware of this fact.
If one takes this approach, then it is premise 5 rather than
premise 6 of WA2 that would be criticized. Premise 5 states that if
the apprehension of the given must occur without conceptual mediation,
then the apprehension of the given is nonproposi tional
. I take the
antecedent to mean that the given as such cannot be known or appre-
hended through the use of concepts. This seems acceptable enough in
that we are talking about the type of apprehension that occurs inde-
pendently of any understanding of concepts. But it does not follow
from the antecedent that this apprehension is nonpropos i tional . The
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above sUe.ch i„«ea.es
.He possiMlU, ,,a. one can appceHen. a propo-
sition even If one possesses no concepts.
should be clear then that either approach can be used to
Challenge WllUa.s' WA2. 1 a. aware, however, that »any questions
could be raised about the general sketch presented above of the given
and Its relation to the conceptual. For example, "If the given Is so
obvious and familiar, why do different philosophers describe It
differently?"
"How do you know that the detail and specificity you
claim to find In experience as such Is not rather provided by the con-
cepts you have by this time undoubtedly acquired?”
"Doesn’t your
account rely on your being able to say that the preconceptual
person’s experience can be the same as the adult’s postconceptual
p ience. But hasn t Wittgenstein shown that you cannot talk about
one experience being the same as another?" And so on.
In order to show that the doctrine of the given is true or
highly likely to be true, one would have to adequately reply to such
questions as these. One would have to say much more in defense and
explication of the doctrine than has been said here. It is not my
intention to establish that the doctrine is true. My concern has been
only to show that the critics of foundationalism have not established
— case. This sometimes involves giving a sketch of what a foun-
dationalist theory, or in this case, an account of what the given,
would look like, for example, when the critics ask "How could that
be? or What could such a view possibly amount to?" But that is
all I wish to do here defuse such questions by giving a rough sketch
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of what that view would amount to Thi<= -r. is IS only to show that there is
3o»e inuial plauslMUty Po the U Is not to at,ue sttot^l, tot
that view. ptasent wotU Is United In that 1 do not Intend to pre-
sent such arguments for foundatlonalls. or allied views. It Is quite
enough for now to show that the antl-foundatlonallsts have not ^de
their case.
An Evaluation of WA4 and WA5
WA4 is an argument against the existence of the given,
,4s I
have noted, I am not sure that the passage I have based my reconstruc-
tion on ought to be construed Just as I have reconstructed It.
Williams may at this point be offering some other version of the argu-
ment against the existence of the given Itself. We shall see about
that presently and have another look at Williams' text. Meanwhile I
shall consider WA4 as one possible Interpretation of Williams'
passage
.
The idea behind the first premise of WA4 is that some account
or characterization must be able to be offered. If no account can be
offered, such a "doctrine" that cannot even be stated is hardly worth
bothering about. But any account that can be offered is then used, in
premises 2 and 3, against the doctrine itself. Any such account would
presumably have to be propositional. But the given is, by hypothesis,
nonpropositional. Hence the doctrine in a sense is refuted by merely
being stated.
It seems clear that this doctrine rests on a confusion between
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the doctrine of the given as an epistemological theory on the one hand
and that which Is actually given In experience on the other. Of
course, the doctrine of the given expressed by some founds tionali sts
and by the two-components view advocates must be expressed and
nderstood In terms of concepts and propositions. In this It Is like
every other epistemological theory and every other theory of any kind,
for that matter. But It does not at all follow that the doctrine Is
thereby vitiated. Premise 1 Is surely true In the sense that any
viable theory must be characterized proposltlonally If it Is ever to
be formulated, understood and evaluated. But to do this Is not to
•proposltlonallze" the given Itself. Constructing an eplstemlc theory
is one thing, having a sensory experience quite another. The former
does indeed require propositional knowledge, but It does not at all
follow that the sensory experience of the given as such requires such
knowledge. That which Is given In sensory experience may well be
uncharacterlzable in propositional terms. So premise 2 may well be
false
.
Alternatively, one might challenge premise 3 on the grounds
that even If an eplstemlc theory can "adequately express the nature of
the given." It does not follow that the given as such Is not Indepen-
dent of experience. If to assert that the given Is Independent of
experience is to assert, as I would take Williams to be asserting
here, that the two-components view is true, then the mere fact that
the given can be described and defended by an epistemic theory does
nothing to undermine this two-components view. The given may well
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exist as seething Independent of propositions In the sense that one
need not grasp or ,n.derstand any proposition in order to apprehend the
given. It may have this Independence even if one can also give a
theoretical characterization of the given.
Finally, If the assertion that the given Is not independent of
propositions means that propositions can be formulated about the
given, or that the given cannot exist Independently of the existence
of propositions, one can simply ask what Interest the conclusion of
WA4 has and how it can be applied against the two-components view.
I shall turn now to alternative Interpretations of the passage
of which WA4 Is one reconstruction. The most plausible alternative I
can discern rests on Williams' claim that Lewis has to characterize
the given as unalterable. On this Interpretation we have:
* /a?
characterizes the given as unalterable.
(2) He must provide some such characterization (e.g. if
not as unalterable then as alterable).
(3) If 1 and 2, then propositions must be able to provide
an adequate characterization of the given.
(4) If 3c, then the content of the given is not ineffable.
( ) If there is a given in the sense required by the two-
components view, it is ineffable.
(6) There is no given in the sense required by the two-
components view.
This interpretation differs only slightly from that offered as
WA4, and I believe it commits the same sort of fallacy. When Williams
says To illustrate the notion of the given by contrasting different
descriptions is to contradict the idea that the content of the given
is ineffable" (cf. ibid., p. 34, my emphasis), he is, I believe, most
clearly committing this fallacy. When we talk about the given we are
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talking about a concept or a notion" Just as „e do with an, eplstetlc
concept.
„e of course use propositions to talk ab.t It. But s.el,
we can talk about the given, about whether It exists In the sense
required by the two-c<xtponents view, tor example, without thereby com-
mitting ourselves to the falsity of that view on the grounds that the
given has already becane unduly
"proposl tlonallzed .
" To characterise
the general concept of the given—to state what we mean when we enun-
ciate the doctrine of the glven-ls not to state what the content of
the given In the case of a specific sensory experience Is. So we are
not committing the fallacy of stating what on our own grounds cannot
be stated.
Williams might feel that what he says about the requirement
that the given be described as nonpaper, nonsoft, etc, constitutes
an answer to the above response, for here we are discussing a specific
sensory experience: Lewis* experience of the pen. But here Williams
may be making the same mistake he may have made earlier with Russell.
Lewis does not say, and Williams is mistaken if he takes Lewis to
imply, that the pen is given as nonsoft, noncubical
,
and nonpaper.
What IS given is a set of sensory experiences that might come to be
conceptualized as being of some object that is nonsoft, etc. But if
I lack those negative concepts, I have only the given—those sensory
experiences—and not the propositional awareness, requiring concepts,
that what is given is hard or nonsoft, etc. In fact, one could treat
these concepts in the same way Lewis treats the concepts of pen,
cylinder, a poor buy, in the passage quoted: I may come to designate
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this object as ••nonpapef when I a. rouging through
.y ,esh loohlng
for that stationary, and so on. Ue are here as before operating at
the conceptual level rather than designating what is given In
experience as such.
Perhaps, finally, some other Interpretation besides those
already given Is required of a passage from Williams such as:
•Necessarily, [the doctrine of the IneffabUlty) of the given breaks
down when one attempts to give some characterization of the given
whereby It Is to be distinguished from other elements In
experience (Ibid., p. 33). But In one sense, there are no other ele-
ments In experience. The sensory given Is all and only that which Is
a sensory experience for a particular subject. What Williams must
mean, then. Is that the doctrine breaks down when we attempt to
distinguish the given from the conceptual. The rest of the passage
from Williams (cf. Ibid.) does seem to support that Interpretation.
But we have already seen where Williams goes astray In thinking that
this constitutes an objection to the doctrine.
I turn now to Williams' last argument against the given,
represented by WA5. This is a fairly straightforward reconstruction
of Williams’ text. According to Williams, psychological experiments
have shown that there is "no such thing as a state of sensuous appre-
hension utterly unaffected by beliefs, desires, and expectations"
(ibid., pp. 45-4 6). This is supposed to show that there can be no
experience of the given as such and hence no reason for thinking it
even exists as a realm distinct from the conceptual and
216
propositional
.
The first point to make concerning WAS Is about the vagueness
°£ the argument, especially of the cnuclal pr»lse which states what
the psychological evidence has uncovered. What Is meant by a state of
"sensuous apprehension utterly unaffected by beliefs, desires and
apprehensions"? Are the advocates of the given Insisting that the
given must be thus unaffected? Not necessarily. No one Is saying
that what is given for a person Is 'utterly unaffected" by that
person s desires, for example. Suppose 1 desire a hot fudge sundae.
I undertake to walk to the corner Ice cream parlor and order a hot
fudge sundae. Immediately afterwards I have sensory experiences of a
particularly happy nature. These sensory experiences constitute part
of what Is given to me at that time. Had I not desired the hot fudge
sundae, 1 would not now be having these sensory experiences. So what
IS given to me Is affected by my desires. The same Is true of dreams.
Dreams constitute part of what Is given to me at certain times. But
It Is a commonplace that what I dream Is often a product of my
beliefs, desires, and fears. So again my beliefs, etc.. Influence
what is given to me.
All this is obvious. If this is sufficient to refute the
doctrine of the given, then it is a rather weak doctrine. But of
course these facts say nothing against the doctrine, l^at is given
need not be unaffected by me, for I can often direct my attention away
from certain sensory experiences. But this means only that the world
of concepts (represented by beliefs, expectations, and desires)
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causall, influences what Is given. This does not at all establish
what Williams needs and what he apparently thinks he has established-
that the so~called given is as ^ r qv • u8 it were imbued through and through with
the conceptual in such a way that it is impossible to conceptually or
eplstemically distinguish between them. To conclude this would be
lust as fallacious as to conclude that idealism must be true because
-ntal events can causally Influence physical events, hence the physi-
cal must be Imbued with the mental and cannot really exist as a pure
and separate state. (Recall again that while the doctrine of the
given will require that thAro -5 c ^q e e is a conceptual and eplstemic distinc-
tion between the given and the concentual thl= a„p , is does not mean that the
roust be concentual T^ i c-p . It is iroportant to avoid the con-
fusion of thinking that because "the given” Itself Is a concept and
can be conceptually distinguished from other concepts. It must be that
the content of the given must also be conceptual.)
If Williams does not mean to be making this obvious (and
Ineffective) point about the causal Influence of the conceptual on the
given. It Is up to him to make clear just what he does mean.
The second comment I wish to make about WAS Is a question
about whether psychological experiments could ever prove or disprove
the philosophical thesis of the given which Is being debated. 1 do
not hold that psychologists and epistemologlsts can never have
anything useful to say to one another. But there are two aspects of
this debate about the given that make me suspicious about claims that
psychology can make a contribution here. The first Is that according
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to WAS, psychologists are making claims about what Is discoverable
through introspection. Or at least the clahns they do .ake are seen,
according to WAS. as being able to detemlne whether something Is or
is not discoverable through Introspection. But psychologists have
been extremely reluctant to talk about introspection, to base conclu-
sions on reports from their o>vn introspective states, or to say what
is or is not discoverable through Introspection. Given the present
methods psychologists employ. It Is unlikely that they can discover
anything about Introspective states, presuming that there are such
states. This Is not because psychological methods are defective, but
because they are designed, or at least have the outcome, of giving us
a different range of facts than those the Introspectlvlst In epistemo-
logy claims to be giving us. The psychologist's reliance on third-
person reports precludes his collecting and reporting on the kind of
data—direct subjective experiences—which the advocate of the given
might claim to base his doctrine on.
The second aspect of the debate about the given that seems to
make it unamenable to psychological testing is that the debate is
about, first of all, whether there is a conceptual distinction between
the given and the conceptual (that is, is the alleged distinction
simply incoherent?) and, secondly, whether there is an epistemic
distinction between the two (that is, can the given serve as the foun-
dation for the justification of ordinary external world
propositions?). It seems doubtful that psychological testing can
offer determining evidence on the existence of these distinctions.
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word about introspection. It can be misleading for the
founcauonaust. o. c.Uic of foun.af fonalf s.. fo fasisf f.af
discerning the given requires reliance on Introspection,
introspection is typically supposed to have as Its object one's o™
mental states-one's thoughts, dreams, and beliefs, for example.
Typically these states are described as "private."
"Inner," etc. But
even If there are such private events, and even If some of these
constitute part of what Is given for a person at a time. It does not
fellow that the advocate of the given Is committed to saying that all
of what is given Is private, inner, and purely mental. If the direct
realist can be a foundatlonallst and an advocate of the given, and
I have seen no refutation of such a possibility, then It may well be
that what Is given In cases of ordinary perceptual experience Is the
ordinary external world rather than anything Irredeanably Inner and
subjective. The physical world or specific objects within It may not
be conceptualised, the person may not know or be Justified In
believing that he Is actually perceiving the physical world and not
rather some dream or hallucination, but none of this, I believe, need
change the fact that In normal cases of "successful" perception, what
IS given may very well be the ordinary physical world and the ordinary
objects in It. If that is so, I would find the term "Introspection"
as applied to such instances of perceiving the given a rather
misleading term at best. Perhaps for such instances it would be best
to coin and use the term "extrospection. " This may cure both foun-
dationalists and their critics of feeling that founda tionali sm
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requires ihe positing o, sense data as things di„erent iro. physical
objects and yet required as the objects of so»e introspective cental
act of sensory experiencing.
This leads to some final remarks about the existence of the
Slven. It appears from the above that unless Williams can show that
direct realism is logically or theoretically incompatible with the
doctrine of the glven-a task he does not address himself to-he must
admit the possibility that what are in fact trees, for example, are
part of the given in cases of ordinary perception, even if the subject
does not conceptualize them as trees. Brick walls, as the motorist
unhappily discover when he collides with one. are even more vigorous
examples. If this can be so. then it can be seen how ineffective and
off the point is Williams' exasperation with proponents of the given
for advocating the Ineffable. If anything Is "ef fable," it is a brick
wall, whether conceived as such or not.
The possibility of ordinary physical objects constituting part
of the given should also give pause to anyone who claims that psycho-
logical experiments have proven that the concept of the given is inco-
herent or that the given just cannot exist. What could such
experiments lead to? At best they could help establish the factual,
genetic question of whether there is ever a pr econceptual stage in
which the given is experienced without the mediation of concepts. But
even supposing the latter were established, it does not seem this
would determine the conceptual and epistemic questions which, as we
have noted above, are central to the debate at hand about the
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existence and epistemic significance
In summary, then, it does not
WA4 and WAS succeed in establishing a
of the given.
seem that Williams’ arguments
case against the given.
B^onjour’s Critique of the Given
In his article "Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?"
Laurence Bonjour professes to give reasons tor "doubtit^ whether any
version of foundatlonallsm is finally acceptable" (Bonjour, 1978,
P.l). The first part of his article Is an attack on the view Boljour
calls "externallsm" (cf. note 4 of Chapter II), a view >*lch the foun-
datlonallst can use to defend the thesis that a subject's beliefs can
be basic for that subject. Although 1 do not think that Bonjour 's
attack on externallsm Is finally successful, I shall not consider It
here. As Bonjour himself admits, this argument Is not successful
against the type of foundatlonallsm which holds that It Is proposi-
tions about the subject's experiences rather than about his beliefs
which ultimately justify nonbaslc propositions. Since It Is this
experience-based" type of foundatlonallsm which 1 wish to discuss and
defend in Chapter VI, Bonjour's argument against externallsm may be
passed over in favor of his critique of the given, which does directly
challenge the type of foundatlonallsm I wish to defend.
Many of the points I have made against Williams will be rele-
vant against Bonjour as well. However, it is Instructive to consider
briefly another fomulation of the argument against the given, for both
its similarities to and differences from Williams' account.
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Bonjour
'
s
straightforward in
basic argument against
"glvanlsm" Is clear and
Its general plan. It can be formulated as
follows
:
cognitive state.
justifying ordinary beliefs. ^
extent‘L\rf'"°®"“*''" “ *“"''ertent it confers Justification, it must also require
(6) If this Intuitive state is to properly serve as thebasis for the justification of ordinary beliefs Itmust both confer Justification on those bellefs’and;°t require justification Itself.
' state cannot properly serve as thebasis for the justification of ordinary beliefs.
Premises 1 and 2 use the concepts of Intuition, apprehension, and
cognitive state, which are not explicated by Bonjour. However. I am
willing enough to accept these premises, as I feel the problems
with the argument lie elsewhere.
In defense of premise 3, Bonjour has this to say:
The problem to be raised revolves around the nature of . . .
t e intuition or immediate apprehension (hereafter I will usemainly the former term). It seems to be a cognitive stateperhaps somehow of a more rudimentary sort than a belief whichinvolves the thesis or assertion that-p. Now if this is
correct, it is easy enough to understand in a rough sort of
way how an intuition can serve to justify a belief with this
same assertive content. The problem is to understand why theintuition, involving as it does the cognitive thesis that-p,does not j-tself require justification. And if the answer is
offered that the intuition is justified by reference to the
state of affairs that-p, then the question will be why this
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the state falrs^to°justl£v*^th°" °i apprehenslon of
wise one and the sIL coanjMvI “ther-
both an apprehension of ?he stat^of af^J constitutetlon of that very anorehenQ-irh
^ fairs and a justifica-
own cognitive bootstraps One’ is
itself up by its
data that certain cogn ;ive «a es"^ MS Chlshota'sthat extr^ely Paradoxical ^e^Iru L riy cL^ Unfe^^’planatlon of how this Is possible. rPnstltut s an ex-
(.Bonjour, 1978, p. lO)
1 believe that Bonjour has moved here from defending his premise to
complaining that foundatlonallsts have not defended theirs. Instead
of explaining why It Is Impossible for any cognitive state (Including
of course the sensory apprehension of the given, which Is at Issue for
the Cartesian foundatlonallst) to both justify ordinary propositions
and not require justification Itself. Bonjour has merely Insisted how
extremely paradoxical this notion Is and asked the foundatlonallsts to
explain themselves. Undoubtedly the foundatlonallsts do need to
explain themselves, but It hardly constitutes a refutation of foun-
datlonallsm to point out that further explanation on the foundational-
ist's part is necessary.^
In defense of premise 4, we have this from Bonjour:
^nd
intuition is not a cognitive statea thus involves no cognitive grasp of the state of affairsin question, then the need for a justification for the intui-tion is obviated, but at the serious cost of making it diffi-
cu t to see how the intuition is supposed to justify thebelief. If the person in question has no cognitive grasp ofthat state of affairs (or of any other) by virtue of having
such an intuition, then how does the intuition give him a
^^^son for thinking that his belief is true?
(Ibid., p. 10)
If in saying a state is non-cognitive Bonjour means that the subject
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has no awareness whatsoever, as he
Bonjour that the subject could not
on the basis of such a state. But
of awareness.
appears to mean, I would agree with
be justified in believing anything
apprehension of the given is a form
Semi-Cognitive Statpg
The points Bonjour nmkes against
'seml-cognitlve states" and
generally In defense of his fifth premise, are, first, that "this
'solution' to the problem seems hopelessly contrived and ad
(Ibid., p. 11). second, that this attanpted solution uses an
Inappropriate visual metaphor with the underlying Idea of a mind
directly confronting Its object (cf. Ibid., pp. 11-12), and third,
that even if there were such seml-cognitlve states, they would be of
no help to the glvenlst. for It Is Impossible to separate the two
relevant aspects of a cognitive state—Its capacity to justify and Its
need for Justification itself and have a seml-cognitlve state which
has the former property while lacking the latter.
Bonjour does have more to say in defense of these last two
points. On the misleading metaphor of vision:
The main account which has usually been offered by give-
nists of such semi-cognitive states is well suggested by the
terms in which immediate or intuitive apprehensions are
described:
^
immediate," "direct," "presentation," etc. The
underlying idea here is that of confrontation : in intuition,
mind or consciousness is directly confronted with its object,
without the intervention of any sort of intermediary. It is
in this sense that the object is given to the mind. The root
metaphor is vision: mind or consciousness is likened to an
immaterial eye, and the object of intuitive awareness is that
which is directly before the mental eye and open to its gaze.
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tlva state which can^stlfy^uJa:! ="" =“
tion
, . .
justif but does not require justifica-
eye LTapr^uI nontlid'' T' -“"I
Whateve/else it 4 be fs Tot ire''""""-
too simple to be even mlnlm^Uy Lelrelo °tje"of mental phenomena and to the vanity of io ?
which such phenomenon depend Thn ^
* conditions upon
is conslderLle Intuittripieal o rte"c“' fespecially as applied to perceptual model,
to insist that this appeal is fsr r
sciousness, but only
adequately support the^ery speclfirslnrof
results >*lch the strong flundatlollllsi needs!’^ 1
!""
slm" “ r;f":ifiLn?i:i'fr
Itself nro„iaf= i seeming confrontation, this by
cognitive states, whatever they may be\alUd
"’"w^Ich^res^t
.
(Ibid., p. 12)
One striking thing about this passage is Bonjour’s claim that
talk of vision Is metaphorical, vague, and inapplicable. Quite the
contrary: vision Itself Is, along with the other senses, precisely
what the Cartesian foundatlonallst is talking about. Vision Is not a
model or metaphor for something else: It Is one of the types of per-
ceptual consciousness under discussion. Bonjour says that the mind Is
0
not, so far as we know, anything like an eye. Perhaps not, but an eye
is quite similar to an eye!
Bonjour obviously thinks the founda tionali st is talking about
the mind as something distinct from vision. What could Bonjour have
in mind here? One possibility is that Bonjour is not in this passage
thinking primarily of Cartesian foundational ism, which he would
characterize as the "perceptual consciousness" approach. Indeed, he
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has just been discussing Anthony Quinton’s external world foun-
datlonalls.. So Bonjour
.ay well grant that the visual
'•.etaphor" Is
-re appropriate to the Cartesian foundatlonallst approach. This
.ay
his concession, in the passage quoted above, that there Is
considerable Intuitive appeal to the
.odel when applied to the
"perceptual consciousness" approach. If this Is right, then, his cri-
tical remarks are not particularly applicable to Cartesian
foundationalism.
Another possibility Is that Bonjour feels that the foundatlon-
allst has much more to deal with than vision and the other senses as
such. His co.ments on the complexity of mental phenomena and the
variety of conditions upon which such phenomena depend suggest this.
Even the direct realist has to admit that there are cases of
hallucination, dreaming, optical Illusions, etc., in which things are
not as they appear. Perhaps in ordinary cases of "successful" vision
there Is a direct confrontation of the percelver with an ordinary phy-
sical object, but this Is not so In all cases. So what Is going on
has to be more complicated than what a simple direct realist metaphor
of confrontation with ordinary physical objects might suggest.
Whether this Is Bonjour's Intended point or not. It deserves a
response. And this Is that the visual confrontation metaphor can
accommodate cases of "unsuccessful" as well as successful perception.
Even If it Is only In cases of successful perception that the subject
actually does confront the ordinary physical object he believes he
perceives, the visual confrontation model still Is appropriate In
227
other (presumably more complex) cases because the subjecr takes there
to be an ordinary object he Is seel^; he has experiences like those
had la cases of ordinary successful perception. Of course he may not
be justified in believinc Vio'o i i jg that he s looking at an ordinary object, but
that's not the Issue here. The Iss^ Is whether the visual confron-
tation model is adequate and can give an account of what seml-
cognltlve states might be. And 1 see no reason why the fact of
unverldlcal perception would In Itself prevent such a model from
working. The given Is the set of sensory experiences an Individual
has. Sometimes, happily, these experiences adequately report what Is
happening In the physical world, sometimes, unhappily, they don't.
But In either case the subject se^ to see (hear, etc). He se^ to
be confronted with this or that object. It we can Imagine a seml-
cognltlve state-a particular visual experience for example-whlch
justifies (without Itself requiring justification) the proposition
that S is looking at something red, surely there Is no problem In Ima-
gining a similar seml-cognltlve state justifying the same proposition,
the only difference being that In this case S Is not In fact looking
at something red, but merely dreaming this. One semi-cognitive state
might be awareness of what is in fact a ripe tomato, another might be
awareness of various colored patches that might be taken to be ele-
ments of a ripe tomato but are in fact elements of a dream or
illusion. The visual experience itself, and hence the cognitive or
semi-cognitive state which the subject is in, may very well be quite
similar. Bonjour would have to supply us with some reason why semi-
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cognitive states could not le plausible explanations lot the unsuc-
cessful visual experiences even though they could be posited for the
successful ones.
Concerning Bonjour’s remark that •'even if empirical knowledge
at some point Involves some sort of confrontation
. .
. this by
Itself provides no clear reason for attributlt* epist^nlc justifica-
tion ... to the cognitive states which result" (ibid., p. 12), it
.ay be remarked that confrontation >rtth an object certainly se^s to
provide a reason for thinking that object is there, and that seeming
confrontation also can provide a reason if the subject has no reason
for thinking the apparent confrontation may not be veridical. I see
no reason at all t*y Bonjour should feel there is any mystery about
how this could be, given that he is supposing at this point that there
Is some confrontation between the observer and the world. Again, if a
motorist collides with a brick wall and has the associated sensations,
what better reason can he have for thinking that he has Indeed
collided vrtth a brick wall? Most of our confrontations with reality
are happily more gentle, but the principle remains the same.
Bonjour's third and last point against seml-cognltlve states
is that even If there were such things they would be of no help to the
givenlst
:
The basic idea, after all, is to distinguish two aspects of a
cognitive state, its capacity to justify other states and its
own need for justification, and then try to find a state which
possesses only the former and not the latter. But it seems
clear on reflection that these two aspects cannot be
separated, that it is one and the same feature of a cognitive
state, viz. its assertive content, which both enables it to
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confer justification on other stafpc ibe justified itself. if ^^so requires that it
to Introduce seml-cognltlve staLrin"’basic beliefs, a^nce^o whL^ver L^Lrsucb“'’'/°capable of conferring Justification It will to^tb'^rextent require justification. Thus evL . kexist, they are of no help to the glvenlsj ^ “ °answer the objection at iLue here attempting to
If It seems clear on reflection" to Bonjour that the justifying and
the justification-requiring features of a cognitive state are In prin-
ciple inseparable, perhaps he Is thinking only of ordinary empirical
assertions such as "Reagan Is President" or "Peas do not grow well 1„
dry country." Ordinary assertions of this sort are clearly both
capable of justifying other propositions and require justification
themselves. If „e think only of such propositions. It Is hard to see
how these two features could be separated. But It Is easier to see
how this might be If we consider the mental states the Cartesian foun-
datlonllst focusses on. A person who Is having visual experiences Is
presented, on this account, with an array of data that are full of
content and can serve as the basis for a great number of assertions.
It seems possible, even plausible here, to imagine that these visual
experiences serve as the justification for ordinary propositions
without themselves calling for or requiring justification. "What
Justifies you In thinking you are having this visual experience?"
"Nothing—I’m just having It, that’s all." This seems to be a per-
fectly reasonable response. Whether It Is true or not Is another
question, but the possibility and apparent reasonableness of this sort
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of account
r eflect ion
Is more than enough to counter Bonjour's claim
It Is clear that no cognitive or seml-cognltlve
justify without itself requiring justification.
An Argument from Tinpiausibili tv
that on
state can
It should be clear that Bonjour's dismissal
states, as well as his whole attack on glvenlsm, Is essentially an
argument from implauslblll ty : how could there be such things as
cognitive or seml-cognltlve states which justify without requiring
justification? How could the need for Justification just end at some
point? And so on.
But arguments from Implauslblll ty are rather weak arguments,
especially In philosophy, where practically any theory can be shown to
have its implausible aspects or consequences. For that matter, even
theories on the physical sciences have their Implausible aspects. If
physicists judged a theory on the basis of Its plausibility rather
than how well and how thoroughly It explained the data at hand, we
would never have relativity theory or quantum mechanics. I do not
believe that philosophers, any more than physicists, should rely on
Implauslblllty arguments. Of course, a feeling of "That’s absurd!
How could that be?" could stimulate a philosopher to find arguments
against the offending theory. But merely to restate his feeling In
various assertive ways is no such argument.
Bonjour does have a point, though, in insisting that foun-
dationalists explain themselves. It certainly does not help a theory
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to have its unexplained iraplausibilities.
articulate some of the problematic
Bonjour's article does
aspects of foundational ism that
need to be attended to. In particular,
needed
.
an account of the given is
As I have noted. It Is not my purpose here to present argu-
ments in support Of founds tlonalls„. But 1 do thl* Bonjoufs call
for explanation deserves a response: at least enough of a response to
defuse the feeling that foundatlonallst. Is too Implausible to be a
viable theory.
This response Is two-fold. The first aspect is the account of
the given which I have presented above In response to Williams’
criticisms. I do not take myself to have presented a convincing
account: only to have presented the beginnings of a explanation of
the way things might be. In particular I have been concerned to show
what the given might be and how It might be capable of providing
justification for ordinary nonbaslc propositions (cf. sections above
discussing these topics).
To the account already presented, I would like to add this in
response to Bonjour’s argument: I do not know whether the awareness
one has when experiences are given to one are properly described as
cognitive or as semi-cognitive states. But I hope to show that it is
not implausible to think that there might be such states. Perhaps the
semi cognitive label is the better one, because "cognition" usually
Implies thinking, reflection, knowledge, all of which imply in turn
that there is some propositional content to what is thought, reflected
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on, etc.
But is It not plausible to suppose that there Is so.e rudimen-
tary form of awareness *lch Is produced by the Interaction of sense
organs with the environment, which occurs even before an Individual Is
capable of understanding propositions. Suppose, as Bonjour Is willing
to, that this awareness Is or can be an awareness of the world as It
Is, at least at that particular place and tlme-that this awareness
involves a direct confrontation of the human perceiver with the world.
Is It not now clear how this awareness could. In principle at least,
serve the two roles Bonjour feels so certain can't be served In
tandem? It could justify ordinary propositions because It Is so rich
In content, so detailed that one visual experience could provide the
basis for myriads of propositions about, for example, the room In
which I am now sitting. But It would not Itself require Justifica-
tion. It Is not a conceptual awareness that the subject could be
making conceptual mistakes about, or which would require an adequate
and accurate conceptual repertory. So It wouldn't have to be
justified by assurances that he was using concepts correctly or that
he correctly remembers what this or that means. There may be no need
or requirement to justify the question "What is the subject's basis
for thinking he is having these visual experiences?" And again, it
seems quite plausible to respond that the very fact that he is having
these visual experiences is enough to justify the fact that he is
having them, if he ever comes to wonder and reflect on the justifica-
tion for his experiences.
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If Bonjour asks, "How can this be7" I thl* It I 3 fait to ask
hi. to look at his own expetlence and see fot hl.sell how It „l,ht he
both that it serves as the basis for his ordinary beliefs and also
that It is senseless to ask fot the justification for this thinking
that he has these experiences and a fortiori that it Is senseless to
the justification for the experiences themselves (since only
propositions, It would see., can be Justified and experiences In ther.-
selves are not propositions). Bonjour might well be dissatisfied at
this, and my general account of the given, as a positive argument In
favor of foundatlonallsm; but 1 think he would have to admit that in
the face of this account his argument from Implauslblllty Is stripped
of whatever force It had. New and stronger arguments are going to
have to be devised If foundatlonallsm Is to be refuted.
The second aspect of my twofold response to Bonjour Is the
account of foundatlonallsm that Is presented and discussed In Chapter
VII below. It Is far from a complete theory, but the mere statement
of some aspects of It. together with reflections on the directions In
which the theory needs to be developed, can help to dispel the objec-
tions of Williams that the theory Is Incoherent and can't even be pro-
perly formulated and of Bonjour that the foundatlonallst needs to
explain himself and show how such a theory could work.
Before I consider this account of foundational ism, I shall
consider Chisholm’s account, for the account discussed in Chapter VII
is merely a reinterpretation of Chisholm's.
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Notes to Chapter V
(196p, °f Auna
critical intarprecatlon of RoblnLn (1975^ ^^^.° ","'''^there is even some dispute as to whohh ^ already noted,
fouadatlonallst or a coha^enurt/ Cf Cor™ " - -pp. 250-251) and my somewhat crltiral 'r^ T ^ interpretation (1978,
In note 2 of ChaptL III
'=’^“ '=nl remarks on that Interpretation
Perceptl!“(19"?"5’ Pnre Reason (1965), H.H. Price,
(1946) and Mind and the World’o7jer"(1956).°^
Knowledge and Valuation
to the antecedent of prej^lL'^^ranrso "^a" would refer
4Cr. Williams* remark ('-iVn'ri ^ ,
is not just found* nhilo^nnhj^r
*
’
i
^j
that the given element
tefIect\ophlstlcated^1^^s°tL^^"sw"p^esrppo^^^L:“^^
passages. Traditional ly’^^the^doc™in^o^the^^dated with the doctrine of sense Lta SenL^J r
some philosophers such as Russell (at least at one\?me) "wle'
S e™ perception. Although WlUlLs usesthe t rm here, I assume that he does so in order to kLp close L
Datf Ld Wre^^r if " "Founda tionali sm , Sense
not reaif re f section of Chapter IV, founda tionali sm does
given irdirectf if doctrine of the
nhv!f
If dire t realism is true, the given might simply be ordinary
MiehfR^*°f ^ perception (see "What the Givenght Be in the present chapter). The discussion of the given then
senL^Itr^^ffif anyone’s part to the existence of
p 11
,'
i^“® seems to implicitly recognize this. Although he
off f terminology here, his argument against Russell doefnfly n the fact that Russell posits the existence of sense data.
p 47 ^ f considerations are supported by Ernest Sosa in "Theaft and the Pyramid. Sosa considers an anti-founda tionali st argu-ment based in part on the arguments of Williams and Bonjour. One pre-
mise of the argument is as follows:
b(i) If a mental state does not incorporate a propositional
attitude, then it is an enigma how such a state can
provide support for any hypothesis
. . .
„
(Sosa, 1980, pp. 6-7)Sosa asks, What reason is there to think, in accordance with premiseb(i), that only propositional attitudes can give support to their own
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kind?" (ibid, n 7 \
sequences (which are’not, of cou^s!
ethics a practice’s con-
justify a person's propositional attit^H^^^ attitudes) can
sustain the practice), Sosa considers
^rthe^t'he"'''"''""'in epistemology: ether the same might not apply
something ^^rbeforf^^bfjus tiffed
^
Its origin in one's vlsll Jpe It has
at an apple in daylieht’ Tf L ^ ^
Show US a source L SstlflLrierj^r
Incorporating a propositional attitude."""''*
tJLfr:?hL"de"'’ ?:r“as "sa^Isr -t a proposl-justlfylng propositional attitudes (e“g'' "rtf'*P)? I hope that my above account vfI®"’ ^ =abject's belief that
given might plausibly be construed as pr^fldrng^ Tcrff^S^fti:!
a Basis ofJusrtffa tlf•‘’afvf 1" "The Given as
chapter V I
CHISHOLM’S FOUNDATIONAL ISM
Rode.iC CMshol^.s foundauonalis.
as developed 1„ PHe
second edition of his Theor^^^jino^^ (1977) la assessed. It Is
found to be unsatisfactory In Its attempt to formulate a "bridging
principle meant to state conditions under *lch a basic proposition
JusUfles a nonbaslc proposition. Chisholm's revision of this system
In "A Version of Foundatlonallsm" (1980) Is then assessed and Is also
found to be unsatisfactory regarding such a principle.
Chisholm’s Epistem lc Principles Approach
Central to any successful foundatlonallst theory Is an account
how the basic or directly evident" propositions which serve as the
foundation for knowledge can confer evidence upon nonbaslc or
Indirectly evident" propositions. Roderick Chisholm, who has
published the most carefully worked out verslon-or verslons-of
founds tlonallsm.l has consistently taken what I have Identified In
Chapter III as the eplstemlc principles approach. That Is. he does
not regard nonbaslc propositions to be deductively or Inductively
implied by basic propositions. The justification of nonbasics by
basics Is Instead determined by eplstemlc principles which state the
conditions under which a basic proposition justifies a nonbaslc
proposition. These principles are taken to be necessarily true.
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Chisholm's attempt to formulate such eplstemlc
"brldglpg
principles" In the first edition of Theor^of^^^u^ has been sho™
ro be unsatisfactory by Herbert Heldelberger (1,69). Chisholm's
second edition system Is In part an attempt to meet Heldelberger's
As I shall argue, this attempt Is unsatisfactory, for his
second edition eplstemlc principles and definitions still do not
explain how a directly evident proposition can Justify an Indirectly
evident one. In spite of the fact that they appear designed to explain
this. In the absence of such explanation, as I shall also argue,
Chisholm's system does not allow for knowledge of propositions about
the external world.
The next section provides a brief exposition of the basic con-
cepts and principles of Chisholm's system. arguments follow In
subsequent sections. Finally, I „IU consider and evaluate Chisholm's
1980 revision of his second edition Theory of Knowledve system.
Chisholm's Account In "Theory of Knowledge.
"
Second Edition
One of the central concepts in Chisholm's second edition foun
dationalist system is introduced in the context of his definition of
knowledge. As this definition, once unravelled, also introduces the
other central epistemic concepts which are important to my argument,
I shall begin with it;^
D6.4 h is known by S =df h is accepted by S; h is true; and
h is nondefectlvely evident for S.
(Chisholm, 1977, p. 110)
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The
the
acceptance
traditional
condition can be equated
definition of knowledge
with the belief condition
The third condition is
designed to avoid Gettler-type counterexamples,
key expression In It as follows;
Chisholm defines
in
the
D6.3 h Is nondefectlvely evident for S =df Either h Is
pTcon^c^lo^^
for S.
^
^ propositloi
(Ibid., p. 109)
The terms "certain" and "evident
Chisholm's carefully delineated
is for Chisholm that which it is
precisely
:
refer to significant points on
scale of epistemic value. The certain
most reasonable to believe. More
D1.4 h is certain for S
for S, and there 1
is more reasonable
-df h is beyond reasonable doubt
s no i such that accepting 1
for S than accepting h.
(Ibid., p. 10)
The phase "beyond reasonable doubt" is also defined:
Dl.l h is beyond reasonable doubt for S =df Accepting
h is more reasonable for S than is withholding h.
(Ibid., p. 7) '
To withhold a proposition Is to accept neither It nor Its negation
(cf. Ibid., p. 6); but the term "accept" itself and the phrase "mDre
reasonable than" are primitives In Chisholm's system. "Accept" may be
equated with "believe" (cf. Ibid., p. 6), but neither tern Is defined
independently of the other.
Certainty is the highest epistemic status a proposition can
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Falling Immediately below what Is certain on the eplstemic
scale is the evident:
• 5 h is evident for 9 =rif f -f \ u j i
for S and (11) for every 1
reasonable doubt
-----
- S rhaT:L^;tl“
-r?l^^-orrL^n for
(Ibid., p. 12)
A proposition may be directly or Indirectly evident. This
nctlon brings out the essentially foundatlonallst character of
Chisholm's epistemology. Intuitively, a directly evident proposition
is one which Is evident without any other proposition serving to
justify or confer evidence upon It. Chisholm expresses this Intuition
as follows: for any directly evident proposition p, It Is acceptable
to say "What justifies me In thinking I know that p Is simply the fact
that p (cf. ibid., p. 19). Indirectly evident propositions then are
those which have their eplstemic status as evident propositions co:^
ferred upon them by some other proposition or propositions.
What Unds of propositions turn out to be directly evident on
Chisholm's account? Chisholm's approach Is foundatlonallst In a
Cartesian sense In that those propositions which are directly evident
tor a person S have to do In some way with S's mental states—his
thoughts, beliefs, feelings, perceptual experiences, etc. "Thinking
and believing provide us with paradigm cases of the directly evident"
(ibid., p. 21). Chisholm calls such directly evident propositions
self-presenting," after Meinong, and provides the following
definition:
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D2.1 h is self-presenting for S at
and necessarily, if h is true
evident for S at t.
t =df
at t,
h is true
then h is
at t;
\
- ,
(j,
A paradlg. ease of a proposition *lch Is. when true, self-presenting
for .e is that expressed by n see„ to have a headache." Examples of
other propositions which can be self-presenting are those about what a
person believes, what he seems to perceive, and what he seems to
remember. The fact that S believes that Socrates Is mortal, for
example. Is said to be enough to make It evident to S that he does
believe that Socrates is mortal (cf. pp. 21-22).
Chisholm does not equate the self-presenting with the directly
evident, but rather sees the former as a subset of the latter. A
directly evident proposition is roughly one that Is entailed by a pro-
position that Is self-presenting (cf. ibid., pp. 23-24, especially
D2.2).3
Even the broader class of directly evident propositions does
not extend far enough to embrace any of those propositions which are
often characterized as being about the "external world," or what
Chisholm calls propositions about "the ordinary things we know"
(Ibid., p. 11). An example of the latter would be the proposition
expressed by "There Is a cat on the roof." Such a proposition Is not
self-presenting for any S-for It may be true without being evident to
S—nor Is It directly evident, since It Is not entailed by any self-
presenting proposition.
Propositions about the external world, then, are for Chisholm
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positions that can only be indirectly and not directly evident,
since Chlshol. emphasizes that such propositions can be and are hno™
(cf. Ibid., pp. n, le. 120-121 ), he must, by 06.4, conclude that
they do achieve the status of being evident. And they must be ren-
dered evident, ultimately, by propositions that are directly evident
(cf. p. 85).
Although directly evident propositions are certain, sharing
with mathematical and other necessary truths the highest eplstemlc
status possible. Indirectly evident propositions are not certain
according to Chisholm, since It Is not as reasonable for us to believe
them as it Is to believe, for example, propositions about the elemen-
tary truths of arithmetic and propositions about what s^ to us to
be the case (cf. ibid., pp. 10-11).
The relation between the directly and Indirectly evident Is of
course a matter of great Importance for Chisholm. As a foun-
datlonallst, he must explain just how the former confers evidence upon
the latter. He sets forth a series of eplstemlc principles In Chapter
4 which appear Intended to give at least a partial account of the
relation between the directly and the Indirectly evident. One of the
most Important of these principles will figure prominently In the
discussion to follow:
C: For any subject S, If S believes, without ground fordoubt, that he is perceiving something to be F, thenit is evident for S that he perceives something tobe F. ^
(Ibid
.
,
p. 78)
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icate letter F is to allow as subs tituends only those predica-
tes *lch connote sensible characteristics, e.g. being „hlte.
Chisholm nses
-perceives- In such a „a. that 11 s perceives seething
white, then It follows that there Is some ordinary external
object which is white. iWhat Chisholm means by belief "without ground
for doubt" will be explained below.
Directly evident propositions do not entail Indirectly evident
ones, even if we take Chisholm's eplstemlc principles to be
necessarily true, as Chisholm himself surely wishes to. Even prin-
ciple C, which moves us from the directly to the Indirectly evident,
does not express this as a matter of the directly evident entallit^’
indirectly evident. Consider two states of affairs:
p: S believes without ground for doubt that he perceivessomething to be white.
^t^ive
and
q: S does perceive something which is white,
q can be indirectly evident to S, but p does not entail q. Principle
C tells us that it is necessary that if p is true, then q is evident
to S (in this case indirectly evident). But it does not follow that q
Itself must be true, for this may be one of those cases in which a
proposition is both evident and false, a possibility which Chisholm
explicitly allows (cf. ibid., p. 15).
Some Difficulties
Let us return now to Chisholm's definition of the nondefec-
tively evident (D6.3). Since Chisholm holds that indirectly evident
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propositions are a.o„g those „e tao„. he .nst allow that so„e
indirectly evident propositions are nondefectlvely evident. By D6.3
there >vlU then be indirectly evident propositions *ich are entailed
hy a conjunction of propositions each of *lch has a basis for S.
When an Indirectly evident proposition Is entailed by a cor.
Junction of propositions, at least some of the propositions conjoined
must themselves be indirectly evident. For as we have seen, no
directly evident proposltlon-and hence no conjunction of th«.-could
entail an Indirectly evident proposition. And since by D6.3^ of
these conjoined propositions has a basis, it follows that at least
some indirectly evident propositions are such that they have bases.
What does it mean for one proposition to be a basis for
another? Chisholm provides the following definition:
Dh.l e Is a basis of h for S =df e is self-presenting for S-and necessarily, if e Is self-presenting for S^thenh IS evident for S.
(Ibid., p. 106)
As we have seen, some h’s are going to have to be indirectly
evident propositions. This requires, by D6.1, that there be some
self-presenting proposition e such that, necessarily, if e is self-
presenting for S, then some proposition h is indirectly evident for S
It is at this point that a careful articulation of Chisholm’s
foundationalism becomes essential to his account of how ordinary pro-
positions about the external world can be Icnown. It has been noted
that such propositions can only be indirectly, not directly, evident.
If they are to be known, they must, on Chisholm’s definition of
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^nowledge. be nondefectlvel, evddeab as well. Hence there
.nst, hy
-r above argument, be so„e Indirectly evident propositions >dalch have
b3S0s
• And tliGiTGforp
"i f pv»t u ti-ucLtir e, It Chisholm is to pxnla-tr.e plain how propositions
about the external world can be tao™, he .ust show that we can
plausibly expect there to be propositions ( self-presentl^ by
finition) which can serve as bases for indirectly evident proposi-
However, Chisholm’s definitions and principles as they stand
do not explain how there can be such propositions. Those of his prin-
ciples Which explain how propositions become Indirectly evident turn
out to exclude self-presenting propositions fro. servlr^ as bases for
indirectly evident ones.
Let us consider precisely why Chisholm's system does not pro-
vide such an explanation: We have already seen that every proposition
which Is self-presenting for S will be directly evident for S, and
that no directly evident and hence no self-presenting proposition can
entail an Indirectly evident proposition. How then can there be some
proposition e such that necessarily. If e is self-presenting for S,
then there Is some proposition h which Is evident for S, but only
Indirectly so? (This Is, of course, what Is required by D6.1 If there
Is to be any Indirectly evident proposition h which has a basis.)
Since this relationship between the self-presenting and the Indirectly
evident cannot be a matter of entallment. It must be a matter of one
of Chisholm's eplstemlc principles saying that the relationship holds.
(Again, we may presume that Chisholm Intends his principles to be
necessarily true.) This leads us to principle C as the keystone which
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states as a necessary truth the conditions ™der *ich so„e directly
Ident proposition makes it the case that some logically distinct
proposition is indirectly evident.
Initially, principle C looks promising. It states that
necessarily, if s helieves >^t,„ut ground lor douht that he is per-
ceiving something to he white (for example), then it is (indirectly,
evident to S that he is perceiving something to be OUte. According
to principle C, It will always be the case that a directly evident
proposition will, under specified conditions, determine another propo-
sition to be indirectly evident. And this seems close to what is
required for a directly evident proposition to be a basis for an
indirectly evident one.
But a closer look at principle C in conjunction with D6.1
brings difficulties to light. If principle C is to express the cor.-
dltlons under which some e can be the basis for some indirectly evi-
dent h, what precisely is our e and what is our h? Obviously, h is
the proposition that S perceives something to be white. As required,
h is indirectly evident for S.
Note that e cannot be the proposition that S believes that he
is perceiving something to be white. For although this proposition
may be self-presenting for S, it is not the case that necessarily, if
it is so then h is evident for S. It is consistent with the necessity
of principle C that there be cases in which (i) the proposition that S
believes that he is perceiving something to be white is true and is
self-presenting for S, yet (ii) h is not evident to S. As Chisholm
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recognizes (cf.
believes that he
ibid., pp. 74 75)^ situation will arise
Is perceiving something to be white and yet
when S
there
also exi
position
St grounds for S to doubt this belief,
that S believes that he is perceiving
Hence by D6.1 the pro
something to be white
cannot be a basis of h for S.^
Clearly, what we need for
ciple C (substituting
"white" for
e is the whole antecedent of
the predicate letter F):
prin-
e
:
S believes, without ground for doubtperceiving something to be white.
’
that he is
But if e is to be a basis for another
self-presenting .5
proposition. it must by D6 . 1 be
Are Epistemic States Self-Presenting?
It does not appear plausible to maintain that an epistemic
state such as e Is self-presenting. It se«s. first, that an analysis
of e in terms of Chisholm's stated definition of one of Its central
concepts-that of a belief that Is without ground for doubt-lndlcates
that e Is not self-presenting, and second, that Chisholm does not In
any case Intend the concept of the self-presenting to embrace episte-
mic propositions such as e. Indeed, we shall see that. In response to
recent criticism of his second edition definitions and principles.
Chisholm has chosen to revise and narrow his definition of the self-
presenting In a way that more clearly excludes epistemic propositions
such as e from falling under that concept
.
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But let us first consider an analysis of e in terms of
CMSH01..S second ed.Uon de^ni^on of che seU-pnesen f fns (02.1).
Such an analysis requires that „e consider
.ore precisely
„hat It
means for a belief to be without ground for doubt. Chlshol. provides
the following definition:
I beijevL'’thitTanf U)
Uons that are ac^eptabU^o“
r?rnd:\'o°"cfutrt:":r'negation of the proposition that p.
(Ibid., p. 76)
When one's belief Is without ground for doubt, then, a quite
complex eplstemlc condition obtains with respect to that belief. (The
complexity Is here not spelled out In full. That would require
replacing 'acceptable" and "tends to confirm" with Chisholm's defini-
tions of these concepts.) since this c«plex eplstemlc coMltlon Is
equivalent by definition to the condition one Is In when one's belief
is without ground for doubt, it would appear that e comes to the
following
:
elieves that he is perceiving something to be whiteand no conjunction of propositions that are acceptable’
u
confirm the negation of the propositionthat he is perceiving something to be white.
Given the definitional equivalence expressed by D4.3, it would seem
that e is self-presenting if and only if f is. But f is not plausibly
construed as self-presenting. Its second conjunct, for example, is a
contingent general proposition, and it appears that such a proposition
can be true without being evident for S.6 The view that general pro-
248
f- a„d eptste^lcaU,
„ore
.aslc propositions wonla see. to be both
andependentl, plausible and a position that Chlshol. would accept.
(Cf. Chisholm on contingent eener^l r,T-r^S g a propositions, ibid., pp. 64-67,
especially p. 66.)
Thus, upon analysis. It does not look as though e can be
counted as self-pmsentlng under Chlshol..s second edition definition
Of that concept. Before „e consider his .ore recent, revised defini-
tion. It will be instructive to exa.lne several passages In Theory of
ESOwle^ that bear on his concept of the self-presenting, to see both
what Chisholm appears to Intend by this concept and *at con-
siderations have led him to revise his definition of It.
No passages, to my knowledge, suggest or clearly imply that
eplstemlc states are self-presenting; there are at least two passages,
however, which suggest that Chisholm does not Intend eplstemlc propo-
sitions in general to count as self-presenting. One such passage Is
to be found in the first edition of Theory of Knowledge
, where there
Is a fuller discussion than In the second edition of the Intended
range and limits of self-presenting states. Chisholm Is careful to
note that propositions about one’s thoughts (which are shown by
example to Include chose about one's beliefs, memories, and emotions)
may not be the only sorts of propositions capable of being self-
presenting. He suggests that some propositions concerning what one Is
trying or undertaking to do” are also capable of being self-
presenting (Chisholm, 1966, p. 29). Therp i<= looci-* » f / mere s at least some reason to
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think that if Chisholm held that eplstemic states conld be self-
presentlng (either because they are themselves tteughts or because
they constitute another category of potentially self-presenting
propositions), then he would mention this possibility in the present
passage. But no such mention is made.
When Chisholm does, in the second edition, directly discuss
the nature of eplstemlc propositions, he does so in terms very dif-
ferent from those that would be suggested if he believed eplstemlc
States could be self— D^esen^fno••P asentlng. he discusses eplstemlc states as nor-
2StlXe states. To assert that one is in some eplstemlc state with
respect to a proposition, Chisholm says, is to assert that one has
some responsibility or duty with respect to one's belief concerning
that proposition (cf. Chisholm, 1977, p. U). But on any traditional
account of normative states, a person can have a duty without it being
evident to him that he has that duty.^
Chisholm's Iterative Principles
Chisholm s second edition also Includes an extended discussion
of iterative eplstemlc prlnclples-for example, the principle that
knowing entails knowing that one knows. This discussion bears impor-
tantly on the question whether e is self-presenting. An iterative
principle which asserted that necessarily, if Ksp, then S knows that
Ksp (where "Ksp" abbreviates "S knows that p") would, given D2.1,
entail of some eplstemlc states that they are self-presenting. For,
on this principle, whenever Ksp were true. It would be evident to
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(indeed.
s Ksp. Hence Ksp „oeXd He seU-pcesencdc, co
S by D2a. ^ue It would not follow that e la self-ptesentlng
,
one
rather hard pressed to explain an eplstetlc state such as
e Is not self-presenting given that one as con,plex as Ksp Is.
However, Chlshol* explicitly rejects such a stror« Iterative
principle, and thus appears to avoid the consequence that Ksp Is
self-presenting. He bases this rejection on the following
considerations
:
same a certain proposition is known. Such a person then
known or evidfnt."'^?Liefore^a pro
anything is
without it being evident t^at irrLwenrLd'
may be known without it being known that it’ is know^!°^°""'"°"'
(Ibid., p. 114)
Chisholm does affirm a series of qualified iterative prin-
Clples. The first of these, and the one most relevant to our pur-
poses, is as follows:
Kl: If S considers the proposition that he knows that pand if it is evident to S that p, then it is evident
to b that he knows that p.
(Ibid.)
Kl appears to allow that the epistemic propositions it per-
tains to may be true without being evident. For an epistemic proposi
tlon, e.g. Ksp, may be true of some person S without having been
considered by S. In such a case, Kl cannot be used to establish that
Ksp is evident to S.
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Unfortunately, K1 does not avoid the conclusion that Ksp Is
self-presenting as neatly as It appears to. Notice that In the quoted
passage above, Chlshol. affirms a psychological principle to the
effect that If a proposition Is evident to a person. It Is understood
by that person. On the basis of this principle, Chisholm rejects a
strong Iterative principle In favor of the weaker K1
. Chisholm also
afflmms as another psychological principle that If one understands a
proposition, one has contemplated and reflected upon It (cf. Ibid.,
p. «). In a recent article, Herbert Heldelberger has shown that
these psychological principles, together >dth D2.1, entail that no
propositions are self-presenting (cf. Heldelberger, 1979, p. 62).
D2.1 can be revised In an obvious way to avoid this consequence, but
Heldelberger notes that the revised definition will then entail that
Ksp Is after all self-presenting, given K1 and the psychological
principles. Implausible results are shown to obtain If one rejects
the second, but retains the first, of the psychological principles
(cf. ibid., pp. 64-67).
Heldelberger further points out that the consequence that Ksp
is self-presenting presents serious difficulties for Chisholm. Either
he must deny that Ksp is self-presenting or adopt the view that self-
presenting states need not be confined to what is epi stemlcal ly basic.
For if Ksp is self-presenting, then p is directly evident, since it is
entailed by Ksp. But p may, of course, be a proposition about the
external world— the sort of proposition Chisholm's founda tionali sm
cannot accept as directly evident or basic (cf. ibid., pp. 66-67).
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According ro Chishol. (1977, p. 70), propositions abont tbe external
world do not constitute a "proper stopping place" in the process of
lustiflcation, for one can reasonably ask what Justif icatlon there is
for accepting such a proposition.
In responding to Heidelberger
.
Chisholm writes:
I believe it is accurate to say that if
remarks about the psychological nr 5-
‘
* the
restrict self-presentation to the ce?tatn\^ari ^t“^from the evident) then wo u ^ dis inguished
Heidelberger points out.
difficulties that
(Chisholm, 1979, p. 337 )
It would seem enough, in order to defuse Heldelberger's criti-
cisms, simply to reject the psychological
"pre-conditions" or prin-
ciples noted above. ,7hy then does Chisholm go further and offer a
revised and restricted definition of the self-presenting? Apparently
the reason Is that he does not wish Ksp to be self-presenting. Recall
that Chisholm rejected a strong and unqualified iterative principle
because he held the psychological principle that a proposition must be
understood if evident. Now that he rejects that psychological
principle, there does not appear to be any reason for Chisholm to
prefer the qualified principle K 1 to a stronger iterative principle
such as the following:
EK. If S knows that p, then it is evident to S that heknows that p.
Apparently, Chisholm would now accept EK, or something very
close to it. Otherwise, he would not feel the need to revise his
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definition of the self-presenting. EK together >rith his original
definition would entail that Ksp Is self-presentlr«
. But he can
retain EK and avoid the apparently undesirable consequence that Ksp Is
self-presenting by requiring that a self-presenting proposition be
d£«aln. rather than merely evident, whenever true. This Is, in
effect, just what his new definition does. 8 Chisholm's decision to
thus restrict the self-presenting also indicates that he does not wish
to opt for the alternative of allowing some self-presenting states to
be nonbaslc, and this means that he cannot allow propositions about
what one Knows to be self-presenting,
.^aln, his restricted deflnl-
tlon neatly avoids such a consequence.
It follows, of course, that if e is to be self-presenting on
this revised definition, it must be certain. Recall that e states
that S’s belief that he is perceiving something to be white is without
ground for doubt. It seems unlikely that such a proposition can be
accorded the highest possible epistemic status for S. Propositions
such as those expressed by "S seems to have a headache" or "S believes
he is perceiving something to be white" seem, when true, to be con-
siderably more reasonable for S to believe. It also seems more reaso-
nable to affirm basic arithmetical truths and other simple necessary
truths than to affirm a proposition such as e. But if other truths
are more reasonable to belive than e, it follows that e is not certain
(cf. D1.4). Even if it were maintained that S could ultimately,
through reflection, achieve certainty about a proposition such as e,
it would not follow that e is self-presenting on the new definition,
for prior to reflection e would be true yet not certain.
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Some Consequences
If it IS true that e is not self-presenting, then principle C
does not provide the required linkup between directly and Indirectly
evident propositions. It Is not this principle that shows us how
directly evident propositions can be bases for Indirectly evident
ones,
.or do any of Chlsbol^.s r^alnlns eplste.lc principles appear
capable of showing this. The only other principle that Is a candidate
for explaining how Indirectly evident propositions can have bases Is
principle I (Chisholm, 1977, p. 84). But like the antecedent of prin-
ciple C, that of principle I contains the requirement that one’s
belief be without ground for doubt. Hence any att^pt to show that
the antecedent of principle I Is self-presenting will encounter the
same difficulties found In trying to show this tor the antecedent of
principle C.
It thus seems doubtful that Indirectly evident propositions do
have bases, as Chisholm understands this tern. This presents a
problem both for Chisholm’s foundatlonallsm and for his attempt to
account for our knowledge of ordinary propositions about the external
world. Revisions would seem to be In order If Chisholm Is to retain
his foundatlonallst structure and his antl-skeptlcal approach to
knowledge
.
Chisholm s A Version of Foundationalism"
Chisholm does indeed offer revisions in "A Version of
Foundationalism (1980). It is to these revisions I shall presently
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First, however. It be helpful to say seething about a
Change In Chisholm's view on propositions that occurred between the
publication of the second edition of Theory of Know1ed,e and "A
Sion of Foundationallsm." Chisholm's newer principles have a quite
different appearance from his older ones, but much of this Is due to
this change, and a brief explanation of Chisholm's new view on propo-
sitions will facilitate an understanding of his newer principles.
Chisholm's new view Is that first-person propositions do not
exist. He has arrived at this view after reflecting on the differen-
ces between such locutions as "There existes xr v, uj-ner st an x such that x believes
himself to be tmse" and "There exists an x such that x believes x to
be vrtse." The first locution can be false while the second Is true,
for example If x reads a palm and concludes that the person whose
palm It Is Is wise, without realizing that the palm Is hls own. This
suggests to Chisholm that we should not think of a belief or other so-
called propositional attitude as a relation between a person and a
proposition, but rather as a relation between a person and a property.
When I say that I am wise, I am not expressing my belief in a
proposition. I am, Chisholm would say, directly attributing the pro-
perty of wisdom to myself. Apparently, all of my beliefs require the
direct attribution of some property to myself, even if I am at the
same time ^directly attributing some property—such as that of being
wise— to someone else. The complexities of indirect attribution need
not detain us here, since the relevant principles Chisholm cites con-
cern only direct attribution. Chisholm leaves the locution "x
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directly attributes to y
that "direct attribution
if X directly attributes
with y" (Chisholm, 1980,
tne property of being F" undefined, but note
is necessarily such that, tor every x and y,
a certain property to y, then x Is Identical
p. 544).
Chisholm* s New Defini tions and Principles
hisholm has redefined several old t-orTn jterms and provided some
definitions of newly introduced terms. I 1 rs 1 shall consider some of these
definitions and the relevant revised principles.
Chisholn, has a new definition of the evident:
counterbalanced. is
(Ibid., p. 548)
The newly Introduced tern m this definition Is in turn defined:
‘hat an attribution Is counterbalanced If and
(Ibid., p. 547)
Chisholm also has a new definition of "objective certainty:"
The direct attribution of a property may be said to be objec-
rhP df
^ person provided these conditions hold;t e irect attribution of that property is beyond reasonabledoubt for that person; and it is at least as reasonable forhim as is the direct attribution of any other property.
(Ibid., p. 548)
For our purposes, the most significant newly introduced concept is
that of being epistemically in the clear:
An attribution may be said tn
^istemlcallv in the clear for unsuspect , or
“ not dlsconfl^^Tl;;rJ,.
presumption in their favor for him.
^ P^^ties that have some
' ) ^ j
This requires an account ot confirmation and dlsconf Irma t Ion:
property orbel^g'^G^UUernatlJel^ to cojfl™
"nLnLXti"
0. L’aXo“ ^ - -
(Ibid., pp. 552-553)
The concept of being eplstemlcally m the clear Is used to define
"basis :
"
We could say that a self-presenting property constitutes theMSis for an attribution provided that the subject has thatproperty and provided that. If he has It and If tL attr^bu-
evld"enL ' attrlbu^iorJs
(Ibid., p. 558)
The following two principles—one new and one revlsed-are
relevant to the discussion that will follow:
P3: For every x, if (i) x directly attributes to himself theproperty of being F, and if (ii) x being F is not expli-
citly contradicted by the set of properties that xirectly attributes to x, then his being F has some pre-
sumption in its favor for x.
(Ibid., p. 552)
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P6: For every subiect x -ff
be something
'that 1 ^ P
then it L evident fo x^thlr^"''"
is F. ^ perceives something thit
(Ibid., p. 555)
P6 is. Of course, the taportant bridging principle that att^pts to
explain the conditions ™der which what Is self-presentlrg «hes a
proposition about the external world evident.
Chlshol. also nakes an Interesting distinction between the
concept Of the directly evident and that of an evidence-base:
Of our'propertles IZlTrT • be yielded by those
constltute^hat *rch irdlr^:car:"de“:® “
evld^"“^^So'’’L"o“? ThL" Trelrre^nJ
L°r:i^:o"\:t\d"^Lt-"rec“iy^\v\r
to that properties which are self-presenting
thus self^p?esentl^!'
"""
Hence a property may be In one’s evidence-base without Itbeing directly evident to one that one has that prorert^ For
that“pL^y one’s having
(Ibid., p. 550)
It may look as though Chisholm is making the distinction noted
in Chapter II between internal and external justification. I believe
there are important similarities between the two distinctions, but
also some differences. Chisholm’s is more narrow in scope. The
internally justified is not limited to the directly evident—it may
include other evident propositions as well—and the externally
259
Lgra
justified 13 Of course „of allied ro the self-present l„g . Pnradf,
cases of e.ter„all, Justified propositions
.11 not .e seU-presentlr,
or potentrally self-presenting at all-they
.11 be ordinary external
world propositions such as the proposition that the butler did It.
Also, a .11 not always be enough to consider an externally Justified
proposition In order that It become internally Justified. Watson may
consider the proposition that the butler did It. but this proposition
.ay not yet be evident to him. However, I believe that If „e restrict
ourselves to the set of self-presenting and directly evident proposi-
tlons (or properties as Chisholm would now have It), what Chisholm
says about the evidence-base and the directly evident .11 be true of
the externally and the Internally Justified, respectively. For
example, I believe that whenever S considers >*ether a self-presentlr«
proposition is true of him (or considers whether a self-presenting
property Is to be attributed to him), then If the proposition Is true
(If he has that property) this .11 be Internally Justified for him.
Within the realm of the self-presenting and the directly evident,
whatever Is in one's evidence-base Is externally Justified, and what-
ever is directly evident Is Internally Justified as well.
An Alleged Counterexample to Chisholm’s
Definition of "Basis
I wish to make an interrelated set of criticisms involving the
principles and several of the definitions noted above. I will proceed
as follows; I will first consider an unsuccessful attempt to offer a
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counte^exa^ple Po new
.eMnUlon of ••..eis.- „HUe fHe
propose. oonnPenexa.pU fs onsoccessfnf
.
an anaf.sfa of wH. f.fa fs so
eads fo results *lch are then applied In criticise of P3 and P6.
The alleged oounterexa.ple Is Intended to show that there Is a
property which is not a basis in hho •I the situation described, but >Alch Is
a basis on Chisholm's definition. It Is a refln^nent on
Heldelberger's 1,6. counterexample to Chisholm's bridging principle In
the first edition of Theo2:.o^Kn^ P,.
counterexample
la as follows: A man Is looking at an object that Is In fact white,
and that Indeed now appears to be white. But a few moments before
the Object had a red light shining on It. The red light has been
’
pointed out to him; It has been turned on and off several times while
the man is looking at the object, etc.
Initially, as In Heldelberger's example, the man Irrationally
persists in believing that he Is perceiving an object that Is red.
even though the red light has been turned off and he Is being appeared
whltely to. The man does Indeed believe (correctly) that he Is being
appeared whitely to. But he also believes (falsely) that he Is being
appeared whitely to by an object that is red.
Then a scientist whom the man (with good reason) admires and
trusts comes In. The scientist tells him he's perceiving (and being
appeared whitely to by) an object that Is white, and for this reason
the man comes to believe that he's perceiving and being appeared whl-
tely to by an object that is white.
Consider these properties:
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“
‘
- »y so.e-
A = the property of being appeared *ltely to.
In the situation cited aftpr ^uc a, t e the scientist has arrived, I
believe It Is true to say of our «„ (call hlM S) both that S has y
and that S has A. Purther. A Is a self-presenting property for S.
although W is not.
The objection that this situation constitutes a counterexample
to Chisholm’s definition of ’basis” runs as follows: Given this
definition. A must be regarded as a basis for the attribution of y.
But A is not a basis for the attribution of y m this case. Any basis
In this case will be a self-presenting property (or properties) having
to do irtth S’s belief that he Is In the presence of some trustworthy
scientist who has told him he Is perceiving a white object. For It Is
on the basis of this more complex belief, rather than any simple per-
ceptual belief, that S comes to directly attribute W.
I believe this objection is correct in its claim that A is a
basis for the attribution of W on Chisholm's definition of "basis."
To say that A is a basis for W is to say (1) that A is
self-presenting; (2) that the attribution of W is epistemically in the
clear; and (3) that necessarily, if A is self-presenting and the
attribution of W epistemically in the clear, then the attribution of W
is evident. (Reference to persons is here suppressed.) I shall exa-
mine these conditions in turn to see that each is satisfied.
(1) A is a self-presenting property. This condition is
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clearly satisfied since rh-i=K^i •Chisholm xs explicit that such ways of being
appeared to are self-presenting (of. ibid., p. 549).
( 2 ) The attribution of W Is eplstemlcally m the clear. Thisis so provided only that W is nnr an-I ot disconfirmed by any set of proper-
ties that have some presumption In their favor for S. To say that the
direct attribution of a property has some presumption In Its favor Is
to say that the direct attribution of that property Is more reasonable
than is the direct attr-fKut-
n
ctribution of its negation (cf. Ibid., p. 547).
It seems to me that Chisholm would wish to say that the
attribution of W Is eplstemlcally In the clear In this case. There Is
- property that has some presumption In its favor for S and that
dlsconflrms W, l.e., there Is no reason for S to believe that It Is
not the case that he Is being appeared to by an object that Is white.
And there is every reason to ,
,
,
u uexieve that he being appeared to by
such an object.
It is not reasonable for S to directly attribute the negation
of W even during the time that he Irrationally persists In dol.^ so
(l.e., in believing that he Is being appeared to by an object that Is
red). Obviously, a person may believe something even when It would be
more reasonable to withhold the belief. (This suggests that the rela-
tion of being more reasonable than, and also the properties of having
some presumption In favor of, being eplstemlcally In the clear, and
being a basis, have to do with a person's evidence-base rather than
with what is directly evident to him; that Is. these properties and
relations have to do with the data that presents Itself to the person
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-the.
.hae *e.He. he has consMe.ed
.his da.a a„a
.he
apprep.ia.e epls.e.ie eonclusions ^.h .aga.d
.o i..,
att.iha.lo„ oi .he nega.ion oi „ un.easonahie io. S (and oi c^.ee
lacking any presump.lon in its favor for S); i. also seems that
.here
ate no properties in this si.na.ion *i.h have any presomp.ion in
their favor for S and which conf-ir^f m the negation of W. No attribution
Of a property *ieh led S to believe that he „as being appeared to by
an object that was red could have had any presumption in its favor for
By hypothesis, he arrived at his belief in a conpletely irrational
way, without the support of any reasonable attributions of properties.
The attributions he did oiake concerning this belief, if he n^de any at
all besides the direct attribution of the belief Itself, were all
quite unreasonable for him.
nable for him to attribute
tional property to attribut
negation of W.
And all those properties which are reaso
point to W as the most reasonable addi-
e given the choice between W and the
If the above considerations are correct, then I believe we
should conclude that W is eplstemlcally in the clear for S.
(3) Necessarily, if A is self-presenting and W eplstemlcally
in the clear, then the attribution of W is evident.
I believe that this third condition for being a basis is
satisfied in virtue of this instance of P6:^
P6 : For every x, if (i) x is appeared whitely to, and if(ii) his being appeared whitely to by something thatis white is epistemically in the clear for x, then itis evident for x that he is appeared whitely to by
something that is white.
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If A is self-presenting for S j.8 , then condition (i) of P6
' is
satisMe..
,Ha cUaP
for S, rhea condition (11) I3 satisfied. So P6' tells us that
necessarily If a Is self-presenting and the attribution of W eplste.1-
cally in the clear, then the attribution of W Is evident for S. That
Is, condition (111) is satisfied.
If the above reasoning Is correct, then „e ™ust conclude that
A is a basis of W for S.
An Unsuccessful Respong^ to the
Alleged Counterexample
I shall now consider a first, and unacceptable, response to
this proposed counterexample. This response Is to state that the
attribution of W Is not after all eplstemlcally In the clear.
The respondent might argue as follows:
”P3 logically Implies that the attribution of W Is not eplste-
mlcally in the clear. P3 states that:
For every x, if (i) x directly attributes to himself theproperty of being F. and If (11) x being F Is not expU-citly contradicted by the set of properties that x
'' ““Ibutes to X. then hls being F has some pre-sumption in its favor for x. ^
"Now consider the following property:
M - the property of being almost always deliberately
misled by others about what S is perceiving.
"Suppose that S directly attributes M to himself. That is, he
believes he is usually deceived by others about what he perceiving.
Perhaps that is what made S refuse initially to attribute W to
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himself.
"It see„s
.Ha.
.He a...iHu.lo„ of H fa no. expffof.f, eo„..a-
^-ted H.
.He se. of p.open.fes
.Ha.
. afoec.l, a...fHu.es
.o x. Po.
he al»pl, Hoes no. Hold an, HeUefs *loH en.aU
.He a...lHu.lon of
the negation of M. To be surf, ino iere, he also indlrec.ly a.
.rlbu.es the
following property to the scientist:
R = the property of being always right.
Hence he directly attributes some appropriate R' to himself. But the
attributions of neither R nor R' entail the attribution of negation of
His belief that the scientist Is always right Is compatible with
his belief that he Is usually deceived deliberately. Perhaps he
believes that onlj^ the scientist Is trustworthy.
•If this is correct, then the attribution of M Is not expli-
citly contradicted by any set of beliefs which S holds; and hence, by
P3, the attribution of M has some presumption In Its favor for S.
"But If this Is so, then the attribution of W Is not eplsteml-
cally in the clear, for the attribution of M dlsconflrms the attribu-
tion of W. That Is, if M were the only logically distinct property
the attribution of which was beyond reasonable doubt for S, then the
attribution of W would not be acceptable. For although the scientist,
in the case described. Is Insisting to S that S Is being appeared
whltely to by an object that Is white, if the attribution of M were
the onlj: thing that was beyond reasonable doubt for S, it would not be
reasonable to attribute W, and would probably be reasonable to attri-
bute the negation of W. since the attribution of M thus dlsconflrms
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that of W. and since, as „e have seen, the attribution of M has sc™a
Ptesueptlon In Its favor for S. It follows that the attribution of w
IS not eplstemlcally In the clear for S."
An Evaluat ion of Chisholm’s P3
I do not believe that this response Is successful. Rather
than showing that the attribution of W Is not eplst^tlcal ly 1 „ the
clear. It seems to me to show that P3 Is false. For It should not be
a result, even in the situation described, that the attribution of M
has some presumption in its favor for S ^ i ^i-avo t b. The culprit here, I believe,
is P3.
I think P3 is too latltudlnarlan. and I believe that It cate-
gorizes as properties having some presumption In their favor those
not have that epistemic status according to Chisholm's
definition of "having some presumption In favor of" (cf. Ibid., p.
551).
I shall consider P3 more directly In order to see what. In my
view, is wrong with It. The difficulty can be Illustrated by giving a
more generalized example analogous to the one given Immediately above.
Suppose a very methodical and consistent, but rather unstable.
philosopher—call him Professor Pyrrho—goes mad. He has read too
much Descartes. He has come to believe that the evil genius hypothe-
SIS IS true. That is, he directly attributes the following property:
E = the property of being such that an evil genius notless powerful than deceitful, has employed his whole
energies in deceiving Professor Pyrrho.
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Professor Py„ho consistently and methodically tevlses his other
beliefs accordingly, so that he does not hold any beliefs inconsistent
With his direct attribution of E.
According to P3, „e would have to say that the attribution of
E has some presumption In Its favor for Professor Py„ho
. But this
seems ^acceptable.
,^y should Professor Pyrrho's
"methodical
madness confer any epistemic legitimacy on such an outlandish
hypothesis as that expressed by his direct attribution of E? The mere
fact that Professor Pyrrho does not hold any beliefs contradicting the
attribution of E does not, It seems, make this attribution have any
positive epistemic status for him. It does not become a more reason-
able hypothesis by virtue of his madness, neither for him nor for
anyone el se
.
This seems to be confirmed by what Chisholm says about the
attribution of a property having some presumption In Its favor. On
this view. If the attribution of a property has some presumption In
its favor, then It Is more reasonable to attribute that property than
to attribute Its negation. But I do not believe that the attribution
of E is more reasonable for Professor Pyrrho than the attribution of
not-E. There are few If any experiences Professor Pyrrho could have
that would lead us to want to say the attribution of E Is more reaso-
nable for him than that of not-E. His madness Is certainly not one of
those experiences. His madness might explain^ he comes to believe
the evil genius hypothesis, but It does not make the hypothesis
justified or reasonable for him.
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Here I a. ass^ing
,Hat *e„ the attribution of a property
-tains the status of having so.e presumption In Its favor for some
person, this status Is conferred upon It and derived from >*at Is In
that person's evidence base, rather than froa „hat Is directly evident
to that person. This Is the „ay I have understood Chisholm's use of
the phrase •'having some presumption In favor" as well as the phrases
acceptable."
"beyond reasonable doubt" and "^re reasonable than."
So the attribution of a property may be beyond reasonable doubt, etc.
for a person even though he strongly rejects attributing It. He^to attribute it, but he doesn't.
A Satisfactory Response to the
Alleged Counterexample
I hope to have established that the proper way to respond to
the initial counterexample Is not to claim that the attribution of W
is after all not eplstemlcally In the clear. But a quite different
kind of response seems to me to be entirely satisfactory, and that Is
to accept that A Is a basis for the attribution of W tor S, and simply
to deny that this result constitutes a counterex'ample. A Is a basis
for the attribution of W. even If s does not, in some sense, "use" A
eplstemlcally In order to reach the decision to attribute W. This
decision is reached In this case by more roundabout means having to do
with the testimony of the scientist. Nevertheless, A tends to confirm
a property such as W. Even if the proper Inferences are not made In
the case cited, A does provide a reason for attributing W. And In
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this sense, A Is a basis for the attribution of W.
I think It Should be Clear that In ^klng this response, as I
believe „e must do, „e are committing ourselves to the view that a
property *lch Is a basis for an attribution constitutes part of a
person's evidence-base, and need not constitute part of what Is
directly evident to a person. A basis Is that which constitutes
grounds or reasons for attributing other properties, or which makes
reasonable the attribution of other properties. But It neel not make
£Iident such attributions, and may not even Itself be evident to the
person for whom that property Is a basis. A basis In some sense cuts
one s work out for one; It provides the groundwork that allows one to
make some eplstemlc Inference, for example, to some property that can
y Indirectly, not directly, evident. But whether one actually
does make the appropriate eplstemlc Inference Is another story. One
may tall utterly to do so. Yet the basis remains a basis. It just
has not been put to use, as it were.
As I have noted. I also believe that when we say that the
attribution of one property is more reasonable than that of another,
or has some presumption in its favor then or is acceptable, or beyond
reasonable doubt, we are saying something about a person’s evidence
base or what can be inferred from it rather than about what is
directly evident or what can be inferred from that.
In this sense I believe that these epistemic properties are
fundamentally different from the epistemic properties of being
evident, being known, and being certain. The latter pertain essen-
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tially to that which is evident fnr .o a person whereas the former per-
tain onl,
,he evidence-base. This is to ^,e the sa.e ah.t
Chishol^.s „te testtictive distinction that i have «de in Chaptet ii
about the distinction het>,een the intetnall, and the externally
justified
.
An Evaluat ion of Chisholm’s P6
The distinction between the evidence-base and the directly
evident can be used to bring out what see« to .e to be a difficulty
with P6 and its instances. This principle tells us that if x Is
ppeared redly to (whitely, etc.) and being appeared redly to is
epistemlcally m the clear for x, then It Is evident for x that he is
appeared redly to by something that is red.
li s has the property of being appeared redly to, then this is
a property that Is part of S's evidence-base. And to say something is
epistemlcally in the clear is to say something about one's evidence
base and about those non-baslc properties that are made reasonable by
what is In one s evidence-base. So the antecedent of P6 Is concerned
essentially vrtth a person’s evidence-base, while the conclusion tells
us what Is actually evident for the person, as opposed to telling us
merely what Is In his evidence base or what Is made reasonable by his
evidence base
.
This move from what is in one’s evidence base to what is
actually evident to one seems to me to be important and the kind of
relation that needs to be explained by some epistemic principles.
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However. It does not appear to n.e that P6 and Its Instances
provide the needed explanation, it does not see. to .e that when the
antecedent oi PS is satisfied, this wiii aiiow ns to .he an. conci-
sions about What is evident to the person in question.
For purposes of illustration, let us co.ider again P6' and
our .an S loohlng at the *lte object *ich earlier had a red light
shining on it. Let us imagine sliehtlv rH f fS S g y different circumstances from
those described above. As before, the red light has been turned off;
the man is appeared whitely to by an object that is white, and he
irrationally believes he is appeared whltely to by an object that is
red. But this time, no scientist comes in to guide him to the correct
belief. instead, he believes that, in five
.inutes, the red object
that is appearing whltely to hi. will turn into a white object. This
belief is not support by any reason. ,«ter five
.Inutes, then, he has
the correct belief, but I do not think we would want to say that the
attribution of W-the property of being appeared whltely to by an
object that is white—is evident to this man. If a man In Maine
believes that an earthquake is occurring in California because a black
cat Just crossed his path, we do not want to say that his belief Is
evident to him; not even If, as it happens, an earthquake Is Just then
occurring in California. It seems to me we have the same sort of
situation In the above case. S arrives at the correct belief by Irra-
tional and accidental means. The coincidental truth of his belief is
not enough. It seems to me, to allow us to say that this belief Is
evident to the man.
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Yet the antecedent of P6' Is. 1 believe, satisfied in this
situation, as It was In the example described earlier. If 30. and If
w is indeed not evident to S then Pfi'u o, cn b is not acceptable.
Or again, consider a person who Is appeared redly to and for
Who™ there Is no data which dlsconflr^s the attribution of the pro-
perty of being appeared redly to by an object that Is red. But su^
pose that the person does not understand what It Is to attribute to
hlrtself the property of being appeared redly to. (Not because of any
lack of knowledge of technical philosophy, but simply be he does not
grasp simple concepts such as beine red 'i Th-ite to g .; This example might also
constitute a problem for P6*.
Finally, consider our S again, du;^ the five minute period
at the end of which, as he Irrationally believes, a red object will
become white. Prior to the Imagined color change, he does not even
attribute W to himself. He directly attributes Its negation. Surely
we could not say In this circumstance that W Is evident to him. And
yet the antecedents of P6' remain satisfied, I believe.
If any of these considerations are correct, then It seems we
must reject P6 and its instances.
A possible response is to say that the consequent, as well as
the antecedent, of P6 pertains to the evidence-base
. On this view P6
tells us how nonbasic properties have various degrees of justifica-
tion conferred on them by basic properties; but they do not tell us
how a property becomes evident .
Such a principle would tell us considerably less than what P6
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appears intended to tell hq t jus. we would not have a principle explaining
how the self-presenting can ^he an external world proposition
evident. But we would have a principle that explains how the self-
presentlr, can at least Justlf, (m the external sense) an external
world proposition.
If «e reinterpret Chisholm's principle as making this more
modest claim and make a few necessary adjustments to accomodate such a
reinterpretation. I helleve that we can have a plausible principle
that will serve the Important role of a bridging principle between the
self-presenting and the external world. In the next chapter I attempt
such a reinterpretation.
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chapter VII
A VIABLE FOUNDATIONAL ISM?
After a discussion of whether belief states should serve as
the basic pcoposmons *lcb Jasllfy ponbaslc pcoposUlons, a
Cblshol.lan principle which acie^pcs Co slate conditions >a,det which a
basic proposition externally justifies a nnnK •y J r r o basic proposition is pre-
sented and discussed.
Chisholm’s New Principle Reinterpreted
We have seen that the critics of founds tlonallsm have failed
to establish an, compelling arguments against a "stable foundations”
version of Cartesian foundatlonallsm. But we have also seen that the
leading systematic attempt to set forth a foundatlonallst theory-that
of Chlsholm-has failed to state conditions under which basic proposi-
tions make evident nonbasic ones. Thus we do not yet have a satlsfac-
tory bridging principle essential to the Cartesian
foundatlonallst-that moves from propositions about a subject’s mental
States to propositions about the external world.
But we would not do well to abandon Chisholm at this point.
It will be recalled from the last chapter that Chisholm’s principle P6
attempted to explain how the self-presenting could make evident an
ordinary proposition about the external world.! It failed because the
antecedent of P6 could be satisfied without the external world propo-
sition in question being evident to the subject. And yet, as I noted
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e a
at the end ot the last chapter. It „ay well be that the relevant pro-
IP, Che subject. This raises
the question whether we could not yet have our Cartesian brld^ln,
Pttnclple 11 we simply reinterpreted and slightly «dllled Chlshol„.s
P6 so that It stated conditions ™der which a basic proposition «.d
nonbaslc proposition externally Justified rather than evident (or
internally justified in my sense).
The principle as thus reinterpreted would be weaker than
Chisholm intended P6 to be. It would not explain the Interesting and
Important relation between basic propositions and the evident.
Nevertheless, it would at least be an attempt to state conditions
under which a basic proposition Justifies (externally justifies. In
this case) a nonbaslc proposition. That too Is Important—the
Cartesian foundatlonallst needs such a principle. And although It
would be more limited than Chisholm's P6. perhaps It Is a necessary
first step before the foundatlonallst can go on to specify the con-
ditions under which a nonbaslc proposition Is rendered evident.
At any rate, I believe that Chisholm's principle as thus rein-
terpreted Is worthy of serious consideration. I shall spend the bulk
of this chapter discussing It. First, however, I shall discuss some
recent remarks by John Pollock which are critical ot foundatlonallst
theories. A response to Pollock can make clear why It appears
necessary to hold chat propositions about a subject's experiences
rather then those about his beliefs are the basic propositions that
serve to justify nonbasic propositions for that subject.
^
Chisho Im' s
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P6, as well as my reinterpretation of It opt for e1 C, experiential states
rather than belief starve tt,hus. the discussion of Pollock can help
explain an Important feature of the bridging principle to be
discussed later has been adopted.
Belief States as ers
Chisholm and Pollock have both apparently assumed chat, if
there Is any basic state that can serve the Important role of
’
Justifying propositions about the external world. It Is likely to be a
subject's belief state. For example. It Is a subject's belief that he
is looking at a red object which, together with other conditions,
justifies the proposition that he Is Indeed looking at a red object.
Or so It was held. But I believe that the assumption >*lch led to
examples like this is mistaken, and that this Is one reason for the
failure of Chisholm's and Pollock's Initial accounts of the baslc-
nonbaslc relation. 3 Both philosophers now seem to recognize this
assumption as a source of difficulty. Chisholm has apparently given
the assumption up, since his most recent principles (P6 and the other
principles formulated In Chisholm, 1980) abandon belief states as the
basis for justification and adopt appearance or experiential states.
Pollock, on the other hand, apparently still accepts the assumption.
In a surprising recent turn, he now holds that the difficulties
generated by this assumption demonstrate the falsity of his earlier
foundatlonallsm as presented In Knowledge and Justification
, and
Indeed, demonstrate the falsity of M forms of foundatlonallsm (cf.
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Pollock, •A Plethora of Epistemological Theories." 1979
. pp.
SO lar as 1 k„o„. this
.election leaves Chisholm as the oal, eorreat
defender of foundatlonallsm who has a published theory of
foundational! sm/
Pollock thus uses the assumption that the Justlfylng-state
Will be a belief-state, if it is to be anything at all, to reject
foundationalism as a whole:
PA: (1) If foundationalism
-f q ri-nQ
are belief states!
’ "
=totes
fr
^ Justifying states are not belief sta teo(3) Foundationalism is not true.
(1) states the assumption that Pollock has apparently retained and
'
Chisholm has rejected. We can of course, and will, ask whether
Pollock is wise in retaining It. But for now. let us look at (2), for
we are trying to determine what mental states serve as justlflers of
nonbaslc propositions, and 1 think Pollock Is right In rejecting
belief states as candidates. My own view Is that, while (1) Is false,
(2) is true.
Pollock^s Criticism of Belief States Justif lers
Pollock considers the following principle which. In line with
(1), he takes to be essential to any classical foundational 1st theory:
(F) Necessarily, a person S Is justified In believing a pro-position P Iff (3D (r Is the set of epistemologically
asic propositions believed by S&F supports P for S)
(Pollock. 1979, p. 93).
Note that any justified proposition will be supported by what S
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That is. belief-states function as justlflers for nonbaslc
propositions
.
It Is principle F, Pollock says, which is th»uj.cn IS e source of the
aiUlculty *lch forces ns to conclude that 'all classical foundations
theories are false" (ibid., p. 98).
believes. Unfortunately, one rLelv Lhpv'' onegically basic propositions at all. Tnl
^Pistemolo-
perception, the only belief one is Lt fo h
example] the belief that rsa- • ^ I^°t
Only^wlih consU^LL sophn«c"trordoe"®
any beliefs at all about perception ItlS Le°"\"?- '’f
^
not about oneself but about the world around oneself
(Ibid., pp. 98-99)
Why should there be a problem If. as Pollock here suggests,
the subject's only relevant belief Is that there Is something red
before him? The problem arises because the proposition that there Is
something red before him Is not basic In the Cartesian sense. It Is
about the external world. A candidate for a Cartesian basic proposi-
tion In this case would be the proposition expressed by "It seems to S
that there Is something red before him." or perhaps that ex_pressed by
"S is appeared to redly." But. and this Is the point Pollock Is making
In the above passage, normally S will not be likely to hold the belief
that he Is appeared to redly. Most likely he will not even know what
that means. "Only with considerable sophistication does one come to
have any beliefs at all about perception Itself." Some eplstemolo-
glsts say In effect that only Chisholm Is sophisticated enough to know
what "S Is appeared to redly" means, and they are not necessarily
282
paying Chisholm a compliment.
But If S does not believe the proposition that he is appeared
to tedl„ then hy (.) this proposition conld not he the Justifier o,
some other proposition P.
One could retain a foundatlonalist structure, in spite of this
Objection, by holding that the basic propositions are ttase which S
vlously believes, for example, the proposition that there is
something red before S. But as noted, such •basics" are about the
external world. If these prf. Koo-ia e basic propositions, then all is lost as
far as a specifically Cartesian foundatlonallsm goes. It the
Cartesian program is to be salvaged ell Koo-tb r , a basics must remain proposi-
tions about S's mental states.
Pollock may be right that S will not normally believe that he
is appeared to redly, nor that he is experiencing a red sense datum,
nor that he sees a red percept (cf. ibid., p. 98). These beliefs
Involve technical concepts much disputed by eplstemologlsts, and it
may be that an ordinary S does not even understand them, let alone
believe them. If so. then these cannot, given (F), Justify any other
propositions. But I am not sure that Pollock is right that there is
Cartesian proposition that S believes when he is looking at some
red object. What about the proposition I mentioned above, expressed
by It seems to S that there is something red before him"? (Another
candidate: "S
_takes there to be something red before him.") The
question at hand is: Under normal circumstances, when S is looking at
something red, does he believe that it seems to him that there is
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-aeves
.He ex.e.ne. „on. p.opos.Uon
.Ha.
.He.e i, ao.e.H.a,
before Hi™. Wa are asking ^e.Her S Helieves
.He Car.esian proposi-
tion tha. 1. se^
.o him
.ha. there is something red before him.
NOW i. is Plausible that
.he answer to this question is "Ho "
One might <,ui.e reasonably be troubled over any insistence that S will
normally go through the rather complex act of believing that He^to see something red whenever he also believes that he act^lly^
see something red. Indeed, one might reasonably maintain that the
concept of actually seeing something red excludes the concept of
seeming to see something red. "I don't^ to see it," s might
insist, I really do see -f f " Ar.a uy it. And perhaps we should take him at his
word
.
It is also plausible, however, to say that the answer is
•Yes." S may be taken to believe that he is having certain experien-
ces when he is looking at a red object, and this may be all that is
involved in seeming to see something red. In this sense, seeming to
be red. or appearing to be red. may be a normal, perhaps even a
necessary, accompaniment to S's seeing something red, and he may
naturally and Inevitably believe that he is having these experiences
of red (cf. the discussion of Roderick Firth's comments In the last
section of Chapter IV).
My own inclination is to say that the answer is "Yes." When a
given belief is adopted, an array of associated beliefs is often also
adopted. It seems plausible to me that S does believe that he has the
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experience of red when
to believe, is what is
seems to see something
he sees something red, and that, I
involved in saying that S believes
red
.
am inclined
that he
These inclinations ot „lna In no way amount to a proof. Mot
do the stated Inclinations to answer "No" to the question. I do not
thdnh that an adequate proof on one side or the other of this dehate
has been or can easily be offerAH n .u-y ed. But this means that the position
that Pollock would have to take—namely that the^exy, n answer must be
No"-ls conjectural and not well founded. At least, he owes us an
argument. So. although I think Pollock Is right to reject belief
States as justifying states, I
reasons than those he gives to
believe that we must look to other
see why they should be rejected.
Why We Should Reject Belief States as
mately,
because
I believe that justified propositions are not justified, ultl
by what we believe. We (In some cases automatically) believe
of our e^riences
.
and these are the ultimate justificatory
bases for what we know.
It Is at least possible that what one believes Is quite Inde-
pendent of what Is Internally or externally justified for one. A suf-
ficiently Irrational or unbalanced person can believe almost any
proposition, perhaps even the false proposition that he seems to see
something red when actually he’s having the experience of green. The
mere fact of such belief. If It can occur, would not seem to be enough
to justify what is believed.
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In order ro dlscounr such examples, U c^ld he ass^ed that aCartesian proposition cannot possibly fall to be believed *en It Istme. This naturalistic account of beliefs Insists than whenever one
has experiences, one Invariably has beliefs that one Is havlt^ those
experiences, or at least that one cannot at the time have beliefs that
one is having experiences other than the ones one Is actually having
Polloch's new article seems to rely on this assumption In places.
though at other points his argument seems to presuppose the f^ of
this assumption.
At any rate, this naturalistic account of beliefs is not
Obviously true, and 1 would not wish to have to rely on It. without
gument in its favor, m order to discount an example such as
that above about the irrational person.
But even if the naturalistic account should prove to be true,
it seems to me that we should look to the sensory experience itself as
the ultimate source tor the justification of propositions about the
external world, for It Is the experience which Is the source of the
belief, and not vice versa. And It seems also to be the experience,
and not the belief, which Is the source of the justlfledness of propo-
sitions about the external world when such propositions are justified.
In sum, although Pollock has not proved that belief states
cannot function as Cartesian justifiers of external world
propositions, the efforts to place belief states in this functional
role have not led to any successful Cartesian founda tionalist
principles. And since there is some reason for thinking that
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experiential states rather than belief
candidates for this role, It seems <rise
place experiential states as justltlers
external world.
states are the more appropriate
to formulate principles which
of propositions about the
Pollock’s Rejec tion of Foundations 1 cm
But Pollock says that to do this Is to abandon founds tlonal-
is.. He accepts both premises of arsument PA noted above, concluding
that all forms of classical foundatlonaism are false.
Why does Pollock accept premise 1 of the argument? He con-
aiders this alternative to his classiVal fr. a *-n C c founda tionali sm principle F
noted above!
(DR) 0(S)(P) [S is justified in believing P iff gT') rr •
epistemologically bLlc^ rofo t ns^^relative to S&r supports P)].
(.Follock, 1979, pp. 99-100)
Pollock calls this alternative
"direct realism."
What Pollock has to say about principle DR as a contrast to
classical Cartesian foundatlonallsm Is curious. He considers whether
principle DR Is compatible rith classical foundatlonallsm:
Hefa^a
*>e regarded as a foundations theory’ I
J!!? 1" [{pledge and JustlfL-
But * ff
delTndlng a foundations
-rn
reflection, I now think that that had moreto do with the genesis of the theory than with Its content.
(Ibid., p. 100)
He then goes on to note that principle DR is compatible with clearly
nonCartesian foundational and nonfoundational theories, and that there
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is a continuum of fHeortes f.o. fha cUsslcal Carfeslan foun-
daUonaUs. af one exffe.e fo pone coHenenffs. af fHe ofHen. f.one fs
not the elean hfea. fhaf
,3ve been expecfe. he.een fonn.affon-
allst and coherence theories (cf. Ibid.).
Pollock is right that principle DR Is compatible >rtth
nonCartesian theories of iustlfirar^on t?J c ti . For principle DR does not
require that basics be about a subject's mental states. Thus, it is
compatible „lth. for example, what we have called external world foun-
datlonallsm and the shifting foundations view. But of course, to say
this is not yet to say principle DR Is Incompatible with Cartesian
foundationalism.
Pollock Is also right that, as I have pointed out In Chapter
III, there Is a continuum of theories between Cartesian founds tlonal-
ism and coherentlsm. But we need to know what Pollock has In mind as
determining placement on the continuum. Apparently position on the
continuum Is determined for Pollock by: (1) How narrow or broad the
class of basic propositions Is. (Cartesian foundationalism, excluding
as basics all but some subjective mental propositions, would be at the
narrow extreme.) (2) How privileged basics are In their eplstemlc
Status. (At one extreme basics would have to be certain or
incorrigible. At the other they would not have to have any higher
epistemic status than that of being justified.)
I gather that this is Pollock's view from the following
passage
:
Epistemological theories make up a rather rough continuum. At
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one extreme we have claQ<=^no^
a privileged status to a ce«al“r" *i''aproposltlons-the eplstemologlcaufLsf”“the opposite extreme we have^nure e h " P"P°sltlons. At
regard all propositions as befi^ £2
hetence
_
theorl^ which
with one another and give no prlvUerd'"'’'^''®''’^”®^'®^ P^PBetween these two extremes we'^have a®rat^*'“^of theories which give some sorrof f" collectionpropositions, but a lesser status tha“Iia?"‘'olassical foundations theories. Bv ret f
conferred by
datlons theories we have efferrt i
Jectlng classical foun-
contlnuum. ctively lopped off one end of the
(Ibid., p. 101)
Notice the clear Implication at the end of this passage that
Pollock has rejected classical foundational Ism and. presumably, given
good reasons for rejecting It. But what reasons has he actually
glvenl All we have from the article on that at this point Is his not
entirely successful argument that belief states cannot serve as
justlflers. and thus that (F) Is false. But let us assume that he Is
right on that-bellef states a^ justlflers. How Is that supposed
to undermine a specifically Cartesian foundatlonallsm and effectively
lop off one end of the continuum? If the continuum Is determined by
conditions (1) and (2) above. It's hard to see why Pollock thinks he
has lopped off the Cartesian foundatlonallst extreme. Recall again
requirements for Cartesian foundatlonallsm stated In Chapter III.
I have noted that nowhere has It been successfully argued that a
Cartesian foundatlonallst must hold that basics are certain or
Incorrigible. It is quite compatible with Cartesian foundatlonallsm
that the guaranteed eplstemlc status of a basic proposition merely be
that of being Justified. Indeed, Pollock himself explicitly agrees:
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£lima faci^ justified, and there is no at leaststatus between prima facie incir'f-j • ° ^^t)us intermediate
Most classical fe^alS Z " incorrigibility,
bility, and many of the classical^^^
opted for incorrlgi-
foundatlona theLlas We focused olasslcal
must be recognized that thft" mor"
"^“^f'^lblllty, but It
required for classical fonnda^ Lnrtheo??es"cannot refute all classical fr. a As such, one
swoop by proving ttarthefe are n^ one fell
cally basic propositions! TMa !! eplstemologl-because some non-founW onl!w c important observationjust that. fo ndati alists have thought they could do
y PF* 'JD
)
Now on Pollock's continuum of theories, at the tar foun-
datlonallst extreme we will presumably find theories which (1)
restrict basics to subjective mental propositions and (2) give basics
the high eplstemlc status of Incorrigibility. But principle F, the
only principle he claims to have refuted, says nothin, ab^t either of
these conditions. It only says that basics must be believed by the
subject and that It Is these belief states which serve as justlflers
for the indirectly evident. So to have refuted (F) Is not to have
said anything against theories embracing conditions (1) and (2) but
holding experiential states rather than belief states as justlflers.
Yet on Pollock's own grounds, such theories should be positioned at
the foundatlonallst extreme of the continuum. So much for having
effectively lopped off one end of the continuum."
Also, as we have seen, and as Pollock recognizes in the above
passage, Cartesian foundationalism need embrace only the first of
these two conditions. It might say only that basics must be
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justified, not IncottigiMe. Such a Catteslan foundationalls™ is
perhaps not at the far end of the foundatlonallst extreme, but it
regains a Cartesian theory that deserves to he called
•classical."
And Pollock has thus far said nothing against it.
It well be that Pollock only „eant by
••classical- foun-
dationalls» a theory *ich held belief states as justlflers. But it
is certainly possible for there to be a Cartesian theory in our tech-
nical sense which rejects (P). namely, one which takes experiential
states rather than belief states as Justlflers. And Pollock has cer-
tainly said nothing that would require us to conclude that Cartesian
theories must hold somerhino HVc f'F'ig like C ). So in arguing against (F), he
has not argued against Cartesian foundatlonallsm as such.
It may be too that Pollock is thinking that classical foun-
dationalism must be ite^-that if a Cartesian proposition Justi-
fies another, the subject must know it does. But we have seen in
Chapters III and IV that there is no obvious inconsistency in a non-
iterative Cartesian foundatlonallsm. Such a theory will say that a
subjective mental experience can make an external world proposition
Justified, even though the subject, lacking any sophisticated episte-
mology, may not be Justified In thinking, indeed may not even believe,
that his subjective mental experience justifies an external world pro-
position.
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Brld.tn.
We have seen that there are reasons for favoring experiential
states over belief states as ,nstlflers. hot no sufficient reasons for
giving up the attempt to construct a bridging principle alor«
Cartesian foundationalist lines AnS t u. And I have suggested that a slight
.edification Of Chisholm's PS might be a plausible candidate for such
a principle. I shall proceed next to construct such a principle from
the ground up. Although the end result ulll be a principle ver, close
to Chisholm's. I prefer to construct It step by step rather than state
It outright. In this way. the reasons for Including various elements
in It can be better understood. I shall Introduce some new ter-
minology and use some terms differently from Chisholm's usage. This
will not alter the Chlsholmlan nature of the principle. Chisholm him-
self has made many such changes from revision to revision. I „in
point out any significant relations between my terminology and
Chisholm’s that might not be obvious.
I shall say that at least one basis for justified propositions
about the external world Is what one's senses present to one. Like
Chisholm. I shall concentrate on one of the senses—vision. Indeed. I
shall restrict myself to It. even though I feel It's not a trivial
matter to extend results to the other senses once principles for
vision have been established. This Is one of several ways In which
the principle to be constructed will be limited In scope.
When, under conditions of normal light with unimpaired vision
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and open, focused eyes, I looU In cHe
.Auction of a nfpe Potato
Which is a few feet In ftont of „e and Is unohstnucted by any Inter-
vening object, then 1 shall say that I a. visually presented with a
red-object-ln-space. But 1 shall also say that I a. vls^lly pre-
sented with a red-object-ln-space when I merely dre^ that I'm looking
tomato. That Is, what Is visually presented to me has to do Just
with what appears to me, not with what actually exists external to me.
So the phrase "visually presented with a red-object-ln-space" must not
be taken to have any existential Implication. If I'm so presented
with a red object. It does not follow that there actually exists some
red object external to me which I was looking at.
I say that my visual experience presents me with a
red-object-ln-space, and not just chat It presents me with a red
ject, or with a red patch. This Is because I take exception to
those theories of perception which state that visual experience at Its
most basic and uninterpreted level consists Just of an array of
colored patches, presented as It were on a flat surface. Due to the
fact that we have two eyes set apart from each other, our visual
experience contains an additional quality which we come to Interpret
as three-dlmenslonallty. Perhaps It Is only through experience that
we come to understand this stereoscopic quality of our visual
experience In terms of distance In space, solidity, and so on.
Nevertheless, It seems to me that this quality Itself Is present even
in the most untutored experlencer of visual phenomena—chat even at
this stage one does not experience vision as a flat array of colored
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patches.
The expression
"S Is visually presented >rith a red-object-
in-space" win take the place of Chisholm's expressions
"S is appeared
redly to" and "S perceptually takes there to be a red object." The
Termer expression will fiu the same role as the latter expressions do
in Chisholm’s epistemic principles. It wi 1 1 ^i ll, in other words, be used
to express a basic proposition.
As noted above, the principle to be constructed
.vlll attempt
to state the conditions under which a basic proposition makes a non-
basic proposition externally iustlfled fac-y J iti (as opposed to internally
justified or evident).
A Chlsholmian Bridging Principles
The most obvious starting point for a bridging principle is
something like the following direct approach:
^ visually presented with a$-object-in-space, then the proposition that S Islooking at a object is externally justified for S.
This is of course a schema, where S can be replaced with the name of a
person and j, with any color predicate to obtain an Instance of the
schematic principle.
But E?i will not do. S may be visually presented with a red-
object-in-space when S has good reason for believing he's not actually
looking at a red object. For example, he may have been told, or may
see, that a red light is shining on a white object.
A natural revision is the following schematic principle, which
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adds a ^aali^nns cona.Uon
,o .He previous p..„e,pi,,
„H.cH
solves the above problem:
least reasonable tor S Is'such Jhrr^ly justify for S the negation of ?he^ ®’''arnal-Is looking at a * object then Jhe P’"°P°altlon that SIs externally justified for S. “""sgated proposition
Again, and In the following principles as well, only color predicates
may be filled in for (\).
It should be clear that EP2 Is Immune to the example EPl Is
vulnerable to. since S does have good reason to believe that he Is
not actually looking at a red object, the proposition that S Is
looking at a red object Is not externally justified for S, according
to EP2. However. EP2 solves this problem at too great a cost. Many
tl.es S will not be externally justified In believing the proposition
that he is looking at a red object, even though the negation of that
proposition Is not externally justified for him. Suppose, for
example, that he Is a subject In a perceptual experiment In which, as
he is correctly Informed, half the time he Is sho>™ a colored object
and half the time he Is shown a white object with a colored light
shining on It. The perceptual situation Is such that It Is hard to
distinguish which event Is occurring at a given time. In such a case,
S Is not externally justified In believing he Is looking at a red
object when he is presented with a red-object-ln-space. But neither
Is the sec of propositions which are reasonable for him sufficient to
externally justify that he Is not looking at a red object. So the
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tecedent of EP2 is true, but the consequent is false.
This suggests that the guaUfylng condition In the antecedent
Should he Changed so that the evidence against a dubious extetnal
wotld ptoposltlon need not be so sttot, that It iustUles the negation
of that proposition. The principle Mght be thus revised as follows-
least reasonable o? S as si'’
justified tofr proposition is externally
Where EP2 regulred that the negation of the external world proposi-
tion be Justified If the external world proposition Itself was not to
be justified, EP3 regulres only that the external world proposition be
rendered tuireasonable
. The precise conditions under which one propo-
sition renders another unreasonable would have to be spelled out by a
detailed theory of justification. Intuitively, the Idea Is that p
renders q unreasonable If, given p and no other relevant data, S would
be better off eplstemlcally withholding or rejecting q rather than
believing q.
Even this Intuitive Idea should be sufficient to reveal the
difficulty with EP3. It may be that S Is In a perceptual situation
where It Is just reasonable, but no more than that, for him to believe
that he Is looking at a red object. Suppose he Is In an experimental
situation where he Is looking at a red object fifty-five percent of
the time, but forty-five percent of the time he Is looking at a white
object with a red light shining on It. And S knows about these
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p-........,
...
..
.....
Ich event is occurring. Then S Is presumably not externally
Justified in believing he Is looking at a red object. It Is not so
reasonable for blm that It Is beyond reasonable doubt and potentially
evident. Yet the total data available to him Is not sufficient to
render the proposition that he Is loohlng at a red object treasonable
for him. In such a case, the antecedent of EP3 Is true, but the con-
sequent is false.
This problem suggests a more radical revision. The above
principles have all been Intended to apply to vls.^1 presentation
generally, ^enever S Is visually presented with a
-object-ln-space.
the principle Is supposed to be able to be Invoked to detennlne
Whether the related external world proposition Is In fact externally
Justified for S. The principles formulated above have all come to
grief because of abnormal perceptual conditions In which there Is at
least some reason for S to doubt that the external world proposition
In question Is true. Perhaps we should consider a more limited prin-
ciple that does not attempt to cover all cases In which S Is visually
presented with a
-object-ln-space, but which restricts Itself to nor-
mal perceptual circumstances where S does not have any evidence that
anything Is amiss perceptually. The following principle suggests
itself
:
EP4: Necessarily, if S is visually presented with a cJ)-object-in space, and if no set of propositions that are reason-
able for S casts doubt upon the proposition that S islooking at a 0 object, then the latter proposition is
externally justified for S.
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Before I discuss EP4, I „euld U,e Co point out its similari-
ties to Chisholm’s P6 (cf. Chisholm, 1980, p. 555), „hich was
discussed in the last chapter. It has already been noted that
Chisholm's bridging principle attempted to establish that the external
world proposition was e«. ir ^an be criticised on those grounds,
so I have instead been worUlng with bridging principles making the
.ore modest conclusion that the external work proposition is
nally JuHltled. Except for this difference, which is of course an
Lportant one, I belief that P6 and EP4 are virtually identical.
Like EP4, Chisholm's principle does not seem to be Intended to
apply to all cases of visual presentation. It appears to be
restricted to cases in *lch there are no problematic perceptual cir-
cumstances or in Which, in Chisholm's te^lnology, the external world
proposition In question is eplstemlcally In the clear." Chisholm
notes that such a proposition is one that is "not dlsconflrmed by any
set of properties [propositions, in my terminology] that have some
presumption In their favor ..." (ibid., p. 552). The term
"disconfirmed" performs the same role. I believe, in P6 as the term
"casts doubt upon" does in EP4. We may even consider Chisholm’s
implicit definition of "disconfirm" as a definition of the term "casts
doubt upon (for Chisholm's definition cf
. ibid., pp. 552-553):^
DCD: p casts doubt upon q for S =df Necessarily, if p igexternally justified for S and if everything that is
externally justified for S is entailed by p, then q is
unreasonable for S.
Where P6 requires only that the dlsconf Irmlng (doubtcasting) proposi-
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tlons have some presumption In their favor EP4 re„ •quires more strictly
" ""
"-asonahle'. In the same
sense Chisholm uses the term
•acceptable." Cf. Chisholm 1977. p. 9
and 1980, p. 547 for his definition of "acceptable.") This minor dif-
ference does not, I believe, significantly detract from the similarity
between P6 and EP4. Both principles say that as lo.^ as no proposl-
frons Which have this favorable eplstemlc status (however specified)
cast doubt upon (l.e., dlsconflrm) the external world proposition In
Cuestlon. then that proposition Is justified, given that the subject
Is having the appropriate sensory experiences.
and Prospect s
EP4 solves some problems, raises more, and may help to suggest
the direction In ,*lch a fully developed Cartesian founds tlonall st
theory must go. I shall not offer such a fully developed theory here;
too much preliminary groundwork remains to be done. I shall Instead
try to suggest—by way of discussion and further development of
EP4—some of the problems and prospects that appear, from this vantage
point, to pertain to the continued development of Cartesian
foundationalism.
In subsequent sections I shall consider (1) how EP4 relates to
previous counterexamples that have worked against other bridging
principles, (2) limitations of EP4 based on the need for a theory of
justification, (3) EPS, a revision of EP4 based on the problem of con-
ceptual understanding, (4) whether EP4 and EP5 can appropriately be
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called foundatloaaist principles, and finally. la r ii (5) some concluding
remarks
.
and Previou s Counterexamples
It should be clear that FP4 ^ cE is Immune to the counterexamples
CO >*ich EP.s 1-3 „ere yulnerahle. and that it is also immune to
Heidelberger's original counterexample to Chisholm's first edition
bridging principles (cf. Chisholm. 1,66. pp. 45,
A7, Heidelberger, 1969, n. 75 ) An i-v,)• 11 these counterexamples posit unu-
sual or tricky perceptual situations *ere some reasonable doubt is
cast upon the external world proposition in question. Hence the ante-
cedent of EP4 will not be satisfied in these situations.
The objection to Chisholm's second edition Theory of Knowledee
bridging principle was not a counterexample. It noted instead some
structural difficulties pertaining to the relation between that prin-
ciple and yarlous definitions, all of which haye since been reylsed.
These structural difficulties wprp ti-ricuxc e e, I believe, specific to Chisholm's
formulations in that edition, and do not pertain to EP4. (Indeed,
Chisholm's related P6 was formulated in part for the yery purpose of
avoiding these difficulties.)
The counterexample to P6 Itself, as will be recalled from my
discussion in Chapter VI
,
posited a man who correctly belleyes that he
is appeared whitely to by an object that is white, although he comes
to this belief through the unreasonable supposition that the object
suddenly and inexplicably changed from being red to being white. Now
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-is „as a coan.e.exa„pU
. pe
„e wopla no. „nn.
proposition that he Is appeared uhltely to by an
bjaot that is *lte Is evl^ to this tan. Chisholm's principle had
s result. believe „e^„ant to say that this proposi-
tion is eHH-iiiJus^ tor this tan. He has every reason to
believe it and no reason to doubt It. And EP4 does have this result.
The tan Is visually presented >rtth a whlte-object-ln-space, and since
there are no reasonable propositions castlr, doubt on the proposition
that he is looking at a white obiect fh-icO j , t is proposition is externally
justified according to EP4 and ar^ra • j6 nra, it does indeed seem to be so
justified
.
EP4 and Theories of JusMf-too-n on
I have already noted that, since EP4 Is restricted to the
externally justified. It does not give us the sort of Information „e
would like to have about the evident or Internally Justified. This Is
an unfortunate limitation. A perhaps even more unfortunate limitation
Is that both of these concepts of justification depend on a full
fledged theory of justification that has not been developed here. In
Chapter II I tried to make the concept of external justification as
clear as possible lacking such a theory and the definitions that would
Included as part of It. But It would of course be desirable to
have the definitions.
This limitation Is perhaps more clearly brought out In the
case of EP4 with regard to Its component concept of one proposition
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part Of an, ade,nate tHeon, of Jnstlffoatio„= anch a theon,
„onld
atte^p. Po explain all sue, iustificaton, relations-othens
^gHt
include nelations sucH aa one proposition defeatins another, oo.
ar^ins another, or rendering another proposition evident (or he,ond
reasonable doubt, etc). Chishol. has offered definitions of these or
sr.rlar relations, and I have of course used one of th™ above to spe-
cify conditions for casting doubt. However, I a. not in a position to
say that the definitions that form part of Chisholm's theory of justi-
fication are correct in the final analysis. The Chlsholmlan defini-
tion DCO is offered here as an indication of Chisholm's approach to
the problem and, should it prove to be inadequate, as a possible
Starting point for a more adequate definition.
It may be appropriate to point out, however, that the problem
raised by our lack of definitions for such Justificatory relations is
just as much a problem for a coherentlst or other nonfoundatlonalist
theory as it is for foundatlonallsm. Any plausible theory about the
structure of justified propositions would seem to require concepts of
confirming, casting doubt, defeating, rendering evident, etc.
Adequate definitions of these concepts would seem to be necessary to
properly tie down any structural theory such as foundatlonallsm or
coherentlsm. Because this prior work has not been done, I cannot say
that the structural eplstemlc principles here formulated are as clear
as they should be. But because this work is prior to anjj structural
theory, it is not a problem solely for foundatlonallsm, nor is it
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dlrectl,
.eleva« to the dispute between founda tlonall s. and
coherentism.
It can also he noted that the pattlculat Justiacatoty concept
e»plo.ed h. HP4-that oi one ptoposition castit, doubt on anothet-is
a taarly co.t.on concept about which we have a telatively cleat
incuitive notion. We can use these intuitions to test the adequacy oi
a definition such as Chishol.'s.^ The basic idea behind one ptoposi-
tlcn p casting doubt on another proposition
, is that p tends to „ahe
q less llhely. Under nonral circumstances, if p ia Justified,
, „iu
be less likely to be true than when p is not Justified. Lacking a
formal definition, this rought Intuitive notion can. It Is to be
hoped, help to clarify EP4. Just as the concept of external Justifi-
cation has been of some use without a fommal definition, so, perhaps,
can this be true of the concept of casting doubt.
Let It be noted, however, that one of the most Important
directions future work should take i<? ^K IS that of proposing formal defini-
tions of these concepts of justification.
E^P4 and the Understanding of Concepts ^
It might be objected against EP4 that it generates coun-
terexamples when we consider subjects rf,o do not have color concepts.
Let us assume that a prellngulstlc child does not have the concept
red. It might be thought that the antecedent of EP4 can be true and
the consequent false In such a case, for how can the child be
justified in believing a proposition for which he does not possess the
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requisite concepts?
This may be a correct objection, but It Is not ob .> UL _LU S vious that itis so. For it may be tha^ a jproposltton such as that expressed by "s
looking at a red object" is externally justified for S even though
S does not understand the relevant concepts. it may be that certain
^inds Of relatively simple perceptual evidence are available to sub-
jects who do not understand the concepts necessary toFLb express proposi-
tions about that evidence.
If so. then certain kinds of propositions could be externally
justified for a person even if he does not understand them.l« This is
Obvious absurdity. Of course any internally justified
proposition must be understood by the subject. But this may not
n6CGss3.iriXy bg ths
-f ajustification is merely external.
I do not intend to resolve this debate here. I „iu merely
remark on the relevance of the debate to EP4 Tf ii simple perceptual
propositions about the external work can be externally justified for a
prellngulstlc child, then EP4 is acceptable as it is. If, as it would
be very plausible to hold, evidence cannot be available and hence
externally justify a proposition unless one possesses the relevant
concepts, then EP4 should be amended. Since both sides would, I
believe, accept the principle as amended, and since the view that it
needs amendatlon is at least a plausible one, it may be desirable to
think of our bridging principle as EPS rather than EP4, where EPS is
identical to EP4 except that it adds to the antecedent the condition
that S understands the proposition that S is looking at a object.
Are These Foundatlonallst Prlnr-fpi^.7
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It might be objected that EP4 and EPS ^5 are not foundatlonallst
principles at all, on the following grounds Th.S . ey require that we
consider other eplste^lc states of the subject besides his seU-
presentlng or basic states. Hence It Is not really his so-called
basic state *lch Justifies the proposition about the external world.
It la rather a large set o, conditions that requires us to examine the
whole of S’s present eplste^lc situation. The principle Is upon
reflection really a coherentlst principle, not a foundatlonallst one.
The response to this objection calls for yet another distinc-
tion between types of foundatlonallst.
„e can Itaglne a type of foun-
datlonallst that is akin to phenotenallst. Where phenctenallst
asserts that propositions about sense data entail propositions about
physical objects, the associated type of foundatlonallst would assert
that a basic proposition would entail that a proposition about the
external world Is Justified. This ••simple" foundatlonallst was Ini-
tially proposed in Chlsholt's first edition Theory of Knowledge and
was shown by Herbert Heldelberger to be Inadequate, at least In that
formulation.
But this simple foundationalism may not exhaust the types of
theories that may properly be called foundational. Consider the view
that while there are indeed basic propositions, and while they must
have a role in justifying any justified empirical proposition, the
justification relation is not the relatively simple one of a basic
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proposition., entailing that a nonbaslc proposition Is Justified.
Other conditions
.ust also occur before there Is Justification. Por
example, the nonbaslc proposition must not be defeated by other
propositions.
In other words, we may contrast two different types of eplste-
.Ic principles stating the conditions ^der which basic propositions
Justify nonbaslc ones. Ptlnclples of the relatively simple type would
fit the following schema:
SEP: Necessarily, if p, then q is justified.
The more complex schema would then be:
CEP: Necessarily, If p and set of conditions C, then
q Is Justified. ’
Obviously, EP4 and EPS are principles of the latter type.
The question Is, of course, whether principles of type CEP are
properly to be called foundational! st principles.
What can be said in favor of the view that they are
foundationalist? It seems to me that the only claim that can be made
against them as foundationalist principles is that it is necessary,
given such principles, to examine the whole of the subject's epistemic
system before it can be established that a nonbasic proposition is
justified. However, I am not sure that this claim is true, nor, if it
is, that this shows that such principles are not foundationalist.
On the first point, is it really the case that one must exa-
mine the whole of S’s epistemic system in order to determine whether,
according to EPS, for example, an external world proposition is
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Jusuae.. one nee. on., essnne
.Ha.
.He.e a.e no
.easonaHU p.„,oa.-
«ons eas.
.onH. on
.He p.oposU.on
.Ha. s a looans a. a ,ob.ec
.H.s
.oes no.
.e,a.e na .o PooH a.
.He
..
Of proposl.lons *lcH Have so.e posU.ve epls.e.lc s.a.es fo. S. I.
would see.
.0 He enougH
.o Inspec.
.Hose p.oposi.lons *lcH s.a.e S's
expeaences. Hellefs. Hnowledse. and
.e.o., pe..aming to
.He pe.cep-
fual sl.ua.lon a. Hand. THe epls.e.lc s.a.us of .any proposl.lons
abou. S s experiences, e.c, would appear
.o Have no bearing on
.He
epls.eac s.a.us of .He ex.ernal world proposl.lon In gues.lon. THa.
S is sail experiencing
.He .as.e of .He s.rawberry He Jus. a.e,
.Ha.
he doesn t know which side to take on the creationist-evolutionist
deba.e,
.Ha. He
.Hlnks
.He prospec.s for .He Red Sox .his year are
very poor, would all seem .o be proposl.lons tha. do no. have a role
in de.ermlnlng whe.her
.he percep.ual proposition Is justified for
him.
On the second point, suppose one Insists that these proposi-
tions do play a role. I. is conceivable that even one's beliefs abou.
the Red Sox could In some circumstances have a role in determining
whether a perceptual proposition Is Justified. (Carl Yastrsemskl, for
whom S has a blind admiration, has been paid by a coherentlst to con-
Vince S that a white object is really green.)
But what can this do to establish that EP5 is not
foundationalist? It seems to me that even if we must in some sense
take account of the whole range of propositions having some positive
epistemic status for S, we are doing so only to establish that they do
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have an epistemlc efferf nr. t-uct on the proposition In question. (If r„ey
--3flea. and the principle
not apply., II cHe propositions do not have any eplat.lc
effect. It seems entirely appropriate to say that the proposition that
S IS presented
..th a
^ohiect-ln-space Justifies the external
„orld
proposition. The other propositions do not add to or contribute to
the justification of the external world proposition In question. It
is rather than they do not prevent the justification from golns
through. This hardly seems to he a picture of a web of propositions
each of which is eplstemlcally supported by a set of distinct
propositions. One might say that the self-presentl.^ proposition
justifies the externa world proposition because there Is a prlma
facie justification relation between the two and because. 1 „ the spe-
cific situation described, there Is nothing to stand In the way of
this prlma facie justification being an actual justification. In such
a case. It seems appropriate to say that the basic proposition justl-
fies the nonbasic proposition.
Further, If „e look at the specific tenets of foundatlonaism,
the essential tenets stated at the beginning of Chapter I as well as
the tenets of the specific varieties of foundatlonallsm noted In
Chapter III, it is not clear that an epistemlc principle of the CEP
type is incompatible with any of these tenets, at least not with those
associated with a Cartesian foundatlonallsm of the type I wish to
defend. The theory I have been discussing posits basic propositions
that are Intrinsically credible In the sense that they are, when true.
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-..n.
.o...
..
..3
..,3 .a.. UseU ae.s
to be ,_paUMe aoHePenUs. (cf. H.:).
,33,0 ,ppp3,-
ttons do not auto.atlcaU, jnstlf, ptoposdtlons about the extetnad
world. Given that external world propositions see» vulnerable to
doubts and countervailing considerations. It Is hardl, to be expected
that the relation between basics and nonbasics could be this
stralshtforward. But given a situation In which there are no such
countervailing considerations, it does seem plausible to say that the
basic proposition Justifies the nonbaslc one. And If „e can say this,
t seems an easy matter to set up the traditional foundational! st
P ture, where these basic propositions provide the ground level
support, do not themselves need additional support, and yet provide
justification for the higher level propositions.
A Cartesian theory using CEP type bridging principles also
seems compatible >rtth EF2, the view that a nonbaslc proposition must
derive at least part of Its justification from some relation It bears
to a basic proposition. This tenet does not even require that the
relation be one of 'exclusive" justification of nonbaslc by basic
propositions, nor does It appear to prevent CEP type principles from
being foundatlonallst. Thus, a theory of the type here being
discussed does not seem Incompatible with either of the essential
tenets of foundatlonallsm, and It seems capable of setting up a
recognizably foundatlonallst structure for justified propositions.
Of course, EP4 and EPS, the CEP principles I am here primarily
concerned with, are extremely limited. They cover only relatively
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simple and straightforward eplste^lc sltnatlons It ,well be that
"ore complex eplate^lc principles necessar. for a foil, developed
eory of Cartesian foundatlonalls. will corn oot to violate one or
more tenets essential to that theory. Perhaps furthy r ma er consideration
the door on the debate whether the theory that Is developing Is truly
alist. At the present time it looks as though It can
plausibly be so labelled. But there Is ™ch here that retains open
for future discussion.
Conclusion
The same can be said about the other Issues raised concerning
EP4 and EPS, as well as the Issues raised for Cartesian foun-
datlonallsm In general: some progress has. I believe, been made, but
there are. If anything, more questions for future discussion than
there were at the starr t in t. I have already mentioned some of them in
previous sections of this chan^pr•C pte . Definitions of various concepts of
justification are needed. The bridging principles discussed are
extremely narrow. They concern only vision, and only eplstemlcally
straightforward cases. Can more complex principles be formulated, and
will they be recognizably foundatlonaist? Also, principles are
needed which state conditions for Internal justification.!! It may be
well to restate here another unresolved problem area mentioned in
Chapters III and IV: Suppose we do arrive at a set of bridging prin-
ciples which seem to adequately cover all perceptual situations. We
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relations, and will this resnl ^ v,o,rhave consequences undesirable to the
Cartesian foundationalist?
Such questions, as well as others recognized and unrecognized
answer the question posed by the title of this dissertation
confusions that have led some philosophers to reject Cartesian foun-
datlonallsm prematurely. 1 believe that the Chlsholmlan bridging
principle discussed In the present chapter Is a plausible one. and I
hope to have suggested some directions In which to proceed fr™ there.
I have not offered any further development myself, so I cannot
conclude that foundatlonallsm works
. But perhaps I can say so far. so
good
.
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